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Abstract 
The Syrian crisis in terms of its crimes against humanity has surpassed most politicians’ wildest 
expectations: it seems that with every passing news cycle the west is informed of new atrocities 
commited against innocent Syrian civilians, in addition to violence perpetrated by Syrian 
Islamists themselves against westerners in ill-advised cries for help. The extent of bloodshed can 
be both horrifying and mystifying to the average American. How is it possible that the 
international community allows these crimes to proliferate and self-perpetuate in this modern 
day-in-age? Hearts sink with every image of a child in dire straights as a result of this man-made 
catastrophe, with more organizations donating to the Syrian plight than ever before; however, 
westerners to a very valid extent are starting to believe that they are throwing pennies down an 
endless abyss of despair and irrepaiable damage to the Syrian people, political system and urban 
fabric. Even relatively uninformed Americans are becoming more engaged in political proceses 
as a result of the terror and destruction witnessed in left and right-leaning media alike. We now 
find ourselves in a place where we identify with each other through an intersectional humanity: a 
deep and unrelenting search for answers and relief in an impossible crisis. What possibly could 
have caused such deep distress between Syrians, their government, Islamist organizations and 
international actors alike that caused the situation to devolve to such bloodshed? To what extent 
are superpowers really contributing to the reparation of the Syrian quandary, and perhaps more 
importantly, to what extent are superpowers responsible for this state of affairs? 
 
In a sense, it can be difficult to objectively point a finger at one’s self for another human’s pain, 
let alone an entire nationality. For this reason, this capstone will employ a strict methodology of 
historical, case study analysis to understand varying view-points in what epitomizes a mutli-
faceted conflict. Through the collection of these various threads of research, from Arab and 
American authors alike, we begin to decipher overlapping historical narratives that share a story 
of unique, complex interconnections in policy applications of the United States towards the Arab 
world as a result of dogmatic developments that determine a web of superpower diplomacy 
applied with respect to one another, as well as various political pawns throughout the developing 
world. In the case of Syria as a case study, we see that the dogmatic developments between the 
United States and the French, Soviets and Saudis not only dictated their own relations, but truly 
molded political discourse with respect to Syria and their own domestic revalations. 
 
Since the fall of the Ottoman era and the conception of Syria, the United States has formed 
Syrian international and domestic policies through its proxy relationships with France, Great 
Britain, the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia. These relations, categorized by three eras of 
American foreign policy, correspond closely with the development of the Syrian crisis in a 
narrative that depicts it as a situation over a century in the making. The various evidence, either 
in the form of testimonials, policy decisions and legislation alike, can begin to offer Americans 
some insight into the way the United States has failed the Syrian people, and more optimistically, 
point to opportunities for productive engagement. As painful as these stories may be, they are 
crucial to the development of superpower diplomacy towards Syria, as well as developing 
nations in the Arab world and developing nations alike to prevent a crisis like this from forming 
again as a result of short-sighted strategy. 
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Executive Summary 
 
One of the blaring difficulties of the Syrian civil crisis is the complex nature of its various 
interwoven proxy-relationships with respect to world powers and developing nations alike. This 
can paint a convoluted picture for non-expert and expert audiences alike, and for this reason the 
capstone includes an executive summary to define the project in terms that work towards 
clarifying the problem, variables, description, methods, argument and significance of the project. 
The problem we witness today with respect to the Syrian civil crisis is that we struggle to 
identify an objective set of variables that explain the unusual extent of complexity and suffering 
on the part of Syrians as a result of proxy superpower conflict. In this case, we will identify 
superpowers as the former Soviet Union (Russia), United States, France, Britain, Saudi Arabia, 
etc. In many cases the author will reference western nations, which will not include the Soviet 
Union for the sake of clarity, as the Soviet Union mainly stood at odds with other broadly 
defined western nations during the Cold War period, as well as the decades immediately 
preceeding and proceeding this era encapsulated by the first and third constructed historical 
narratives. In order to construct the three narratives, we will distill our analysis to include the 
comparison of one superpower with repsect to its counterparts: in this case, the United States. 
The United State’s foreign relationships with superpowers will be described with respect to three 
dogmatic periods, relating to theories of [1] Wilsonian initiative with respect to democratizing 
nations, [2] Cold War Policy, more specitifically anti-communist proliferation rising out of the 
Soviet Union, and [3] the self-described war on globalizing terror perpetrated by Islamist groups. 
The United States narratives will be described with respect to the revelations of Syrian politics, 
notably periods that correspond very closely with the three foreign policy initiatives employed 
by the United States. The description of the application of these three theories with respect to 
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Syrian domestic and international politics will help us understand how Syria came to witness a 
cycle of [1] the rise of nationalist (Wilsonian) sentiment, [2] the rise of (anti-communist) Islamic 
policy and Islamist movements within Syria, and [3] the fall of and branded Islamic regime and 
fight against Islamist movements that would tear the country apart. Readers will begin to 
understand how the connections between American dogmatic movements and its reprecussions 
on Syria do not simply cancel each other out; they work to tear down the developing country 
with every practical development they seem to accomplish.  
Understanding these entangements allows readers to understand the various misteps that 
world powers, in this case the United States with respect to its peers, took to rectify various 
western political ailments at the expense of developing nations, particularly Syria. Debate 
surrounding the causes of the Syrian crisis is relatively polarized and defined by democratic and 
republican rhetoric in the American media; however, Americans are beginning to identify with 
the idea that the destruction of Syria was not self-inflicted, but rather the working of various 
international forces at odds with one another on a proxy platform that happened to be identified 
as the underdeveloped, and therefore politically malleable Arab country. The issue of 
understanding the roots of Syrian conflict is not at its heart a democratic or republican issue: it 
finds its roots in decades’ and even centuries’ old political misteps that came to define the 
unapproachable and devolving state of United States diplomacy with respect to Syria. In order to 
understand the ways in which the United States can move forward to mediate the situation and 
begin true reparations, we must find it within our superiority complex to seize the opportunity to 
self-reflect on our destructive proxy policies and open new pathways towards peaceful 
negotiation and resolution. Innocent Syrians will not have the opportunity to look towards a 
brighter future until we take it upon ourselves to identify the misteps crushing their future. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
Background 
The inhumanity we are witnessing in the Syrian civil war is not only appalling, but 
arguably perplexing; it is easily the deadliest conflict witnessed of the 21st century thus far, 
resulting in more than 250,000 Syrian deaths and the largest humanitarian crisis in recent 
memory.  Aleppo, headlining with images of daily destruction and bombardment, has become 
symbolic of the Syrian plight. To the children born at the war’s conception, war has molded and 
reduced formative playtime to games of taking strategic shelter among the debris of decimated 
city blocks. The images leave citizens of all nationalities and creeds wondering how such 
violence-reminiscent of an arcane, barbaric warfare- came to be in a global political climate 
which promises to prosecute such brazen human rights violations. 
As the problem grows with multiplying death tolls and displacement statistics, we are 
facing growing questions regarding the proper political approaches to housing, educating, and 
putting Syrian immigrants back to work in foreign nations. Despite the severity of these political, 
economic and social ramifications of the civil war, we seem to be creeping increasingly further 
away from brokering a political deal between all sides. Between complex relations Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, United States, Turkey, Iran, The Syrian Government, Russia, ISIS, Rebel groups and the 
Kurds, we are witnessing a complex net of political conflict ranging from support, territorial 
interests, defense, avoidance of conflicts, and fighting terrorism (Peck).  With the plethora of 
political groups and actors all fighting for different goals and stakes in the region, it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to operationalize a diplomatic solution appropriately for all parties 
involved. Considering all the suffering this impasse has caused, we as major foreign actors can 
begin to question: how has the United States impacted the trajectory and ultimate political 
instability of the Syrian State? How can we correlate the rise, evolution and eventual decay of 
the Syrian State to our own policy objectives? Taking a fresh look at these episodes in the 
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historical narrative of foreign policy can begin to uncover these evolving entanglements, and 
provide glimpses into how policy can begin to repair the Syrian humanity that has been so 
violently taken away from these civilians.   
 
Argument and Theory 
Existing references cover three broad time periods of international policy with respect to 
Syria. These may be defined as [1] The rise of the state, hereafter described as the Wilsonian era, 
wherein every nation is entitled to have its own state helped which effectively facilitated the 
independent state of Syria, [2] the fight against communism and the effective transition of Syria 
to a more plural polity, and [3] the fight against terror, including the global war against terrorism 
leading to the decay and collapse of the Syrian state. 
The rise of the Wilsonian era describes the United States foreign policy claiming that every 
country is entitled to having its own state, in this case referencing the various ways the west has 
helped and facilitated the independent state of Syria. This project will explore whether the 
United States pressured France to get out of Syria, and whether the United States supported the 
Syrian independence movement through diplomatic engagement with the French.  
The fight against communism, more specifically referencing the United States’ attempt to 
prevent the transition of Syria to a more plural polity, describes the rise and containment of the 
Ba’athist regime. It also describes a Strong authoritarian stance that was not necessarily present 
in Wilsonian foreign policy with respect to Syria, which rails against the idea of a democratic 
Left leaning state. This notably also references the era in which the United States evolved its 
stance to support a nationalist, rather than Pan Arabist, state of Syria in stark contrast with the 
United Arab Republic. The era is capstoned by the 1961 coup, ending the United Arab republic 
through supplying arms and countering the allure of Syria maintaining economic relations with 
Egypt and Russia as a strategy for combating communist proliferation in the region. 
This period has also historically been described as the democratization and secularization of 
Syria, marked by the conception of the Truman Doctrine, first announced to congress by the 
president on March 12th, 1947. This milestone of US foreign policy is traditionally referred to as 
the end of Truman’s hallmark isolationist doctrine, as it pledged American support for nations 
threatened by Soviet communism (Beschloss). This period also marks the approximate time of 
Syria’s rise to the global stage of foreign policy. Though official United States-Syrian relations 
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began in 1835 when the United States first appointed the US consuls to Aleppo which was then a 
part of the Ottoman Empire, we may consider the United States recognition of an independent 
Syria on September 7, 1946 (Syrian Embassy) to be the onset of significant foreign interest for 
the purposes of this project. Shortly after the conception of these relations the United States 
would engage in what would come to be coined the “revolving door” governments of 1949-1958. 
Through a series of covert operations, the United States would effectively remove pro-Soviet or 
otherwise moderate governments and replace them with pro-US figures. This series of events 
would lead to a politically unstable Syria for a nine-year duration. After this tumultuous series of 
political turnover, the Ba’ath party rose to power and Hafez al-Assad secured his dominion over 
Syria. The Hafez al Assad presidency, hallmarked by the secularized nature of his rein, would 
remain among the most important figures in Syrian history in securing an Arab Nationalist 
identity and unifying Syria despite years of political turnover instigated by the west. 
As Cold War tensions between the United States and Soviet Union would rise between the 
years of 1957 and the early years of Bashar al-Assad’s rein, we come to observe the western 
reintroduction of theocratic aspirations in the Arab world, as Islam would become a combative 
force against Soviet communist aggression in this region. During these years, United States 
policy with respect to Syria would devolve from covert militaristic movements to a more overt 
militarism and diplomacy. On January 5, 1957, President Eisenhower would promise military or 
economic aid to any Middle Eastern country needing help in resisting communist aggression. 
Although this represents no real change in diplomacy, as Truman had pledged the same support 
to Greece and Turkey ten years prior, it would mark the status of the United States response to 
the Soviet infiltration of arms through Egypt and increasingly strong communist support among 
the Arab states against an Israeli, French and British attack on Egypt in October 1956 
(Britannica). This additional proclamation would state that, with the approval of Congress, 
President Eisenhower would use military forces to protect the independence of any Middle 
Eastern country seeking American help. While the ultimate goal of containing or resisting any 
extension of the Soviet sphere of influence would come to be regarded as a failure, president 
Eisenhower would also take non-militaristic measures to grow and Islamist revival through the 
Omega Memorandum. This document, a secret initiative drafted by Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles for President Eisenhower, aimed to reduce the influence in the Middle East of 
Nasser, who at the time seemed to be leaning towards favoring the Soviet Union. It is also seen 
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as an opportunity to promote King Saud as the dominant Arab Leader (Kyle). By taking steps to 
promote Islamism through the means of setting up massive networks of charity and good works, 
the installation of the World Muslim League, uniting various regional powers under the 
Organization of Islamic Conference, and creating an Islamic financial system that tied several 
Middle Eastern, African and Asian countries to the oil rich nations (Kumar), King Saud was to 
be seen as the “Islamic Pope” who would combat a growing subscription to Marxist values 
through an anti-secular lens. After the death of Hafez al Assad and his older brother, Bashar 
would begin to adopt Islamism as a primary characteristic of his rein, and though himself an 
Alawite, would use pro-Islamic propaganda to attempt to unite a religiously diverse country 
around the wave of newfound theocratic aspirations established by the United States. However, 
we will find that as this pseudo-Islamic identity failed to gain traction as a unifying identity 
under Bashar’s rein, the country would begin to devolve into a series of factionalist conflicts and 
demonstrations. 
In referencing the current state of affairs, coined by politicians as “the global war against 
terrorism,” characterizes Syria as a decaying and failing, though not entirely obliterated, state of 
the Syrian regime. The broadcast purpose of these transgressions has been to prevent a safe 
haven for terrorist groups in the Levant region, though in doing this the United States has tacitly 
allowed the Syrian state to survive, though perhaps more meaningfully, erode while avoiding 
complete collapse.  
 Syria’s modern civil strife can be traced back to these short-sighted United States foreign 
policy missteps with respect to the region. Today, we witness a divided Syrian public that would 
grow both increasingly anti-Bashar and anti-American, and as these competing interests grow 
increasingly destructive and violent in their demonstration, we see movements towards radical 
Islamist groups that promise to remedy this devolved state of affairs perpetrated by foreign 
interests. We may even begin to link the interest in Islamist political groups to the positive 
frameworks they have to offer Syrians and the greater Arab region in order to understand the 
foreign pathways that have caused this dissolution of Syrian domestic politics. 
Within each of these chronological eras of Syrian political discourse we can begin to 
frame research according to the following proposed theory, as a way to pinpoint the ways that we 
might begin to link foreign factors to civil war. This argument may be summed up in the arrow 
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diagram below, theorizing the mechanisms causing domestic civil unrest in the country as a 
result of foreign interventionism, leading to the “proxy state” status we see today: 
 
The observed Proxy State Status Theory: 
The United Stated global foreign policy, especially with respect to Middle Eastern relations and 
Syria  The mechanisms the United States has used to both directly and indirectly influence the 
trajectory of Syria, in both diplomatic and covert fashions  Eras of Syrian state issues that 
deeply coincide with the United States’ and other global power foreign policy initiatives 
 
It is useful to outline critical points and events described in the theory, to guide the study of 
existing scholarship on these events: 
 
Independent variable: United States global foreign policy, especially with respect to Middle 
Eastern relations and Syria 
The independent variable can be described in terms of the three eras of United States foreign 
policy aforementioned, including [1] The Rise of the State, referred to as Wilsonian foreign 
policy, in which the United States supported Syrian independent statehood, [2] The fight against 
communist proliferation, especially in susceptible Middle Eastern states like Syria, and [3] The 
fight against global terror, including the global war against terrorism in Levant and specifically 
Syria. 
 
Mechanisms, or pathways, linking the independent variable to the dependent variable 
described below: The mechanisms the United States has used to both directly and indirectly 
influence the trajectory of Syria, in both diplomatic and covert fashions 
This term includes pressuring France into recognizing an independent state of Syria, the 
revolving door governments of 1949-1955 continuously displaced by United States and Soviet 
governments, Cold War and Eisenhower doctrine with respect to Syrian relations, the Omega 
Memorandum with respect to Syria, US involvement in democratic uprisings, and 21st century 
diplomatic relations between the United States and Russia with respect to Syria. 
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Dependent Variable: Eras of Syrian state issues that deeply coincide with United States and 
other global power foreign policy initiatives 
This is including [1] Syrian claiming its independence from France, [2] The prevention of the 
transition of Syria to a more plural policy despite regional forces supporting a natural transition 
to a more leftist state, causing a teetering state and an excessive number of political transitions 
within short periods of time, and [3] the Syrian state’s erosion, though barely avoiding a collapse 
thus far. 
 
Foreign interventionism fundamentally changed the social and political structure of Syria, 
causing economic dependencies on faltering Soviet markets, a distrust of western foreign policy 
and a social identity crisis. As a result of these factors acting in tandem, we see mass 
mobilization tendencies towards Islamist political movements, providing economic relief, 
independence from a questionable western agenda, and a renewed cultural identity for Syrians.  
 
Three Historical Narratives 
It is useful to understand existing scholarship on the topic through studying these texts in 
terms of the frameworks outlined above, while chronologically following the conception foreign 
relations between the United States and Syria and focusing study on the political eras, outlined as 
[1] Wilsonian diplomacy era, [2] Fight against communist proliferation and, [3] the fight against 
global terror. Though there lacks an academic discourse unifying historical tendency towards 
understanding the ramifications of short-sighted foreign policy on civil war, we can use existing 
literature to begin to string together domestic political mobilization forces in opposition to one or 
more domestic Syrian political groups. 
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Chapter 2 
Historical Narrative I: Wilsonian Diplomacy in Syria 
 
 
 
Wilsonian diplomacy describes a period of United States foreign relations and tactical 
diplomacy, introduced by American President Wilson, which supports the theory of every 
nation’s entitlement to self-proclaimed statehood. The Wilsonian era corresponds with the 
demise and partitioning of the Ottoman Empire, with Greater Syrian territories falling under 
French command. Despite their attempts at appeasing Syrian calls for independence from the 
French, the state proved to be a bear beyond its logistical value of maintaining and controlling 
the colony as an unsubmissive entity. To understand what role Wilsonian diplomacy would take 
to combat French colonialist amibtions, we need to understand the fine line the American took 
between supporting Syria’s nationalist ambitions without outwardly meddling in the Franco-
British disputes that took place over the importance of retaining dominance over Syrian grounds. 
Although this period would typically be characterized by relative isolationism on the part of 
United States foreign policies, there is narrative evidence to show American dipomats did have, 
at the very least, a role in the theoretical dealings that took place during the French emancipation 
of Syria. 
 
French Divide and Rule 
    Our first narrative positions itself immediately proceeding World War One, where 
Syrian territories, for the first time in over 400 years, were forced to acknowledge their 
instability with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. The fall of the Ottoman Empire would 
have dire consequences for the Middle East as it were, as it had now lost any kind of protection 
against European rule. When the Allied powers advanced into Syria, they lacked any definitive 
territorial boarder, and would for some time adopt the title of “Greater Syria” as it adopted a 
number of Ottoman administrative divisions. However, closely following the Allied Powers’ 
initial occupation, the state began to settle on a final arrangement, which would come to be 
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defined by a boundary running approximately midway through Syria from east to west, dividing 
the rectangular settlement into two halves. Great Britain would be assigned the southern part, 
called Palestine, while the northern part, called Syria and Lebanon, would be assigned to France. 
Syria would further be further subdivided into five parts, [1] Tyre, Sidon, Beirut, and Tripoli, [2] 
The State of Syria, including Aleppo, Hama, Homs and Damascus, [3] The mountainous region 
of the Jabal al-Druze, with Suaida as the principal town, [5] The Sanjak of Latakia, with Latakia 
as its principal down, and [5] Sanjak of Alexandretta, in theory part of Syria, but in practice 
separate and subject to a special autonomous form of government. The ramifications of these 
divisions, drawn arbitrarily based on geographical markers rather than socially conscious design, 
would be analyzed and disputed for the next century. Ayse Tekdal Fildis, writing for the Middle 
East Policy Council, writes extensively about the ramifications of these divisions in her Journal 
Essay, “The Troubles in Syria: Spawned by French Divide and Rule,” priming us for 
understanding the various philosophical contradictions that would ensue after this series of these 
Euro-centric-colonialist, haphazard decisions.  
 These former Ottoman provinces would be split into sections referred to as mandates, 
where new mandates would be granted conditionally directly supervised by a third party, the 
League of Nations. In subsequent years, these peoples would be further subjectively and 
artificially divided, and the mandatory powers of Britain and France would delineate the desert 
borderlines and common boundaries. In the case of Syria, the French pushed even more by 
establishing semi-autonomous local governments within the greater Syrian national polity.  The 
author describes, “While the Allied Powers gathered in Paris to sort out their conflicting 
interests, Amir Faysal Ibn Husayni, field commander of the Arab revolt, was forming an 
independent Arab government in Damascus, General Sir Edmund Allenby, supreme commander 
of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, had allowed Faysal to administer Syrian affairs from 
Damascus,” (Fildis). Amir Faysal would claim an “independent Arab constitutional government 
with authority over all Syria” and instated a Damascus Syrian Congress which would enact his 
legitimate kingship over united Syria. Britain and France both were threatened by the 
proclamation of Faysal as king, France faced with the decision to either bring Faysal’s 
government under French control or break it militarily, while Britain was faced with Faysal’s 
claims to Palestine and Lebanon, in addition to demanding independence from Mesopotamia. To 
the British, Syrian nationalism could not be allowed to disorder British control over Palestine 
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and Mesopotamia, and therefore British Foreign Secretary Lord George Nathaniel Curzon and 
Secretary General of the Quai d’Orsay, Philippe Berthelot agreed on terms of a joint declaration 
condemning Faysal’s action. Fildis writes, “In October, Faysal was called to London and told to 
settle with France on the best terms he could obtain. To make sure he did so, the British 
government cut his month subsidy by half, leaving France to pay the other half. Under pressure 
from the British, Faysal arrived in Paris on October 20 for a discussion with Premier Goerge 
Clemenceau,” (Fildis).  Despite this initiative, on January 6, 1920, it was secretly agreed that 
France would recognize the partial independence of Syria and Faysal as king if Syria remained 
under French control and influence. This agreement, defined by the Paris Peace Conference, 
would be established at the San Remo Conference (Fildis). The author describes, “Syria was to 
accept the French mandate, thus relying entirely on French military and economic help; 
furthermore, France would control Syria's foreign policy. Additionally, Syria had to recognize 
the independence of Lebanon under the French mandate. Their agreement allowed Amir Faysal 
to rule an independent Syria over which France would exercise only a loose trusteeship. From 
the point of view of Clemenceau, these were generous terms: "No other French politician would 
have agreed to let Arab Syria retain a certain measure of independence or offered to let the pro-
British Faysal remain in Damascus, let alone as Syria's monarch,’” (Fildis). These terms would 
leave Syria pacified, albeit for a brief moment until a far more interventionist government of 
Alexandre Millerand replaced Clemenceau. Millerand stood in stark contrast with his 
predecessor in that he would dedicate careful consideration to French policy in the Levant and 
would be directly involved in its design. The friendly relations between Faysal and France would 
come to a screeching stand-still, and the king was forced to abandon his confidential deal. 
Faysal’s followers were mostly members of the Party of Arab Independence, Hizb al-istiqlal al-
Arabi, set up by al-Fatat and by then in control of the Syrian Congress (Fildis). At this point, 
Faysal was no longer in a position to resolve Syria’s destiny by himself, where Al-Fatat 
demanded he call back the Syrian Congress. “On March 7, 1920, the congress declared the 
unconditional independence of Syria. The following day Faysal was reluctantly declared king of 
the "United Syrian Kingdom," which was to include Palestine and Lebanon and reject a Jewish 
national home in Palestine. An official Syrian government was immediately set up in 
Damascus.The convocation of the Syrian Congress in Damascus and the coronation of Faysal 
began a new phase in the deteriorating relations between France and the king. Millerand declared 
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the congressional resolution to be "null and void" and refused to recognize Faysal as king of 
Syria,” (Fildis). This would mark a pivotal moment in the Middle Eastern history, as shortly after 
in the San Remo Conference of April 1920, the content of the mandates was jointly decided by 
France and Britain, awarding France the mandate for Lebanon and Syria, and Great Britain the 
mandate for Palestine and Iraq. France would relinquish Palestine and Mosul to the British, 
acquiring just 25 percent share of Mosul’s oil. This way, France could now contemplate war 
against Faysal without having to worry about British intervention. “For the French, the most 
important result of San Remo was to clear the way for a final settlement with Faysal. France now 
had the diplomatic, if not yet the military, means to impose terms on Faysal. The unilateral 
British decision to evacuate their army from Syria at the end of 1919 had already undermined 
Faysal's position. Once the mandates had been assigned, Britain had to accept that the French 
were free to act in their zone, as the British were in theirs. Planning for the campaign against 
Faysal could now begin. On June 29, the British government was told of the coming offensive 
and warned not to meddle,” (Fildis). It is to no surprise that the pronouncement of San Remo 
would anger Arab nationalists, who would support defiance of the Allied Powers and would 
pressure Faysal to do the same. However, others advised him to find a way to compromise with 
the French and meet their demands while still preserving the Syrian kingdom. Uncertain about 
which of these two strategies to follow, he would open negotiations with the French commander-
in-chief, which lead to an ultimatum that included five demands to be accepted or rejected as a 
whole within four days. These five demands listed as follows: 
(1) Unconditional acceptance of the French mandate (Fildis) 
(2) Acceptance of the French Syrian paper money based on the franc (Fildis) 
(3) Abolition of conscription and reduction of the army to the numbers on December 1, 1919 
(Fildis) 
(4) French military occupation of the railway and stations from Riyaq to Aleppo (Fildis) 
(5) Punishment of persons implicated in hostile acts against the French (Fildis) 
Despite Faysal’s principled and unconditional acceptance, commander-in-chief Gouraud was 
ordered not to negotiate and disregard this coming to terms. The French went ahead with their 
decision to acquire Syria, and on July 26, 1920, they seized Damascus, toppling Faysa’s 
nationalist government. Despite being sent to exile, he was reinstated in the British mandate of 
Iraq just one short year later. The author explains that this act was out of a nagging sense of 
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responsibility toward Faysal on the part of British officials who felt Faysal should be 
compensated for his wartime activities, and felt that he had learned a valuable lesson in Syria 
that would make him the ideal candidate for ruling Iraq. This lesson was understanding the limits 
of Arab nationalism and Europe’s superior strength.  
 France would continue to follow a policy of divide and rule, arbitrarily dividing 
territories along regional and ethnic lines, causing an increasingly hostile native resistance. Arab 
nationalism, developed mainly by the Sunni Muslim community, was seen by the French as a 
threat to their authority, as well as to the Christian and heterodox Muslim communities. “In 
stressing communal differences and aspirations, they claimed to be bowing to political reality 
and popular feeling. However, their perception of political reality conveniently fit the French 
desire to weaken pan-Syrian reaction and Arab nationalism and to reinforce their rule by courting 
potentially Francophile minorities. The only cordial welcome extended to the French from the 
Muslim community was from those urban notables who had been pushed aside by nationalist 
forces during the Faysal period,” (Fildis). This was, however, a predicable consequence. Robert 
de Caix, principal designer of French strategy in Syria preceding and throughout World War I, 
was famously against the formation of a united Syrian state in the area that endured subsequent 
the conception of an isolated Lebanese state. He believed it would have Muslim and Arab 
alignment that would be antagonistic to the French and would venture a risky influence on 
French North Africa. “He advocated the creation of small states, reflecting the country's regional 
and ethnic diversity. The territory of Geographical Syria was predominantly Arab, and among 
the Arabs pan-Arab nationalism held sway. General Gouraud, the first high commissioner, and 
his influential aide de Caix sought to take advantage of the local and communal particularisms in 
order to break Syria up and reshape it gradually to their liking,” (Fildis). Despite this warning, in 
1920, France carved out a series of separate political unites, designed to obstruct the progress of 
the Syrian national identity. The two separate states of Aleppo and Damascus took shape, 
including the districts of Homs and Hama. These states were ruled by a local governor supported 
by a French Advisor. France would further its efforts towards political fragmentation by stressing 
the distinctiveness of Syria’s two regionally compact minority groups, the Alawites and the 
Druze. These two groups were governmentally separate from Syria until 1942, and despite the 
variety of administration in Syria’s outlying areas, Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo enjoyed 
consistency under a single government. However, nationalist pressure and expenses forced 
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France to unite Damascus and Aleppo, and the French would continue to hold onto their policy 
of political isolationism to combat any nationalist proliferation taking place. “The Alawite and 
Jabal al-Druze territories were kept in shifting degrees of administrative isolation and political 
insulation from these centers for the better part of France's tenure in Syria. "French policy was 
clear: if the mandate authority could not break the back of the nationalist movement, the next 
best alternative was to contain it in its heartland,” (Fildis). This strategy would help define the 
extent of the nationalist movement during much of the mandate era. The French managed this by 
hindering the nationalist movement from contaminating the minority-inhabited areas and to cut 
its ties to the urban nationalist opposition to the peripheral regions. Through this strategy, the 
Syrian nationalist movement encountered great difficulties in expanding the core of its activities 
beyond its home bases of Damascus, Aleppo, Hama and Homs.  
 The mandate system in itself would prove to be little more than nineteenth-century 
imperialism sporting the façade of self-determination, which at this point in time was the 
philosophically correct channel through which to engage in foreign affairs. Fildis offers an 
interesting perspective on this repackaged form of colonialism. The author describes, “According 
to the principle of the mandate, an "advanced" state was going to tutor a less-advanced state in 
the complexities of democratic self-government until it was ready to rule itself. Imperial 
domination was formally qualified to provide for eventual full independence. It was perceived as 
a liberal concept that covered and "legitimized" outright imperial control. In contrast to a colony 
or protectorate, the mandate was officially a provisional arrangement, although its length was 
unspecified,” (Fildis). In order to achieve this, the Ottoman empire would be carved up into 
mandates, where the mandatory powers of Britain in Iraq and Palestine, and France in Syria and 
Lebanon, would merely provide “administrative advice and assistance” to the peoples soon to be 
granted self-government in theory. However, these mandates in the Middle Easter were 
established in spite of the local populations’ clear preference for independence, and in the cases 
of Syria and Lebanon, their deep-rooted objection to the assignment of the mandate to France. 
The author cites Article I of the Mandate Act for Syria and Lebanon, which states, “The 
Mandatory shall frame, within a period of three years from the coming into force of this 
mandate, an organic law for Syria and Lebanon. This organic law shall be framed in agreement 
with the native authorities and shall take into account the rights, interests and wishes of all the 
population inhabiting the said territory. The mandatory shall further enact measures to facilitate 
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the progressive development of Syria and Lebanon as independent states. Pending the coming 
into effect of the organic law, the Government of Syria and the Lebanon shall be conducted in 
accordance with the spirit of this mandate. The Mandatory shall, as far as circumstances permit, 
encourage local autonomy,” (Fildis). Despite the clear altruistic framing of this article, Millerand 
makes it clear that the reality was different from the theory. He describes, “In assuming the 
mandate in Syria, France has not attempted to create a new colony but to maintain a century-old 
situation necessary for her place in the Mediterranean; she [France] wishes to ensure her 
influence there...,” (Fildis). This reality was made possible because the obligations of the 
mandate outlined in this article meant very little in practice. The French would continue to regard 
Middle Eastern mandates as imperial positions, and did so without the observing the spirit of 
Article I. In fact, no organic law was established within the allotted three-year period from the 
initiation of the mandate on September 29, 1923, and in September 1926, the Supreme Council 
of the League of nations had, for the third time, agreed to France’s request for a further six-
month delay. After this period passed, France officially asked the council to grant a further delay 
of unspecified length, alleging the antagonism among diverse communities who wished to be 
political autonomous made fulfillment of this obligation impossible for the time being.  
 The author concludes by reinforcing the position that the arrangements imposed by the 
French under the mandate went wrong from the start. Beginning with the policy of division, it 
had become an integral competent to the original French approach to the mandate. Not only was 
France there for the sole strategic, economic and ideological purposes of colonialism, the French 
made relatively limited efforts to endorse or advance the formal liberation of Syria. In reality, 
they bargained for years over the terms of an independence treaty and ultimately had to be 
required by the British to relinquish without a treaty in 1946. France did little to train native 
representatives with secondary custodies and forced an artificial and idealistic separation 
between the diverse components of Syria, and above all, failed to give Syria appropriate training 
for responsible self-government. The many re-divisions of Syria over a quarter century would 
hinder the progress of a united organizational elite, where the product was that Syria arose after 
1945 as a unitary state with very limited practice in unity. The legacy of the French mandate 
would therefore almost guarantee Syria’s future political instability for decades to come.  
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The French Mandate in American Politics 
The United States was, at best, perplexed by France’s seemingly misguided focus on 
holding Syrian territory as it struggles to ward off more significant political issues on a domestic 
front and abroad; a newspaper article entitled, “French Mandate in Syria is not Popular, Declares 
Earle at Radcliffe Conference,” from 1926 begins to capture some of this confused, at times even 
aggravated sentiment as Americans struggle to understand why France continues to insist on 
maintaining their hold on a region that has repeatedly revolted against their colonialist paternity. 
According to the author’s reporting, Americans, whether intellectuals, students or otherwise, 
were aware of the Syrian civilian upheavals, to the extent that they were concerned enough to 
speak to these issues. They write, “France is having trouble with the administration of her 
mandatory in Syria solely because the Syrians do not want the French in their country,’ declared 
Professor Edward Mead Earle, head of the Department of History at Barnard college, in his 
address before the second meeting of the conference of the Massachusetts League of Women 
Voters’ School of Politics, on Foreign affairs held in Agassiz House yesterday,” (Crimson, 
1926). Professor Earle, he explains, was also formerly Professor of History at Columbia 
University, and at the time maintained his position as one of the youngest authoritative students 
in the United States of the Near East. By spending several months traveling in the region, he had 
become thoroughly aware of the popular situation arising in the country. He describes, “The 
results of a recent plebiscite taken after the Damascus bombardment during which the French 
army drove out the Syrian government…showed that 85 percent of the people wished an 
independent government. Their second choice was for a United States mandate and third choice 
was for the British,” (Crimson, 1926). These polls would come to reflect an unparalleled level of 
trust for the United States, despite its first choice in maintaining an independent government 
weighing in at an impressive 85 percent. Despite the near unanimity in opposition to the French 
mandate, the League held no power to change it. The only remedy for the situation would be a 
voluntary French withdrawal or its forceful expulsion of the country occupied.  
This article again begins to address an important question that arises from these issues: 
where does this steadfast interest in Syrian occupation come from, despite the Syrian civilian 
populations consistent and bloody revolts against their presence? The author explains that the 
interest is hardly tactless or commercialistic, but rather the result of a long existing and 
sentimental tradition. In short, the interest is a cultural one. The author writes, “Now that the 
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French are in Syria they can find hundreds of reasons for not leaving. The saying is often heard 
nowadays, ‘we can not scuttle’ not only by the French but by the Americans and British as well. 
The French attachment to Syria is largely a cultural one that extends back beyond Napoleon’s 
empire. French is the cultural language of Syria, the greatest universities and schools are French, 
and there is the additional religious interest which French Roman Catholics have in their many 
Syrian churches and schools which holds France in a country where she is obviously not 
wanted,” (Crimson, 1926). The apparent interest in maintaining this cultural legacy as a French 
one has been deeply important to the French since their occupation in 1919, which has sustained 
in part because of the right of conquest but more importantly due the right of treaty. The author 
explains that the French had never kept a very large army in Syria and that the majority of the 
army was composed of native Syrians. The conquest was involved in the bombardment of 
Damascus, in which the commander of the French army issued an ultimatum to the Syrian 
government which was answered and given to the French representative in Damascus, who 
delayed it until the time had expired and the army marched on the city.  
As the French have yet to withdraw their forces, the Syrians have taken it upon 
themselves to invoke the other option: driving out French forces through their own limited 
military capabilities. Earle reports that since the act, there have been six armed Syrian 
insurrections, but only one of these received any mention in American newspapers. He describes, 
“This notice was confined to a small piece in a New York paper saying that American property 
was endangered and that United States destroyers had sailed to protect it. Three successive 
French military governors have been sent to Syria, each one worse than his predecessor. 
Recently the home government realizing its mistake established a civil government,” (Crimson, 
1926). The author goes on to explain that Professor Earle believes that France is unable to take 
Syria seriously, and is less able now than any time in her modern history to handle the situation 
due to having their hands full with their own problems, finance and Riffian troubles which 
continue to be a living disturbance. In response to this blaring issue, professor Earle would close 
with two proposed remedies for this situation. “The first is that the League send a Commission of 
Investigation to Syria to find out the complete details of the Damascus bombardment. Secondly, 
that a League Commissioner be placed in every mandate to see that the spirit as well as the letter 
of mandate be observed,” (Crimson, 1926). It was made clear to the American people that the 
significance of these decisions, specifically how the situation evolves after the Locarno treaties, 
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is of growing importance to domestic prosperity in the post war climate. Professor Hodges, 
another expert in Near East foreign relations, describes, “The European stabilization crystallizing 
from the treaties of Locarno…guarantees American prosperity for a generation. These pacts 
might well be looked upon by the American people as a European insurance policy underwriting 
the prosperity of the United States: It is the best international promise that the war debts will be 
liquidated we have, almost as important as the debt settlements themselves to us, and the 
agreements reached by the seven nations of Europe at Locarno put the political relations of our 
best customers upon a friendly basis which has not existed since 1914,” (Crimson, 1926). 
Americans have clear economic interests in ending conflict among the allied powers, though 
France with its colonialist influences in Syria stood in bleak opposition to these contracts of 
peace. The pacts of Locarno would be known to constitute the close of the era of the great war, 
including its effects on demobilizing the hates and suspicions of the war itself, the peace of 
Versailles, and the unhappy post-war days mistakenly called the reconstruction period. Professor 
Hodges agrees. He writes, “’Any idea that a United Europe is a menace to America….is 
grotesquely at variance with realities. If the Old World did not get together at Locarno, we would 
soon be confronted with debt settlements of no value: the collapsing of the most valuable 
markets open to American business; and the wiping out of the hundreds of millions of dollars our 
bankers have staked in European stability,’” (Crimson, 1926). Americans clearly had every 
interest in closing out World War I with the allied powers in financial settlement, and French 
infringement on Syrian independence was a resounding threat to this balance.  
 
WWI and its Aftermath 
Wilson’s policies of self-determination have been a common thread of discourse since the 
conception of the Sykes-Picot agreement, and as the French continued to exploit their Syrian 
mandate as a colonial possession rather than a project of altruistic self-determination. In 
preparation for the 1918 peace conference, the main topic of discussion among the British was 
how to void the Sykes-Picot agreement, that “unfortunate Agreement, which has been hanging 
like a millstone round our necks,” as Curzon put it, and to which “the French seem disposed to 
adhere most tenaciously,” (Lieshout, 330). Robert Lieshout, author of “Britain and the Arab 
Middle East, World War I and its Aftermath,” writes extensively on the ramifications of the 
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Syke-Picot Agreement and the messy negotiations funneled into the pact to keep it afloat. He 
describes the opinion of Lord Robert, who claimed that “the French are in an unassailable 
position. If we cannot induce them in any way to abandon the Agreement, we cannot go back on 
our signatures,” and that this is the only way to make the French change their minds was to get 
the Americans in on the side of the British (Lieshout, 330). However, the Americans had little 
incentive to throw their support behind this unless the British had the Ottomans behind them, as 
“the Americans will only support us if they think we are going in for something in the nature of a 
native government,” (Lieshout, 330). Despite this setback, experts agreed that the United States 
was the only avenue for getting us out of this impossible situation, and that the best way to 
achieve this was “to get the Arabs behind us,” while General Macdonogh emphasized that he had 
already suggested in a paper that “the only way in which we could get out of the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement was by a combination of President Wilson and the policy of self-determination.  
During the December 5th discussion of the Eastern Committee on Syria, Curzon declared in his opening 
statement that “…if we consult our own feelings we should all of us like to get the French out of Syria 
altogether.” Although he did not fail to mention Hirtzel’s position that Britain should “back the Frnech at 
the expense of Feisal; after all, the French are a great Power, and you have to be on good terms with the 
rest of her in different parts of the world […] see her through the best of your ability, and do not be too 
much concerned about the Arabs,” Curzon clearly favored the opposite policy. He would also question 
Balfour on whether the proposed policy of backing self-determination in order to get the Americans to put 
pressure on the French would work.  
 “Is it possible that, when we sit down to the Peace Conference, President Wilson might say, and might get 
us out of a great difficulty by saying, 'Here we are inaugurating a new era of free and open diplomacy; the 
various States of Europe have bound themselves by all sorts of unscrupulous secret engagements in the 
earlier years of the war; before we enter into any anangements for the future let us sweep all those off the 
board; let the Sykes—Pico Agreement go, let the Agreement with the Italians go, and let us staff Mith a 
clean slate?' If that is impossible, may I suggest that our line of action probably should be this, to back 
Feisal and the Arabs as far as we can, up to the point of not alienating the French [... ] Ought we not to play 
the policy of self-determination for all it is worth? We ought to play self-determination for all it is wolth 
wherever we are involved in difficulties with the French, the Arabs, or anybody else, and leave the case to 
be settled by that final argument knowing in the bottom of our healts that we  are more likely to benefit 
from it than anybody else. 
 While Balfour on one hand confirmed that the broad principle of self-determination in 
the one that they should work for, but warned against the eagerness with which Curzon appeared 
to be ready to play the card for self-determination. He claimed that the British, “Ought to be 
most careful not to give either the French or the Italians the impression that we are frying to get 
out of our bargains with them made at an earlier and different stage of the war. If the Americans 
get us out well and good […] But it is all-important that we should not only not do it ourselves, 
but that we should not either appear to do it or really do it,” (Lieshout, 332). Now that the war 
had just ended, “the price in both cases, so far as we are concerned, must be paid without 
chicanery. If the Americans choose to step in and cut the knot, that is their affair, but we must 
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not put the knife into their hand.” Others also cautioned against pressuring self-determination, 
including Cecil, who echoed Hirtzel’s sentiment that however much the British might wish to get 
the French out of Syria, it would: 
“Be an awful mistake if we think we can get rid of the French out of Syria […] you Mill never get the 
French to give up the whole of Syria Mithout the most tremendous convulsion. They would rather give up 
anything in the world than give up that claim to Syria; they are mad about it, and Cambon is quite insane if 
you suggest it. I am sure you will never get them out of Syria, and we ought to make up our mind to go for 
some settlement which will give them some position in Syria, however unpleasant it may be to have them 
there.” 
Despite these warnings, the resolution on Syria adopted by the Eastern Committee just one week 
later completely disregarded Cecil. The program was of an extremist nature, wich envisaged 
British predominance in Syria, and expected the French to give up the rights under the Sykes-
Picot agreement in area A, and even the Syrian parts of the blue zone, in order that Syria would 
have access to the sea. In exchange, the British prepared to “support the French claims to a 
special position in the Lebanon and Beiruit […] and at Alexandretta, keeping in mind that it was 
essential that no foreign influence other than that of Great Britain should be predominant in areas 
A and B (Lieshout, 333).  
 During the next Eastern Committee meeting on December 18th, Lord Robert seemed to 
have set aside his principles stance against pushing self-determination at the expense of the 
French, but this time only Balfour urged that the French and Italians, who would never accept 
this. He claimed that a policy based on self-determination was “the most admirable and logical, 
and wholly consistant…It fits in with all theories, and with the fourteen points of Presdient 
Wilson, but it does not fit in with the Powers we have to deal with-the French and the Italians. 
They are not in the least out for self-determination, they are out for getting whatever they can,” 
(Lieshout, 333). When Cecil took issue and argued that the French and the Italians had 
colonialist ambitions, Balfour agreed “exactly. They are Imperialistic and quite frankly so. The 
French may not be quite so frank [as the Italians], but that is exactly what they are thinking of,” 
(Lieshout, 333). In this case Balfour would repeat the sentiments of Hirtzel, when he argued that 
the French would say, “By all your arrangements, the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1915 [sic], and 
all the rest of it, equality is what we look to do,” (Lieshout, 333). Cecil had to admit that “the 
French have a good contractual claim”, but if the French insisted on equal treatment then they 
had no other option than to make it their business that the native populations liked them and, if 
they failed, “we cannot help that”. To which Curzon gleefully added that the French were bound 
to fail, as “none of these nations in any circumstances would ever consent to be protected by the 
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French,” (Lieshout, 333). At this point Britain’s policy on the Syrian question was becoming 
quite clear to the Eastern Committee.  Cecil had of course advocated for this policy for months, 
though had proven unsuccessful until now. On one hand, the Sykes-Picot agreement was 
obsolete and had to be cancelled, but because the French refuse to contemplate this and Britain 
was bound by her signature, it should be left to the Americans to bring pressure on the French to 
give up their Syrian claims. On the other hand, the Americans would only be prepared to do so if 
Britain was seen to embrace the principle of self-determination. Moreover, taking a stand on self-
determination not only promised a smooth departure from the Sykes-Picot issue without Britain 
having to break her word, but also clearly served the British in that, if left the choice, the Syrian 
population would certainly vote for a British mandate. 
 Though brief, this first narrative only begins to detail the conversations that took place 
among foreign diplomats regarding the significance and influence of Wilsonian foreign policy on 
the development of Syria, even as it barely existed as a colonial extension of France. As the 
Sykes-Picot agreement degenerated into the international quagmire and embarrassment for which 
it came to be known-with affiliated parties pointing to one another in resentment- these 
international powers often turned to Wilsonian diplomatic policy of independent statehood as a 
pathway in line with prevailing political theory. While the United States, in this case, was 
avoiding any direct meddling in the complex affairs of other nations, its individualist dogma 
became the prevailing political discourse to touch its very conception.  
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Chapter 3 
Historical Narrative II: Fight Against Communist Proliferation in Syria 
 
 
 
The fight against communism, more specifically referencing the United States’ attempt to 
prevent the transition of Syria to a more plural polity, describes the rise and containment of the 
Ba’athist regime. It also describes a Strong authoritarian stance that was not necessarily present 
in Wilsonian foreign policy with respect to Syria, which rails against the idea of a democratic 
Left leaning state. This notably also references the era in which the United States evolved its 
stance to support a nationalist, rather than Pan Arabist, state of Syria in stark contrast with the 
United Arab Republic. The era is capstoned by the 1961 coup, ending the United Arab Republic 
through supplying arms and countering the allure of Syria maintaining economic relations with 
Egypt and Russia as a strategy for combating communist proliferation in the region. It is 
important to to consider the way that the United States formally and informally engaged with 
Syrian politics in this era, as it would have a direct effect on the turnover of Syrian leadership 
and resulting instability that comes with these revolving door governments. Although the United 
States acted in what it saw as a global necessity to prevent the rise of communist proliferation in 
developing Middle Eastern Nations, especially with respect to such malleable platforms as Syria 
and Iraq, the conclusions of these coups were largely destructive to the sovereignty of Syrian 
nationhood. This destabilization prefaces the development of Islamist groups that would prove to 
be particularly potent political forces during the third narrative of Syria’s poltical discourse. 
 
Cold War and Covert Action 
Douglas Little, author of Cold War and Covert Action: The United States and Syria, 1945-
1958, has written extensively on US-Syria relations directly proceeding World War II Truman-
era isolationism in American foreign policy. His writing is indicative of the paradoxical nature of 
President Truman’s doctrine of containment; while outwardly, the United States had every 
intention of preventing the proliferation of Soviet Communism, its belittling policy blunders 
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gave Syrians every reason to distrust American politics. He explains how Syria’s strategic 
location and chronic political instability held ominous implications for broader US interests in 
the Middle East during the late 1940s. Little explains, “Because Turkey lay to the north and 
Israel to the south an unfriendly Syria could easily undermine President Harry Truman's doctrine 
of containment or complicate his special relationship with Tel Aviv,” (Little, 52). Syria’s 
location between Turkey and Israel opens up a host off strategic issues for Truman’s containment 
policies. Little more specifically explains two scenarios in which Syria’s location could prove 
hostile to Truman’s doctrine, one of which described as, “Because it stood athwart the pipelines 
carrying Persian Gulf oil to the Mediterranean, an unpredictable Syria could suddenly halt the 
flow of petroleum upon which Western European economic recovery depended,” (Little, 52). 
Although Truman’s concern for strategic oil resource management in relationship to Turkey is 
understandable, there seemed to be larger issues at stake with Syria’s particular vulnerability to 
succumbing to the proliferating Marxist political doctrine of the Soviet Union. Little describes, 
“In addition, because it hosted a surprising array of left-wing political organizations, including 
the Arab world's most active communist party, an unstable Syria seemed especially vulnerable to 
Soviet influence,” (Little, 52). It was becoming increasingly clear to the Truman administration 
that the faltering state of Syria was quickly becoming a threat to regional peace and stability, and 
as a result, the CIA secretly encouraged the right-wing military coup in March 1949. Little 
describes the the repercussions of this first critical military movement in Syria since the 
conception of United States-Syrian relations. He states, “In the short run, this seemed the perfect 
way to create a stable pro-Western regime without resorting to armed intervention that might 
draw the United States directly into the Arab-Israeli conflict, or, even worse, into a superpower 
showdown with the Soviets. Repeated CIA covert action during the following decade, however, 
merely stimulated Arab anti-Americanism, drove the Syrian left closer to the Kremlin, and, 
ironically, made overt military involvement more, not less, likely,” (Little, 51). Though the use 
of covert action was intended to install pro-American sentiment among Syrian leadership, and 
effectively, its population, the perpetration of covert military action did little to contain Soviet 
proliferation, and as Little argues, drove Syria closer to pro-Soviet sentiment.  
He goes on to argue that on the surface, the US infiltration in Syrian politics was broadly sold 
as a fight against a communist take-over, while in the back of their minds, politicians were 
largely distrustful in Syria’s desire to follow through on various western policy initiatives. It has 
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now become clear that the growing animosity between Syria and the United States intived 
speculation at the State Department in the late 1940s that Syrians might gravitate towards Soviet 
sympathies. Little argues, however, “The real danger, however, was not a Bolshevik-style 
takeover by Communist Party leader Khalid Bakdash and his 2,000 followers, but rather a Syro-
Soviet marriage of convenience based on Quwatly's need for arms and Stalin's desire to fish in 
troubled waters,” (Little, 54). The Russian-Syrian relationship the State Department witnessed 
blossoming before their eyes was more than a repercussion of Soviet imperialist ambitions; it 
becomes an opportunity for both Syrians and Russians to gain what they needed most from their 
symbiotic relationship. Unfortunately for the United States, while Russia and Syria grew fonder 
of one another in their foreign relations, American relations with Syria deteriorated still further 
during the fall. Little explains, “Washington's frustration mounted when Quwatly refused to 
accept UN media- tor Count Folke Bernadotte's truce proposal. CIA speculation that 
‘nationalistic elements in Syria’ were readying a fresh campaign to wrest Alexandretta from 
Turkey deepened State Department gloom as did a less than positive report on the status of 
TAPLINE. ARAMCO's quest for a right-of-way across Syria remained stalled in parliament, and 
James Keeley, the US ambassador, doubted whether even "baksheesh in the right place could 
carry the day,” (Little, 55). The purpose of encouraging the military coup of of 1949 is becoming 
increasingly convoluted with the pipeline on the line, and the United States feels the opportunity 
to change Syria’s course is running short. 
When President Truman and Miles Copeland made the joint decision to act in Syria, they 
scrapped an open-diplomacy option for a number of covert operations, inducing military coups 
against “soviet sympathizing” regimes and replacing them with leaders that would operate in-
sync with western interests. The severe instability induced by such frequent transitions would be 
remembered by Syrians as a period of revolving door governments. Between the years of 1949-
1955, Syria would experience fluctuations in leadership outlined by Little below: 
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Political Changes in Syria, 1949-1955 
March 30, 1949 Army Chief of Staff Husni Zaim overthrows President Shukri Quqatly 
August 14, 1949 Zaim is overthrown and executed by officers group headed by Colonel 
Sami Hinnawi 
December 19, 1949 Colonel Adib Shishakli ousts Hinnawi and heads seven civilian 
cabinets in the next 23 months 
November 29, 1951 Shishakli dissolves parliament and establishes a military dictatorship 
February 25, 1954 Colonel Adnan Malki overthrows Shishakli 
April 22, 1955 Pro-Shishakli members of the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party 
assassinate Malki 
August 18, 1955 Quwatly is elected president 
 
Little describes Miles Copeland, a former CIA Middle East specialist, when he first disclosed 20 
years ago that he and Meade had engineered the March 1949 coup in which Chief of Staff Husni 
Zaim overthrew Quwatly and Azm. The author explains that while most observers dismissed his 
claims as tall tales, recently declassified records confirm that beginning on November 30, 1948, 
Meade met secretly with Colonel Zaim at least six times to discuss the “possibility [of an] army 
supported dictatorship” (Little). Little quotes, “'US officials apparently realized from the start 
that Zaim was a " 'Banana Republic' dictator type’ who ‘did not have the competence of a French 
corporal,’ but they were also well aware of his ‘strong anti-Soviet attitude,’ his willingness 
to//talk peace with Israel, and his desire for American military assistance,” (Little, 55-56). While 
Zaim may not have been the ideal pick in the eyes of the United States, his anti-Soviet sentiment 
was enough to overcome these weaknesses. To the surprise of the State Department, Ziam’s 
performance over the next three months would far exceed their expectations. Among his 
accomplishments were resuming peace talks with Israel and that Syria would consider resettling 
as many as 250,000 Palestinian refugees in the Jazirah Valley along the Iraqi frontier (Little). He 
would also approve the long-delayed TAPLINE concession, removing the final obstacle to 
ARAM- CO's plan to pipe Saudi oil to the Mediterranean (Little). Shortly after, he would have 
broadened his anti-Soviet campaign by banning the Communist Party and jailing dozens of left-
wing dissidents (Little). Finally, Ziam would withdraw all Syrian claims against Turkey over 
Alexandretta and then by signing the long-awaited Syro-Israeli armistice. Little lists these 
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accomplishments and further contextualizes these progressive movements by explaining, 
“Having done so much so quickly to improve relations between Syria and the United States, 
Zaim not unreasonably anticipated equally swift American approval for the $100 million military 
and economic aid package he requested in late July,” (Little, 57-58). Little explains, however, 
before the generous proposal could grow beyond its preliminary exploratory stages, the virtuoso 
ruler would be overthrown and execute by Colonel Sami Hinnawi and other officers unhappy 
with his increasingly personalistic rule and his friendly policies towards Israel (Little). Little 
further explains how the Truman was caught off guard and fearful that Hinnawi might undo 
Zaim’s pro-American policies, and agreed to recognize the new regime only after receiving 
assurances that “free elections” would be held later that fall. Despite this initiative, Little 
describes, “… the frictions that had bedeviled Syro-American relations prior to Zaim's takeover 
reappeared. As early as 5 October, Hinnawi warned that continued Israeli violations of the 
armistice would necessitate Syrian retaliation unless the United States could persuade Israel to 
live up to its obligations,” (Little, 58). Just a week after the news surfaced, Truman also received 
debilitating news regarding the status of the pipeline. Little writes, “A week later ARAMCO 
officials asked for US help in overcoming a "succession of minor delays which threatened a new 
crisis in Tapline-Syrian relations.’” (Little, 58). As the November 15 elections drew closer, the 
US military intelligence reported that, "’Commies [were] attempting [to] assure increased 
influence in [the] new parliament by offering to support numerous non-Commie candidates 
throughout country.’ The balloting produced not a swing to the left, but rather a victory for 
Hinnawi's Populist Party, which announced plans in December for a Syrian union with Iraq's 
Hashemite dynasty,” (Little, 58). With the prospects of a free Syria now breached, civilians 
would begin to take matters into their own hands. “Appalled by the prospect of domination from 
Baghdad, on December 19, 1949, Colonel Adib Shishakli ousted Hinnawi in Syria's third coup in 
nine months and scuttled plans for the Syro-Iraqi federation. Shishakli's power play, however, 
did little to curb the political chaos, largely because he aimed merely to preserve Syrian 
independence, not to establish a strong central government, military or otherwise,” (Little, 58). 
As a result of his failed leadership, this coup commenced what would become seven revolving-
door civilian cabinets in 23 months. Now, with Syria again tending towards leftward policies in 
mid-1951, the United States again would initiate a military fix, and this time with a veteran of 
Syrian affairs.  Little explains, “Shishakli had approached US officials as early as March 1950 
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seeking "military aid for army modernization the better 'to maintain order in Syria,' but American 
commitment to the Tripartite Declaration limiting Middle East arms sales as well as American 
interest in such regional defense plans as Britain's proposed Middle East Command (MEC) 
sidetracked his request. Nevertheless, US officials realized that Shishakli and like-minded 
officers had "by default emerged as . . . one of the strongest anti-Communist forces in the 
country." As a result, Washington hinted in early 1951 that Syria might soon receive US 
weapons under the recently created Mutual Security Program,” (Little, 59). This marking the end 
of Truman’s leadership in 1953, Truman had intended to leave Syria relatively unscathed and 
uncommitted; however, he had set a precedent of interventionist foreign policy that would 
inevitably carry over to his predecessor, President Eisenhower.  
Eisenhower and Dulles clearly inherited a pattern of interventionist Syria that was making 
very little leeway in establishing a stable, pro-American ally in the Middle East; and yet, they 
continued on his predecessor’s course of covert apprehension of pro-Soviet leaders. Although it 
remains unclear to what extent the Shishakli coup was triggered by an American intervention, 
the United States certainly welcomed the coup. Little describes, “Charge d'affaires Harlan Clark 
cabled Washington on 30 November that "if US is to profit from new sit[uatio]n, it will be more 
than ever necessary for us to be able to show Shishakli how and when we can help him,’” (Little, 
60). The statement was followed by a deal to deliver selected military material on a cash-
reimbursable basis, contingent upon Syrian agreement to the provisions of the Tripartite 
Declaration. Shortly thereafter Shishakli was encouraged to come to the West to discuss 
proposals for additional aid. (Little). Though Shishakli continued to impress the State 
Department through his short tenure, Little explains that his popularity had started to recede 
since December 1953 when antigovernment and anti-American riots had rocked Aleppo and 
Damascus. Though US officials hoped he would weather the storm, he faced insurmountable 
discontent between both inside the army and among political rivals. Little explains that the 
Communist Party, half of what it was prior to being driven underground by Shishakli, saw the 
coup as the first step toward a national front with the Ba'athists and others opposed to Western 
influence. He describes, “Washington reluctantly recognized the new regime on 8 March after 
receiving assurances that it would hold elections as soon as possible. With the approach of 
summer, however, American diplomats were deeply troubled by mounting evidence of 
"considerable Communist infiltration in the ASRP [Ba'ath party]" and other telltale signs that 
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"Soviet influence is growing," (Little, 62). There were other signs of Russia’s position in Middle 
Eastern affairs growing, notably after Stalin’s death in March 1953. Nikita Khrushchev made 
himself busy courting the anti-Western nationalism growing in Cairo and Damascus. The 
Eisenhower administration, growing increasingly weary of Soviet influence in the region, quietly 
encouraged “’responsible political elements’ to ‘remain united and pursue constructive 
policies,’” (Little, 62). Among the most innovative attempts to foil Communist rise in Syria took 
place at the Damascus International Fair. Little Describes, “…where the CIA, ARAMCO, and 
the US Information Agency (USIA) financed an American pavilion whose chief exhibit was to 
be an outdoor film event called Cinerama. As expected, thousands more Damascenes flocked to 
watch This is America on the wide screen than visited the dreary pavilions of the Soviet bloc,” 
(Little, 62). However, the showmanship came to no avail when on September 24th, the Ba’ath 
party was again favored in Parliamentary elections and Khalid Bakdash became the first freely 
elected Communist Party deputy in the Arab World (Little). By this time it was becoming 
increasingly clear to US that Syria was slipping through their fingers, as anti-Western and anti-
American rhetoric became increasingly bitter, especially among the Communist-controlled 
segments of the Syrian Press. Little describes the increasingly negative situation, stating, 
“Although American officials did what they could to get "Syrian conservatives [to] organize to 
combat left-wingers," by the end of the year Secretary Dulles would complain that "from the way 
Syria acts at the UN she is a Soviet satellite." CIA director Allen Dulles, John Foster's brother, 
agreed that "the situation in that country is the worst of all the countries in that area,'” (Little, 62-
63). Taking immediate action, the United States approved Britain and Iraq’s announcement in 
1955 for the Baghdad Pact, and urged Syria, among other Arab states, to join. While moderate 
politicians were generally leaning towards an agreement, the “Progressive Front,” an 
organization led by Ba’athist Salah al-Din Bitar and backed by Colonel Adnan Malki was 
opposed to Syrian participation. Instead, when Iraq and Turkey concluded a bilateral accord on 
February 25th, Syria would join with Egypt in calling for Arab nonalighment.  The Eisenhower 
administration understandably grew increasingly uneasy about Syria’s dismissal of the accord, 
and more importantly, their anti-western alignment with Egypt. Little describes, “On 7 April, 
Eisenhower's Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), an interagency group that monitored covert 
actions, protested that "the increasing influence of leftists and a few communists" inside the 
Syrian army was impeding American plans for Middle East Defense. Should Malki or other left-
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wing officers actually seize power and conclude a formal alliance with Nasir's Egypt, Secretary 
Dulles remarked gravely a week later, Syria's "anti-Western policies" could easily // trigger 
"Iraqi military intervention" or, even worse, "Israeli military action against one or several Arab 
states," (Little, 63-64). The ramifications were seemingly percolating out of control in front of 
their eyes until April 22, 1955 when Malki was assassinated by an assailant aligned with the 
Syrian Social Nationalist Party, a right-wing group that had supported Shishakli and even alleged 
to have connections to the United States Central Intelligence Agency (Little). While Malki was 
removed, the SSNP relationship with the CIA sparked intrigue among Syrians and anti-
Americanism flooded social-political thought in unprecedented levels. Ambassador James 
Moose warned of Syria’s impending fall to Ba’athist control unless pro-Western civilians and 
military leaders were mobilized. Eveland and Moose would agree that an introduction of “pro-
West” army officers would be a reasonable course of action to counter leftist rise, but after 
reviewing the situation the OCB concluded that the army had already been infiltrated by the 
Syrian Communist Party, now growing at an alarming rate. With this in mind, the OCB argued 
that rather than strengthening internal Syrian security forces, “Washington should focus on other 
unspecified "courses of action . . . designed to affect the situation in Syria,"' (Little, 64). To 
whatever extent we can praise Eisenhower’s diplomatic initiative until July, we may still reach 
the conclusion that an “unspecified” course of action is a codified term for a militaristic 
intervention, during a time when the Syrian populous had quickly transformed from somewhat 
pro-Western (or otherwise indifferent to our foreign affairs in the region) to strongly pro-
Ba’athist, a secularist Pan-Arab identity for Syrians. At this point the history of Syrian political 
discourse had devolved from a somewhat diplomatic approach to proxy Russo-American affairs 
to a hot proxy war of politics trickling down to the very identity-politics of the Syrian people. At 
its face, the future of Syrian leadership was at stake; perhaps more importantly, the Syrian people 
themselves were about to reach a crossroads being unknowingly manipulated by a foreign crisis. 
In the next portion of his thesis, the author extensively discusses Operation Straggle, a 
capstone to this series of covert American intervention in Syria, attempting to isolate Nasir and 
remove him from power by pitting him and his Syrian supporters against regional Islamist rivals. 
We can objectively begin to dissect the policy failures to follow as a result of a proxy war 
between the United States and Soviets on the theoretical grounds of Islamism versus Marxism.  
While the Kremlin would be busy dealing with an increasingly fruitful arms trade with Egypt 
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and Syria, the Eisenhower administration would try to counter the inroads Soviets were making 
among Arabs with an economic offensive of their own. Little describes the offer to help finance 
Egypt’s Aswan Dam as the center of that plan, but Washington was also willing to subsidize 
construction of a Syrian oil refinery at Homs. When this plan was met with little to no diplomatic 
progress, Eisenhower concluded that, “’…we will have to serve some notice on certain Middle 
Eastern countries." On 28 March, he approved a State Department plan, code-named Project 
Omega, which called for scuttling the Aswan Dam, shoring up Nasir's conservative Arab rivals, 
and overthrowing the increasingly pro-Nasir regime in Syria,” (Little, 65). This operation 
overthrow would differ from the previous missions of Zaim and Shishakli in that, for the first 
time, the United States had agreed to cooperate with Great Britain. Ambassador Moose claimed 
that the United States had exhausted orthodox diplomatic procedures to revive the failing 
relationship between the United States and Syria, and suggested additional approaches such as an 
“anti-Communist coup” contrived by the SSNP (Little). Various other plans were discussed 
among British and United States, with Secretary Dulles notably claiming that Syria was behaving 
much like, “’a Soviet satellite’” and additionally, “’if it should be decided to move against 
Nasser, it might be wise to consider Syria as well,’” (Little, 66). Little explains, “By mid-March, 
Eden and Lloyd had developed a covert strategy for the Middle East that sought, among other 
things, “’to establish in Syria a Government more friendly to the West.’ British Ambassador 
Roger Makins advised Secretary Dulles on 23 March that Whitehall was still "interested in the 
Syria situation." A week later, Allen Dulles and CIA Middle East chief Kermit Roosevelt flew to 
London, where they worked out the details for the Syrian coup with their counterparts in 
Britain's Secret Intelligence (SIS),” (Little, 66). While many key documents of Operation 
Straggle remain classified, we know little regarding the evolution of the document, though some 
sources suggest Turkey was originally responsible for staging border incidents, British operatives 
for stirring up the desert tribes, and American agents to mobilize SSNP guerrillas, all of which 
would have triggered a pro-Western coup by Syrian anticommunist elements (Little). These 
initial plans were disrupted by Nasir’s seizure of the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956, but Dulles 
remarked that contracting dissatisfied elements indigenous to Syria would remain the course of 
action. Little quotes, "’The United States has increased its efforts to counter- act leftist influence 
in Syria,’ Foster Dulles remarked elliptically on 21 September, ‘and will continue to do so 
’through contacts with ‘conservative elements in Syria, dissatisfied with the present situation, 
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[who] are considering steps which might be taken to bring about an improvement," (Little, 67). 
Although few details remain released regarding Operation Straggle’s development since Little’s 
work was published, the premise of contracting Syrian opposition groups dissatisfied with the 
leftist government remains divisive; a secret proxy war has been waged at the expense of 
domestic Syrian economic, political and social stability. While the outcomes and effectiveness of 
Operation Straggle are debatable in terms of their ability to achieve the foreign policy initiatives 
the United States desperately attempted to achieve, its repercussions on Syrian civil stability 
deserve both close study and measurement. 
 
Eisenhower Doctrine in Syria 
Though often overlooked, the Eisenhower Doctrine was a significant stepping stone in 
incorporating the Middle East into the United States scope of influence; though Syria did not 
display a concrete tendency toward succumbing to Soviet expansionism, Eisenhower sought to 
protect the west’s relationship with conservative Arab regimes. Salim Yaqub, prominent scholar 
of the Eisenhower Doctrine specializing in the United States foreign relations with respect to the 
Middle East at UCSB Department of History and author of publication, “Containing Arab 
Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East,” writes extensively about the 
various ways Eisenhower attempted to curb the proliferation of communism in the Middle East 
in less-than-transparent ways. On January 5, 1957, the president would address Congress, 
speaking of a grave crisis in the region which may soon succumb to the Soviet Union, and his 
stance that America must do all that it could to assist these nations retain their freedom. He 
describes, “Eisenhower asked Congress to pass a resolution authorizing him to pledge increased 
economic and military aid and even direct US protection to any Middle Eastern nation willing to 
acknowledge the threat posed by international communism. Two months later Congress passed 
the requested resolution in slightly modified form,” (Yaqub). He describes, however, that at this 
point the policy embodied in the legislation was coined the Eisenhower doctrine, marking 
America’s emergence as the dominant Western power in the Middle East, and this role would 
continue to be imposed by the United States even after the policy would become obsolete 
(Yaqub). 
While there is no clear catalyst for this new policy outlined by Eisenhower’s 
35 
 
announcement, Yaqub argues that this resolution immediately proceeds the Suez war of late 
1956, in which, “Britain, France, and Israel had spectacularly failed to reverse Egypt’s 
nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. Because of the fiasco, Britain was widely regarded 
as having forfeited its status as the preeminent Western power of the Middle East,” (Yaqub). 
Thus, both the president and his secretary state, John Foster Dulles, argued that Britain’s failure 
resulted in a vacuum in the region that the Soviets would capitalize on unless the United States 
intervened (Yaqub). The author describes, “One way the Soviets could conceivably fill the 
vacuum, though US officials agreed this was improbable, was by direct military intervention in a 
neighboring country like Turkey or Iran. A far more likely scenario was that the Soviets would 
increase economic and military aid and develop closer political ties to Arab states. Already 
Egypt and Syria had concluded military and economic agreements with the Soviet bloc. With 
Britain’s Arab allies now facing overwhelming political pressure to shun their discredited patron, 
there was a danger that other Arab countries would soon follow Egypt’s and Syria’s example,” 
(Yaqub). Therefore, it would seem that the official purpose of the Eisenhower Doctrine would be 
designed to defend the Middle East from Soviet infringement, largely within the realm of 
deepening economic relations between the two countries as a result of Syria’s need for military 
aid and weaponry. Therefore, this would act as no more than a more precise application of the 
general containment doctrine which the United States had waged the Cold War for a decade. 
However, Yaqub argues that it would also seek to contain the radical Arab nationalism of the 
Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser and would discredit his policy of positive neutrality in 
the Cold War, which held that Arab nations were entitled to enjoy profitable relations with both 
Cold War blocs (Yaqub). In fact, Eisenhower and Dulles would formally denounce both the 
“positive” and the “neutrality” aspects of the plan; they argued that Nasser was rather becoming 
increasingly hostile to the West and even a tool to Soviet expansionism. He illustrates, “’In July 
1958 Eisenhower privately remarked that Nasser “is a puppet of the Soviets, even though he 
probably doesn’t think so.’ Rather than cooperate with Egypt, as it had done until recently, the 
United States would now try to strengthen conservative Arab regimes- like those of Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia, Lebanon, and Libya- and reinforce their pro-Western tendencies,” (Yaqub). The 
Eisenhower Doctrine was thus an attempt through economic and military aid to encourage the 
governments to side openly with the West in the Cold War, therefore swinging away from the 
Leftist Nasser regime and his regional allies, including the Syrian government and the Nasserist 
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opposition parties in other Arab countries. While Eisenhower would continue to push this 
strategy until 1958, the administration would then reluctantly conclude that Nasserism was too 
politically powerful to be successfully opposed and that the United States would instead seek an 
accommodation with that movement (Yaqub). Yaqub further describes the events that transpired 
between 1957 and 1958 as the competing struggle between the United States and the Nasserist 
movement over the acceptable limits to mainstream Arab politics versus what would be 
identified as extremism. “For the United States the cardinal issue was international communism. 
If a critical mass of Arab states could be induced to declare their opposition to international 
communism- to ‘stand up and be counted,’ as the phrase went at the time- then those Arab 
government advocated positive neutrality in the Cold War could be marginalized,” (Yaqub). This 
western idea of extremism stands in stark contrast with the Nasserist movement’s identification 
of extremism, which identifies more strongly with an anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist policy. 
“The Nasserist movement stressed “Western imperialism” and Zionism, insisting that those Arab 
governments with close ties to Britain or France (or, increasingly, the United States itself) where 
themselves outside the mainstream of Arab politics, discredited by their association with the 
great power’s “imperialist” policies and support for Israel,” (Yaqub). The Nasser ideology would 
prove to draw much stronger regional alliances; however, this made little difference in terms of 
achieving the end goal of preventing communist proliferation in the Arab states. 
Though the Eisenhower doctrine did succeed at warding off whatever threat it perceived 
the Middle East may be subject to by Soviet expansionism, the means through which he 
attempted to accomplish this was largely a strategic failure. In order to evaluate the overall 
success of the Eisenhower Doctrine, Yaqub argues it is best practice to distinguish between the 
policy’s ultimate objective and the strategy employed to achieve that objective. Yaqub explains, 
“the ultimate objective was to prevent a Soviet takeover of the Middle East, and since such a 
takeover never occurred, it has to be said that the objective was achieved. But the strategy behind 
the policy-discrediting Arab figures deemed “soft on communism” by promoting other Arab 
figures who were conspicuously anticommunist-failed miserably,” (Yaqub). He further explains 
that because the strategy was so poorly chosen that its failure did not compromise the ultimate 
objective. Yaqub cites two main reasons for the failure of the anti-Nasserist strategy. The first of 
which is Eisenhower and Dulles’ extreme overestimation of America’s political strength in the 
Arab world while underestimating that of Nasserism.  Yaqub writes, “…The United States had 
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no intention of repudiating its alliance with Britain and France or its support for Israel’s 
existence and security- stubborn realities that prevent the United States from gaining the 
wholehearted support of the Arab public opinion. Nasser’s own regional popularity, by contrast, 
soared in the aftermath of Suez,” (Yaqub). It is because of this that any Arab figure seeking to 
align himself with US Cold War Policies, or to oppose Nasserist policies at US instigation, could 
be considered an enemy of Arabism by Nasserist propagandists. The second strategic failure 
cited by Yaqub is that the conservative Arab leaders were unable or unwilling to play their 
assigned roles. These leaders were either too fearful of domestic or regional opinion to take a 
strong stand in favor of the United States or against Nasserism. “Even when they were prepared 
to take such a stand, they were too suspicious of one another to do so as a bloc. The most 
celebrated case in point was the long-standing feud between Saudi Arabia and the Hashemite 
Iraq, but there were other rivalries-between Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, between the Iraqi and 
Jordanian branches of the Hashemite dynasty, and within the Saudi and Iraqi governments-that 
also obstructed conservative unity,” (Yaqub). On a related note, many conservative leaders, 
among them notably, King Hussein of Jordan and King Saud of Saudi Arabia, claimed 
supporting the Eisenhower Doctrine would come at too great a political cost. However, each of 
them convinced the Eisenhower administration that his general orientation was sufficiently pro-
Western to warrant major US political support for him (Yaqub). In sum, the political weakness 
of the United States, the strength of Nasserism, and the independent proclivities of the 
conservative Arab regimes meant that the Eisenhower administration was unable to achieve 
Nasser’s regional isolation. Although superficially the doctrine seemed to succeed during its 
early months shortly proceeding implementation, issues arose during the summer of 1957, and 
just a year later the strategy had fallen apart. Yaqub explains, “Egypt had merged with Syria to 
form the United Arab Republic (UAR), vastly increasing Nasser’s power and terrifying the 
conservative Arab regimes….the Iraqi regime had been overthrown by army officers who 
appeared to be Nasserist in orientation…throughout the Arab world, the forces of radical 
nationalism seemed to be running rampant. Eisenhower and his advisers could do little more than 
gape in disbelief at the magnitude of the apparent disaster,” (Yaqub). This transgression was not 
only a deep embarrassment for the United States themselves, but so ill advised that Nasser would 
come to brand the Eisenhower doctrine as an ultimate example of the amateur blunders that had 
come to characterize United States foreign policy with respect to the United States. 
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The failure of the Eisenhower doctrine may have been seen as a major learning-curve for 
Western government in previously unchartered political territory. However, its naivete and 
missteps against the teetering regime of Syria added ammunition to Islamist and anti-American 
sentiment, making future relations increasingly precarious. Yaqub explains, “Scholars have 
recently questioned the extent to which American policymakers in the 1950s were bound by 
Cold War thinking their dealings with the Third World. In those regions, the argument goes, US 
policymakers were equally preoccupied with racial and cultural issues and with “North-South” 
concerns such as population growth, famine, drought, and modernization. For this reason, the 
thesis of this paper begins to encapsulate not only US-Syrian relations with respect to politics 
and policy, but also socio-cultural issues not previously confronted for which it needed to 
confront an unchartered dogmatic stance on not only Syria, but also concepts of Arabism and 
Arabism on the fringes of normal political doctrinal concerns during the 1950s and prior. Yaqub 
argues that this new frame not only existed in Syria, but the Third World at large. He writes, “In 
the Middle East, however, preoccupation with the Cold War was pervasive, crowding out or co-
opting most other concerns. To be sure, Eisenhower and his top advisers occasionally fretted 
over the threat of resurgent Islam or responded favorably to the optimistic projections of 
modernization theorists. But not only were such remarks vastly outnumbered by direct references 
to the communist challenge; they were themselves usually couched, implicitly or explicitly, in 
Cold War terms,” (Yaqub). Not only was this theoretical with respect to Islam and Arabism 
telling, but actions themselves as well: only after Nasser began publicly feuding with the Soviets 
in 1959 did US relations with the UAR markedly improve (Yaqub). Although each side 
identified with competing forces, Yaqub argues that each of these sides were propelled by two 
competing sets of values. The first of which he identifies as the “vanquishing of evil: honor, 
sacrifice, solidarity, steadfastness, simplicity, and moral absolutism.” The second of which he 
identifies as “deal making: patience, pragmatism, empathy, compromise, subtlety, and moral 
relativism.” While the politics behind each of these values is presented in competing form, each 
party could also find in its history positive precedents for either approach. “Americans could 
invoke the wars they had fought against tyranny and aggression, but also the cautioning spirit of 
George Washington’s Farewell Address and the historical commitment of the United States to 
the freedom of the seas and to the arbitration of foreign conflicts. Nasserists could look back on 
the impressive military performance of the Prophet Muhammad’s early successors and of the 
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Salah al-Din, but also on the commercial heritage of the region and on the long experience of 
Arab leaders in manipulating and maneuvering among the great powers,” (Yaqub). During the 
Cold War era these movements applied their shared values inversely, each of them urging a 
compromise where the other demanded commitment. On one hand, the United States wished that 
the region be conciliatory toward Zionism and European imperialism but partisan in the Cold 
War. On the other hand, the Nasserists stood steadfast in their defense of the right to make deals 
with the communist bloc even as they demanded United States support for the Arab positions 
against Zionism and imperialism.  Yaqub further explains, “Dulles explicitly rejected the 
proposition that America’s friends could engage in rational bargaining with both Cold War blocs, 
warning an Egyptian diplomat in 1957 that ‘if a country came and indicated that it was in a good 
bargaining position and if we did not give them what they wanted, they could get it from the 
Soviet Union, we were not interested in that sort of relationship,’” (Yaqub).  On the other hand, 
the Nasserist movement would defend positive neutrality with pragmatic arguments. By 
maintaining positive relations with both Cold blocs, Arab countries would be able to develop 
their economic and military strength more fully than they could through exclusive relations with 
either bloc. Yaqub explains, “A policy of nonalignment was also ‘the best way to serve the cause 
of peace and bring an end to the Cold War,” as Nasser put in a 1957 interview. At the same time, 
Nasserists criticized the United States for urging Arabs to compromise in their struggles against 
European imperialism and Zionism. How could one split the difference between independence 
and foreign domination? How could one allow an interloper even part of the land he had seized?” 
(Yaqub). In concealed conversations, the majority of Arab leaders acknowledged the 
impracticality of dismantling Israel, but held their extremely defiant views in public discourse in 
an attempt to secure moral high ground.  The duality of these views- those communicated in 
public versus private expression- were, as Yaqub writes, a recurrent theme in United States-Arab 
relations during this period. While behind closed doors, Arab leaders often expressed sympathy 
for each other’s positions, they simultaneously insisted that they could not communicate these 
sympathies to their constituencies. Yaqub cites several examples of this political difficulty in his 
work. One of the most important to understanding Syria’s situation in this context is Nasser’s 
admission of concern over the accelerating proliferation of communist views in Egypt. He 
describes, “Speaking to a U.S. diplomat in January 1957, Nasser admitted that he was concerned 
about the "growing strength [of the] Communist movement in Egypt…. [But w]hat would 
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happen if he stood up and said [the] Soviets were [the] greatest threat when the Egyptian people 
saw them as helpful and sympathetic[?] People can be led but only up to a point,’” (Yaqub). The 
understanding of Nasser’s duality was critical in working with Egypt, and Dulles himself even 
acknowledged the multifaceted nature of their outwardly hardline stance against a communist 
Middle East. “Urged by an Arab League official "to support the Arab position in the debate on 
Algeria in the [United Nations] General Assembly," Dulles demurred, remarking "that the public 
position we might find it necessary to take would probably not reflect exactly our private 
position…. We could do more effective work privately and quietly rather than having the issue 
become even more involved and complex through public debate."[46] There was a time and 
place for moral clarity, and a time and place for creative ambiguity,” (Yaqub). In this regard, the 
United States and the Nasserist movement were often able to find common ground in private 
negotiations, but felt obliged to put on their stark adversarial facades in public. Yaqub elaborates, 
“This dualism was primarily expressed in attitudes toward third parties, be they Soviet, Israeli, 
British, or French. There was, however, an additional tension that Americans and Nasserists 
experienced concerning their dealings with one another. From early 1956 on, each of the two 
antagonists was under enormous compulsion to press its advantage against the other. Doing so 
was not only psychologically satisfying but potentially reassuring to pugnacious regional allies. 
The United States faced constant pressure from the Iraqi and Lebanese governments to toughen 
its line against Egypt and Syria. Nasser privately grumbled about "Egyptian and Syrian 
hotheads" who urged him to ratchet up his rhetoric against conservative Arab regimes—pressure 
to which Nasser all too often succumbed,” (Yaqub). However, the adversarial rhetoric exhibited 
in the public eye was not always beneficial, and at times either figure would see the wisdom of 
conciliation. In fact, a U.S. Department policy study in March 1958 recommended that the 
United States avoid public controversy with Nasser, due to his popular position with citizenry of 
the greater Middle East region. After each major crisis associated with the Eisenhower doctrine, 
which unfortunately were not far and few in between, Eisenhower himself would consider 
strategies for improved relations with Nasser, although he lacked the conviction to change the 
general course of U.S. foreign policy.  “The struggle over the Eisenhower Doctrine was largely a 
moral conflict, but one that occurred within a shared moral framework. The United States and 
the Nasserist movement each proclaimed the virtues of national liberation, political 
independence, economic empowerment, and international harmony, but they disagreed over 
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when and where those values were at stake. Both parties were willing to consider conciliation 
with each other, provided it did not compromise their own security, alliances, or basic sense of 
fairness,” (Yaqub). While politicians may have shared stark differences in values in the public 
eye, they at heart shared the values of rational, resourceful, and principled leaders, moved less by 
the need fo cultural vindication than by a common desire for justice and advantage. The clash of 
civilizations theory certainly holds its merits, though the failure of the United States to contain 
communist proliferation and negotiate with Arab leaders more importantly stemmed from a clash 
of interests and priorities, as opposed to civilizations.  
 
1957 Syrian Crisis 
Perhaps the callous and ill-advised missteps of the United States could have been 
excusable if taken on their own right; however, Eisenhower had already set a dangerous 
precedent of using covert operations to achieve his foreign policy goals, predisposing himself to 
a greater distrust to Syrians and the greater Middle East region. Brown describes, “By the time of 
the Syrian Crisis, the United States had an established record of using covert operations to 
support achievement of foreign policy goals. The overthrow of al-Quwatli in Syria in 1949, the 
success of the coup in Iran in 1953 to depose Mohammed Mossadeq, and the plot to overthrow 
the democratically elected president of Guatemala, Jacabo Arbenz, in 1954 reinforced the 
growing ease with which the U.S. used the threat of the Soviet influence to justify interventions 
that, theoretically, went against the broader message of non-imperialism,” (Brown, 12). This 
overt conflict of interest was not unfounded, and the Eisenhower could have been seen by United 
States diplomats as a way to achieve the objective of containing communist proliferation while 
achieving democratic agency for Middle Eastern countries struggling with their position in 
politics with respect to regional superpowers. Brown further elaborates, “With the 
pronouncement of the Eisenhower Doctrine, military and economic resources could be 
committed to this effort in the name of bolstering the individual security of Middle Eastern 
nations and regional security as a whole, all the while operating under the true objective of 
containing communism,” (Brown, 12-13). Unfortunately, Arab states did not see the objectives 
of the Eisenhower doctrine through a mutual lens. Instead, its proclamation was met with 
immense suspicion and resistance, and the execution of the doctrine only served to push Syria 
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further from the United States’ orbit, and create a sense of American imperialist behavior among 
enemies and allies, an unfortunate progression given the early understanding by administration 
officials of the importance of getting ahead of this bow wave of international perception 
(Brown). The reprecussions of this response were predictable. “In an attempt to avoid U.S. direct 
involvement in an Arab-Israeli conflict or open warfare with the Soviet Union, the United States 
instead resorted to undercover operations. On April 7, 1955 the OCB, charged with oversight of 
ongoing covert activities, complained that “the increasing influence of leftists and few 
communists” inside the Syrian Army was impeding American plans for Middle East defense,” 
(Brown, 13). Despite prior word from US diplomats assessing the situation claiming that the 
Communist threat was overinflated, and the warning by the Foreign Service Officers that this 
situation could be defused by simple diplomatic engagement, the United States pursued these 
covert operations. Brown describes, “When the Syrian Government alleged that the Syrian 
Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP) had ties with the CIA, it generated polemic public statements 
in Syrian newspapers, stirring anti-Western sentiment and paranoia as to the true intentions of 
the United States in the Middle East, and generated “a torrent of Arab anti-Americanism.” 
History was repeating, as the warnings of appointed diplomats repeatedly went unheeded 
resulting in the ill effect of poorly placed and poorly executed covert operations,” (Brown, 13). 
President Eisenhower was faced with the opportunity-and even encouraged by local 
stakeholders- to take a transparent, diplomatic approach. Unfortunately, Eisenhower chose to 
ignore calls for talks and instead strengthened Syria’s speculations of a covert American policy 
of western imperialism. With this sentiment, regarded historians seem to concur. “…there were 
significant strategic opportunities for diplomatic engagement that indicate a different approach 
was possible if only the Eisenhower Administration had followed its stated aims and taken those 
opportunities more seriously,” (Brown, 13). This is evidenced by the intitiatives taken by foreign 
leaders, incuding the late January 1957 meeting with Saudi Arabia’s King Saud, who impressed 
upon Eisenhower that the Cairo meeting of the Arab League earlier that month had urged 
associates to look upon American efforts in the region as motivated by genuine friendship and 
desire to help, as opposed to the general sentiment that spoke to a desire to conquer. “As the 
meeting closed, King Saud strongly recommended a face-to-face talk with the leaders of Egypt 
and Syria, calling such a move “very valuable.” During this personal one on one meeting, the 
details of which Eisenhower recorded in his diary, King Saud suggested the President ask 
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Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and the King of Syria to visit the White House, stating 
that “he believed great good could come of such visits,” and was quick to assert that “he was 
certain these people did not lean nearly so much toward the Soviets as we had thought and they 
would like to re-establish their ties with the West,’” (Brown, 14). The King of Saudi Arabia, 
referred to by David Lesch as the “counterpoise to Nasser” and critical corollary to the 
Eisenhower Doctrine, encouraged open diplomatic negotiations with Nasser and Syria despite his 
Arab perspective. Brown describes, “When Eisenhower balked and informed the King that he 
did not feel he could do so without risking difficulty in the U.S. relationship with Israel, the King 
suggested that an invitation for the “head of the Jewish State ... would be quite all right and 
satisfactory,” (Brown, 14). Despite this initiative, this diplomatic tripartite never occurred in the 
months leading up to the crisis due to the lack of encouragement from his Secretary of State to 
pursue this course of action. Dulles’ dealings with independent states from the third world were 
described by Richard Immerman as “foundering in an alien sea,” suffering form “frequent 
confusion of nationalism and communism,” and unable to grasp the cultural and post-colonial 
perspective that King Saud was attempting to offer (Brown). After the proclamation of the 
Eisenhower Doctrine, James Richards was appointed to Special Ambassador status by 
Eisenhower and specifically tasked to embark on a fifteen-nation fact-finding mission through 
the Middle East in the spring of 1957 to determined how the mutual security approach resonated 
with the region (Brown). “While his approach to meeting with Syria is treated differently in a 
number of secondary sources, they all conclude he purposely did not engage directly with Syrian 
officials, but not by virtue of his own inclinations. An approach that avoided engagement with 
Syria seems, once again, in direct contravention of the prescribed policy of the administration to 
wield the diplomacy and moral position of the United States. In fact, the political director of the 
Syrian Foreign Office, Ghazi Al-Kayyali suggested that the U.S. should have directly sought out 
a meeting with the Syrian regime rather than having expected Syrian leaders to take the 
initiative,” (Brown, 15). Recommendations by Syrian and Saudi Arabian leadership were not 
exclusively representing the interests of the Arab states, as their desire for a balanced diplomatic 
approach that included Syria were seconded by the U.S. special ambassador to the region. 
Ambassador Richards cabled back to Washington before finishing his trip, admitting that he, 
himself, was uncomfortable visiting Israel without having also visited Syria (Brown). “If directed 
to visit Israel, Richards stated he would do so only under formal protest as he deemed such an 
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action would represent an undeniable image of anti-Arab sentiment in the eyes of the Syrians. 
Richards was ordered to return to the U.S. after first stopping in Israel, and as a result, relations 
with Syria took a turn for the worse and reified perceptions of the Eisenhower Doctrine as a 
furtherance of American imperialism in the Arab world. This turn of events also provided 
strategic fodder for similar Soviet claims about American intentions and supported their regional 
efforts at extending their influence,” (Brown, 15). Shortly after it became known to the Syrians 
that there was a plot to initiate a coup on August 12th, the United States engaged once again in 
aggressive shuttle diplomacy sending Loy Henderson, Under Secretary of State with a long 
history of foreign service in the Middle East, throughout the region again, this time to secure 
support for belligerent action against a Soviet support of Syria. However, despite advice from 
Saudi leadership, the United States did not have their lead statesman engage directly with Syrian 
leadership. “The Syrian government informed the U.S. Embassy that Richards was welcome to 
visit Syria if he so desired—rather than use this open door, the U.S. countered that Henderson 
would only do so if formally invited. As it played out, the Richards trip resulted in the promise of 
$68 million in economic aid and $50 million in military aid to Syria’s neighbors, yet lacked the 
inclusion of as much as a simple diplomatic engagement with Syria,” (Brown, 16). Visiting 
neighboring countries but neglecting to include Syria generated ill-feeling among Syrian 
officials, who had already claimed that the Eisenhower Doctrine was an advancement of selfish 
aims of the United States, “..Without taking into account the national aspirations of the people of 
the region.” Egyptian President Gamal Nasser’s recommendation in this situation “was that [the 
U.S. Government] should go in for bit of ‘psychiatry’ and deal gently with Syrians in such a way 
as to relieve their fears,’” (Brown, 16). Similarly, the Saudi Foreign Minister to Pakistan reported 
to his American counterpart James Langley that “Syrians were Arabs [and] that Arabs could not 
possibly be Communists, therefore nobody should be concerned about recent events in Syria.” 
(Brown). Unfortunately, Langley characterized this view as unsophisticated, while Dulles 
considered it hardly believable that the Saudi’s could see Israel as a greater danger to the Middle 
East than the Soviets. 
While some details of the August 12, 1957 operation remain concealed, United States 
objectives became clear: The U.S. was prepared to secretly intervene in the internal affairs of 
another nation, while openly stating otherwise, and the United States was fully committed to 
aggressive action against Syria. “In a Syrian government press conference on August 23, in a 
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declaration of allegiance to the positive neutralism of the Bandung Conference, Syrian officials 
declared they wanted nothing to do with the “paternalism of the so-called great powers.” Despite 
a warning to the NSC by Ambassador Richards not to move too fast in a situation which might 
well change character and ease off in a few days or weeks, the months that followed and the 
actions taken were focused on preparing the region for war,” (Brown, 17). At this point, 
Eisenhower seems ill-informed on the facts that Syria had had enough of its interference in its 
internal affairs, and as a result, in a full implementation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, the 
President took the position that the US should “start shipping material at once, making use of the 
emergency fund” because it was essential to “do everything possible to bring up the strength of 
the nations in the area quickly,” (Brown, 17). In a difficult turn of events, on August 28, 1957, 
two weeks after the Syrian government called for the expulsion of American diplomats in the 
wake of the alleged coup attempt, the President expressed his concern to the NSC over messages 
received from King Saud regarding tensions in Syria. In these messages, the King felt that he 
could not avoid blaming the United States for much of the difficulty there. This escalation of 
tensions needed to be quelled, and Secretary Dulles recognized this by suggesting to the 
President that the cooling of relations occurred sometime in 1955 when offers of costly US 
military assistance were turned down in lieu of Soviet bids. Brown describes, “While accurate, 
this assessment seems a bit disingenuous and in denial of the stream of intelligence estimates 
over the previous two years, the missed diplomatic opportunities that were foregone, and the 
impact on the Syrian psyche of recent covert operations that were turned out by Syrian 
intelligence two weeks prior. In answering the President regarding Kind Saud’s assertion that the 
U.S. was to blame for the tensions in Syria, the Secretary suggested simply that the King was 
difficult to manage because he was insulated from receiving U.S. information, and that despite 
previously successful engagements, “those results [had] six months to wear off.” In response, the 
President noted that he felt that King Saud was “the key to the Middle East,” suggesting a 
realization that an Arabization of the approach to the Middle East was missing,” (Brown, 18). 
King Saud represented a key diplomatic engagement for the future of Middle Eastern affairs, that 
direct personal engagement with Egypt and Syria were in order, and if the United States had 
simply folloed its own objectives as stipulated three years prior and leveraged personal 
relationships in the region, Eisenhower might have been able to champion the United States 
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foreign diplomatic success and forego the clumsy handling of the covert operations in Syria 
(Brown).  
Ultimately, Eisenhower’s handling of Syria in 1956 may have in fact lead to a disastrous 
Soviet take-over; however, through mediated diplomacy on the part of the Saudis, Syria and the 
United States were able to finally reach an agreement that satisfied the international objectives of 
both nations. Unfortunately, the inexcusable covert nature of United States action in Syria will 
leave a large blemish on foreign relations to come. “In November of 1957, shortly after al-Bitar 
and Rountree had commenced rapprochement between the United States and Syria, Eisenhower 
penned an “eyes only” note to Dulles asking if it might be worthwhile to “bring Nasser back to 
our side,” suggesting perhaps a latent recognition of a missed opportunity for direct engagement 
with key Arab influencers, as opposed to the failed covert approaches chosen to achieve an 
American solution,” (Brown, 25). This interest in engaging the Syrians diplomatically came as a 
result of Saudi mediation, Syrian and Soviet engagement in the United Nations, and the 
ultimately point-to-point diplomatic engagements between the cabinet and ministry officials of 
the two nations that took far too long to begin and come to fruition. These engagements arose 
from the purpose of insuring international, regional, national and cultural objectives were taken 
into account, but the crisis came to a more formal conclusion with the unification of Syria and 
Egypt as the United Arab Republic (UAR) in February 1958. “It was Nasser and al-Bitar who 
ultimately decided that unification would help deter communist takeover and protect their 
national and regional ambitions. In an example of learning the lessons of the past, Eisenhower 
and Dulles recognized that opposition to the merger would only earn Arab resentment, and 
further recognized that the existence of the UAR would provide certain gains toward limiting the 
spread of communism in Damascus and a means for absorbing Nasser’s political energy,” 
(Brown, 25). By recognizing the UAR on February 25, 1958 the United States-Syrian crisis had 
come to a close, as Arab nations had begun imploring the United States to recognize their pursuit 
of Arab nationalism and neutralism as a barrier to Communism. “That time had finally come and 
would, ironically, become a point of leverage in United States foreign policy in the Middle East 
as the Kennedy administration saw Nasser and other Third World nationalists as “potential 
bulwarks against Soviet communism rather than as communist stooges,” and successfully used 
nationalism to preserve U.S. interests in the Middle East,” (Brown, 25). Though recognized early 
in the administration as critical, the importance of aggressive diplomacy was inhibited by 
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inconsistent integration in foreign policy efforts through the decade. If, in fact, effective 
communication of American intentions was the desired goal of the administration, then the 
advice of C.D. Jackson in a speech to members of the National Security Council in 1953 was 
certainly not heeded the four years later: If men and women in other countries are to believe that 
American objectives and their own aspirations have much in common, this is to be brought about 
not merely by telling them so. It is to be done by our acts, explained and interpreted by our 
words (Brown). A more effective diplomacy-both public and traditional-would have insured a 
more consistent application of the Eisenhower administrations ultimate goals of stability in the 
Middle East. “With the Syrian Crisis in the annals of history, Eisenhower reflected on problems 
across the Arab world in July of 1958, shortly after the United States landed 10,000 Marines in 
Lebanon, stating that “the problem is that we have a campaign of hatred against us, not by 
governments but by the people [who] are on Nasser’s side.” Odd that a decade which began with 
a Syrian and greater Arab population that was pro-American would end in this way, but it comes 
as no surprise given the post-colonial nationalist attitude of Arab nations, their intense desire for 
self-determination, and the head-on collision with an uninformed, cavalier and bullish U.S. 
doctrine,” (Brown, 26). The hardline anticommunist approach had created an implicit ultimatum, 
coined by brown “you are either with us or against us,” and should be no less surprising when 
overlaid on the mid-1957 Syrian Crisis when applied to the contemporary Arab response to a 
similar ultimatum issued by the United States following the historical attacks on September 11. 
Unfortunately, the history of the Syrian crisis and a lesson on maintaining open diplomatic 
channels in a crisis are lost in the annals of Cold War standoffs with international communism. 
 
Omega Doctrine and Islamism 
It is during this period that, perhaps operating on a more subvert level, the omega 
doctrine is a recognition by Eisenhower that the Islamist doctrine may act as a foil to Marxist 
intentions of the Soviet Union.  Deepa Kumar, associate professor of Media Studies and Middle 
East Studies at Rutgers University, grapples with this concept in her article, “Political Islam: A 
Marxist Analysis,” in the International Socialist Review. She writes, “The turn by the United 
States toward promoting Islam on the political stage began in the 1950s. “We wanted to explore 
the possibilities of building up King Saud as a counterweight to Nasser,” Eisenhower wrote to a 
confidante. “The king was a logical choice in this regard; he at least professed anti-Communism, 
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and he enjoyed, on religious grounds, a high standing among all Arab nations.” In this, 
Eisenhower was influenced by the prevailing ideas among leading scholars who argued that 
Islam had been disrupted by Western influences, and therefore had to be brought back..” 
(Kumar). While this is an arguably simplistic understanding of the role of religion and politics in 
the Middle East, it acted upon it in a joint operation with Britain called “Omega,” in which the 
United States sought to isolate Nasser and create an alternate pole of attraction in King Saud. 
Some administrators even began developing the notion of the Islamic Pope around Saud, but 
Saud failed to be such a pole of attraction for a number of reasons. Meanwhile, his successor, 
King Faisal, would make significant strides towards Islamizing the region, and since then Saudi 
Arabia has been one of the most powerful behind-the-scenes promoters of Islamism.  
Even though Saudi Arabia holds the greatest natural supply of oil reserves in the world, it 
held little political legitimacy in the Middle East during the era of progressive secular 
nationalism; in this respect, Nasserism was the widely accepted regional model, and Egypt acted 
as the dominant political force until the end of the 1960s (Kumar). However, as Kumar explains, 
after 1973 this dynamic would change. “The oil embargo raised Saudi Arabia’s prestige, so much 
so that it was able to seize the initiative and put Wahhabism on the map. The Saudi ruling elite 
then used their vast oil resources to promote Islamism in the following ways: 
• They set up a massive network of charity and good works, which allowed Islamist groups 
to provide solutions to the economic crises gripping various countries.  
• They used the World Muslim League, which was set up in 1962 to counter secularism. 
• They brought together a number of countries in the region under the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference in 1969 to set an agenda consistent with the Saudi outlook. 
• They created an Islamic financial system that tied various African, Asian, and Middle 
Eastern countries to the oil rich nations,” (Kumar) 
 As Kumar further elaborates, if the World Muslim League and the Organization for the Islamic 
Conference were the political means of establishing Saudi hegemony, it is the Islamic financial 
system that laid the economic basis for its growth. The Saudis would ensure that vast amounts of 
money pouring into Arab oil exporting countries in the early 1970s were directed into a network 
of banks that were under the control of the Islamic Right and the Muslim Brotherhood. “These 
banks then funded sympathetic politicians, parties and media companies as well as the business 
ventures of the devout middle class— a group consisting of the descendants of the mercantile 
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classes of the bazaars and souks, and of the newly wealthy professionals, flush with money from 
jobs held in various oil-producing countries. The Muslim Brotherhood also financed their 
operations in Egypt, Kuwait, Pakistan, Turkey, and Jordan through these banks,” (Kumar). The 
West would appreciate this banking system whole-heartedly, and even pitched in providing 
expertise, training and technological know-how in order to now be left out of the vast amounts of 
petrodollars that were now flowing through these banks. These players included, but were not 
limited to the United States giants of Citibank, Chase Manhattan, Price Waterhouse and 
Goldman Sachs. “Additionally, the rise of the Islamic banking system coincided with the 
development of the neoliberal model in the West. Close ties were forged between neoliberal guru 
Milton Friedman and his disciples at the University of Chicago and the Islamists. As Robert 
Dreyfuss states, “Islamic finance repeatedly relied on right-wing economists and Islamist 
politicians who advocated the privatizing, free-market views of the Chicago school.” Once in 
power, it is not surprising that the Islamists adopted neoliberal measures such as in Algeria and 
the Sudan,” (Kumar). In sum, through the Omega Doctrine, Saudi Arabia would rise to fame as a 
key player in promoting political Islam as a foil to Marxist values. This initiative was 
reciprocated by the tacit approval of the United States, and its role was accentuated even more 
over time, notably after 1979 when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and the Iranian 
Revolution deposed of the Shah. 
 
Rise of the Syrian Ba’ath Party 
The next chapter of diplomacy in the saga of American-Syrian relations during the anti-
communist phase of American history brings us to the Hafez al-Assad Presidency. Although 
Hafez al-Assad branded his presidency with ties to Islamic values, the unwavering strength and 
stability of his regime is tied more closely to the political savvy of his autocratic model. His 
connections to the Ba’ath party may have been marketed as his primary source for consultation; 
however, subordinates acted primarily as instruments for government control and gatherers of 
information rather than true participants in decision making processes. Doctor Schmuel Bar, 
Director of Studies at the Institute of Policy and Strategy in Herzliya, Israel and steering team of 
the annual “Herzliya Conference,” writes extensively on the various undertones steering the 
Hafez al-Asad presidency and how his unique political model would serve as a foundation for 
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the far less successful Bashar al-Asad presidency. In his introductory remarks on the regime, he 
writes, “The hallmark of the Asad regime, which set it apart from its predecessors, was its strong 
hold on power and stability in a country which set it apart from its predecessors, was its strong 
hold on power and stability in a country which in the twenty years prior to its rise had 
experienced numerous coup d’etats and a constant sense of instability,” (Bar, 353). Even without 
the context of constant overthrow prior to his presidency, Hafez al-Asad’s work in stabilizing 
Syria may be well regarded in its own merit. Bar further elaborates, “Since the triple crisis of the 
early 1980s (rebellion of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hafez al-Asad’s health crisis and the 
challenge to the regime by his brother, Rif’at), the regime has been stable: domestic opposition 
was rare and was dealt with summarily; global and regional events such as the fall of the Soviet 
bloc, the first Gulf war, and the Israeli-Arab peace process did not seem to affect the country’s 
stability,” (Bar, 353). This unique stability is often attributed to Hafez al-Asad’s style of rule; 
while his processes were not outwardly autocratic, he kept his staff in a closely centralized state 
without relinquishing his own political might. Bar explains, “Ex officio, the president controls all 
the pillars of power: he Is the secretary general of the Ba’ath party, (which controls the 
parliament), commander-in-chief of the armed forces and the authority of all the intelligence 
services. His informal power goes even further. The models of Asad’s regime were the autocratic 
Communist regimes of Eastern Europe, particularly the Ceausecu regime in Rumania,” (Bar, 
354). This model was not only influenced European autocratic rulers, but even took on a self-
proclaimed interpretation of North Korean regime of Kim Il Sung. Not only was his structured 
political model influenced by these precedents, but even the rhetoric itself can be likened to 
Stalinist terminology and customary Islamic sycophancy (Bar).  Hafez was not shy about this 
interpretation of his rule either, almost to a comical degree. “He likened himself to the Muslim 
hero Salah a-Din al-Ayoubi (Saladin),” (Bar, 354). At the time, Asad was portrayed as a 
quintessentially Islamic leader, in spite of being an Alawite and, in the eyes of most Sunnis, not 
even a Muslim. Despite this conflict, he clearly described himself as a Muslim and was branded 
by others as a “believing Muslim” who loved Allah and his people and the relationship between 
him and the people was presented in terms of baya’ (Islamic oath of allegiance). “One of the 
highlights of this can be seen in the inscription from the Qur’an adorning the building around 
Hafez al-Asad’s tomb: “Oh Ye who Believe! Obey Allah and Obey is Prophet and those who are 
in authority among you!” This verse has been used by Muslim regimes and their Islamic 
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establishments for centuries to legitimize their rule and delegitimize rebellion against them,” 
(Bar, 354). Clearly, despite his being an official Alawite, he did not allow this discrepancy to get 
in the way of a unified front with an Islamic electorate. 
Returning to the structure of his autocratic model, Bar cites Hafez al-Asad’s aversion to 
“groupthink”; in fact, he preferred to access opinions and information from his subordinates in 
the format of direct one-on-one reporting of the latter to the president. Bar offers more insight 
into this strategy of making himself the chief strategist and decision maker.  “During the Hafez 
al-Asad era the Ba’ath party lost the internal decision making mechanisms that existed in the pre-
regime Ba’ath. The party became an instrument for collecting information on the domestic 
theatre and mobilizing support for the decisions that the leader took, but was not a real 
participant in the decision-making process itself. True, all of the President’s inner circle were 
senior members of the party (almost always members of the Regional Command), but their input 
in the decision-making process was not related to their formal party status, but due to their 
membership in the president’s “gang” (jama’a) fellow officers who were part of the original 
junta that brought Asad to power, a bond stronger than Asad’s ties with his brothers,” (Bar, 355). 
Despite strong ties with the jama’a officers that allowed Asad to wield such great power, their 
ties to each other were relatively nominal. This centralization of power affected other formal 
branches of power as well. Bar explains, “The Syrian regime maintains a powerless legislative 
branch dominated by the Ba’ath party as part of the nominal “National Progressive Front.” The 
technocratic executive also is not a vehicle of power: those ministers who wield formal power 
(for example, the minister of defense and the prime minister) do so not by dint of their 
membership in the formal executive, but of their belonging to the informal inner circle, a de facto 
“cabinet” of the president’s main political, military and security advisers),” (Bar, 356). In order 
understand the practical hierarchies created by Hafez Al-Asad’s ruling, we may reference the 
diagram below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Content published in Bar, 356 
 
 Despite the nominal nature of the legislative branch, Hafez al-Asad continued to regard 
the Syrian military as one of the primary mainstays of the regime. This rose out of the integrity 
of its various functions under the Ba’ath regime, including not only defense of the country in the 
face of Israeli, Turkish and, to a certain extent, Iraqi threats, but also domestic duties of 
counterterrorism and gathering intelligence on potential subversion (Bar). Bar again references 
the practical applications of this branch in the above diagram, “The Ba’ath party apparatus in the 
military and the civilian organs do not interact below the level of the Regional Congress, where 
the military has a number of seats, and, of course, in the Regional Command. This, however, is 
on a purely formal level. On the practical level, Syria has been under martial law since 1963. The 
military and the “civilian” mukhabarat have extensive powers in the civilian sector,” (Bar, 357). 
The level to which Hafez al-Asad controlled the operations of the mokhabarat in relation to the 
party is impressive, as was the level to which he expected all heads of various apparatuses to 
answer to the president directly in all matter. Bar explains that this acted as a safeguard to the 
regime and prevented dissident activity. “In this context, any activity that calls for “de-
Ba’athification” of the regime is viewed as subversive. There is, however, no indication that the 
policy of the apparatuses toward various expressions of dissident voices is officially determined 
in consultation with party bodies. Rather, there are indications that different agencies act on their 
own, according to their own reading of the threats to the regime implicit in a certain activity, and 
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according to their own interests,” (Bar, 357). Not only did this require Hafez al-Asad to extend 
his powers beyond the typical powers of the presidency, but it also forced the president to gain 
close connections to people outside of societal hierarchies organizing peoples based on religion, 
politics or other status. “… the Syrian regime is the regime of a well-defined Syrian nomeklatura 
which is not exclusively Ba’athist, Alawite, or military. The description of an “Alawite” regime 
imposed on a Sunni country, for example, does not do justice to the complex relationship of the 
regime to the Alawite and the other communities (Sunni, Druze, Christian, Yazidis, and the 
Isma’ilis). The term Ba’athist regime implies party control of the state (along the lines of the 
Communist party in the former Soviet Union), which was not the case in Syria. A more accurate 
description of the Syrian regime would be a “confessional coalitionism,” (Bar, 357). This system 
held Hafez al-Asad directly accountable not only to a Muslim majority, but also made him 
personally aware of the various contingencies among minority groups and strengthened his 
political relationships with these other realms as well. Within this complex web of relationships 
that Hafez aimed to establish, the Syrian regime was also arguably based on a complex patronage 
system that allowed Hafez to organize and prioritize issues. These patronage line may derive 
from a variety of relationships, and can include any of the following as outlined per Bar’s essay: 
1. Family power bases: These are particularly strong in the Alawite, Druze, and Isma’ili 
communities and in the rural Sunni milieu. They include extended family members, at 
least cousins and occasionally more distant relations. Frequently, these power bases are at 
odds with competing families (very frequently distant relatives) in the same area (Bar, 
358) 
2. Party/bureaucracy power bases: These include branches of the party. “popular 
organizations,” bureaus, and so forth (Bar, 358) 
3. Communal or region-based power bases: members of the “old guard” built their own 
power bases within their communities. This was done by channeling funds to their home 
areas or tribes and providing perks to those close to them. From the point of view of the 
leadership, the most important of these power bases are in Alawite areas, since they 
provide access to senior figures in the military and security forces 
4. Military protégées: The members of the old guard, who headed the Syrian military and 
security services for years, still have former subordinates of high rank through whom 
they can wield influence (Bar, 358) 
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5. Economic power bases: almost all of the “old guard” have amassed fortunes, and they 
control different sectors of the Syrian economy. This form of influence is particularly 
significant in the case of Sunni nonmilitary leaders, who lack the two former channels of 
influence (Bar, 358) 
6. Foreign relations: relationships with countries with leverage over the present leadership, 
such as Russia, Saudi Arabia, and France (Bar, 358) 
Despite the immense range and complexity of these relationships, the predominant elements 
in the Syrian regime remain the inner circle of advisors surrounding the president. The inner 
circle usually included all the heads of security services and the military, a few political figures 
with personal experience, diplomatic abilities, or other personal traits that accord them added 
value in the eyes of the president (Bar). The members of the president’s junta were in no way a 
surprise, as inner circle members correlated heavily with the president’s “old boy’s club”- fellow 
officers who were part of the original gang that brought Asad to power. “The strength of this 
bond was greater than that of Asad’s family ties. The brothers Rifaat and Jamil al-Asad (the 
latter died in December 2004) were pushed aside at an early stage, while old comrades such as 
Mustafa Tlas and ‘Abd al-Halim Khadam remained in power to supervise the transfer of 
authority to Bashar. These persons were both the main source of advice for the president and his 
main source of information on the issues under study,” (Bar, 358). However, Hafez al-Asad held 
his allegiances close for calculated reasons. While the system prioritized his gang through 
political appointments, he felt that the system was indispensable for the wellbeing of the nation: 
to control the country, the president needed to guarantee the loyalty of various power brokers. 
While the Syrian Ba’ath party represents a primarily Islamic electorate of Syria, its 
foundations are rooted an intellectually-deft branch devoted to Syrian nationalism. The 
secularism of the party is an important source of legitimacy for a diverse body of Islamic factions 
and non-Muslim Syrians. It can be argued that Asad himself subscribed to the philosophies of the 
Ba’ath party because it’s apolitical and areligious nature gives him full control of Syrian politics 
as he sees fit. “The Ba’ath party portrays itself as the true representative of the masses in Syria. 
From the point of view of its presence among those masses, there is some justification for this 
claim. The number of members of the party in Syria is approximately 1.8 million, which 
accounts for about 18 percent of the adult population. Here the party is a vehicle for the 
maintenance of the nomenklatura. But it has not succeeded (or even made a serious effort) in 
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inculcating the Ba’ath ideology to wide strata of society,” (Bar, 359). The Ba’ath party in fact 
originally arose as a middle-class movement, but was taken over by the military who viewed the 
middle class with suspicion. However, throughout years of the Ba’athis rule, a new middle class 
emerged, incorporating art of the old Syrian middle class and a new bourgeoisie, which grew 
under the Ba’ath regime and shared with the regime a vested interest in continued stability (Bar).  
Bar explains, “On a social level, the Ba’ath party is essentially a vehicle for social mobility and a 
patronage network for achieving perquisites form the regime. Since not all members of extended 
families are party members, this number can also be viewed as representing a larger number of 
citizens who enjoy privileges by dint of their party-member relatives. While this network is 
based on the party, it is actually a transformation of the model of the traditional “zaïm,” networks 
prevalent in much of the Arab world and specifically in Syria and Lebanon- the old-style village 
boss or leader. The zu’ama play an intermediate role between the citizens and the state, taking 
their share of concessions, controlling monopolies, and blocking any competition. They respect 
each other’s areas of control and have a common interest in preserving the system, (Bar, 359). 
However, more importantly, the secularism of the party truly acted as an important source of 
legitimacy. With about 25 percent of Syria’s population identifying as non-Sunni Muslims (this 
including the Alawites, Druze and Isma’ilis) or non muslims (Christians), and another portion of 
the population identifying as Sunni non-Arabs (Kurds, Circassians, and Turkomans) who are 
traditionally less orthodox than Sunni Arabs, the Ba’ath secularism is a bulwark against Sunni 
domination and Islamic fundamentalism. This message was exploited by the regime domestically 
and in messages to foreign audiences to support its legitimacy, as the lesser of two evils (Bar). 
The party gained its footing in Syria in the 1940s as an Arab nationalist party advocating Arab 
unity, socialism and secular nonsectarianism.  Bar explains, “The “nonsectarianism” of the party 
derived from French cultural influences, the preponderance of non-Muslims (Christians, 
Alawites and Druze) among the founders of the party, and the division into confessional 
communities of the population in Syria and Lebanon. The party grew in popularity and spread 
outside of the Levant during the heyday of Arab nationalism in the 1950s and the 1960s. The 
idealism of the early Ba’ath was demonstrated when it willingly dismantled itself to be part of 
the United Arab Republic (1958-1961) which merged Egypt and Syria with Egyptian President 
Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser at the helm,” (Bar, 360). The organizational principles of the Syrian 
Ba’ath party are based on the ‘internal statue” (nizam dakhili) that was approved by the last 
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“national Congress” in July 1980. These principles closely resemble those of communist parties 
of the mid twentieth century. Bar describes these principles as: 
1. A transnational superstructure, the “National Command” (analogous to the Comintern 
of the Communist Party); 
2. Strict mechanisms for control of membership and stages of achieving full 
membership in the party; 
3. A hierarchal structure, which duplicates itself in each level of the party (national, 
regional, and local); 
4. Formal electoral mechanisms for representation of the roots of the party with checks 
and balances to guarantee the predominance of the party leadership; and 
5. Committees and popular organizations for mobilization of the party membership, and 
mechanisms of “criticism” and “self criticism” to preserve ideological conformity 
(Bar, 360) 
However, the pan-Arab elements of the party structure, like the revolutionarism of Ba’ath 
ideology have fallen into desuetude. “The party in Syria is typical of a ruling one-party regime. 
Its organs reflect organizational concepts of a small revolutionary party and of a transnational pa-
Arab party. In fact, it is a Syrian party par excellence with only vestiges of atrophied formal 
bodies that maintain the “pan-Arab” character of the party,” (Bar). Bar offers a more accurate 
reflection of the constituent bodies of the Syrian Ba’ath party as: 
1. the National (Arab) Command  
2. The Regional Secretary 
3. The Regional command 
4. Bureaus and Committees of the Regional Command 
5. The central Committee 
6. The regional Congress 
7. Popular Organizations 
8. Workers and professional Associations 
9. Branches, Sub-Branches, Sections and Cells, and 
10. The party in the military and security services (Bar, 360) 
Much like the diagram of powers within the Hafez al-Asad regime presented earlier, the 
relationships between these various bodies is largely vertical and hierarchical with very few 
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perceptible horizontal relationships. In this same vein, there is no evidence of interministerial 
bodies composed of different bureaus or of ad hoc bodies dealing with a specific problem (Bar).  
Despite the rigidity of the structure Hafez al-Asad had surrounded himself with, the erosion of 
the fundamental ideologies of the Ba’ath pan-Arabism was evident early on in its split between 
the Syrian and Iraqi parties, and in the decline of the National Command. “In both the Syrian and 
the Iraqi ‘Ba’ath’ parties the ideological dimension became secondary and either country has 
there been any real intellectual activity for further development of Ba’ath ideology,” (Bar, 361). 
Although the regime would still consider themselves to be subscribers to the Ba’ath doctrine, it 
was in fact a ‘sloganized ideology, consisting of a limited number of dictums, most of which 
reflected the subordination of the doctrine to the particular leadership cult in each country and 
did not express real political doctrines. “Intellectual activity on ideological issues, to the extent 
that it continued to exist, was the territory of elder Ba’athists who eventually died out and the 
supporters of the party outside of Syria and Iraq, such as the proxy Ba’ath parties in Jordan and 
Lebanon,” (Bar, 361). The rise to power of the Ba’ath in Syria (1963) and of Hafez al-Assad 
(1970) would bring about a transformation of the Syrian Ba’ath’s view of the role of the party: 
from an elite “leading the masses” to an instrument for mass mobilization. This transformation 
would be reflected in the drive for mass recruitment of members, without the cautious balances 
that the party had established in its clandestine years, and in a marginalization of the ideology of 
the party. The latter trend towards a utilitarian and non-ideological party is evident in the neglect, 
during the decades of the Ba’ath rule in Damascus, of any real development of ideological texts 
of theories based in Ba’ath ideology (Bar).  “This dearth of ideological activity stands in stark 
contrast to the importance that other ostensibly ideological regimes-particularly the Communist 
regimes of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the PRC-ascribed to study of ideological texts 
of Marxism-Leninism and the developing contemporary theories that could explain current 
affairs in a manner compatible with the ideology,” (Bar, 361). However, this trend again can be 
linked to the pragmatic and Machiavellian autrocracy of Hafez al-Asad, and his desire to be as 
unfettered as possible by constraints outside of his control. This allowed the regime to maneuver 
freely, without ideological contradictions (Bar). “Prime examples are Syria’s rejection of an 
almost total consensus among Arab states in the Iran-Iraq war: Ba’ath secular ideology and Arab 
identity notwithstanding, Damascus was almost alone among the Arabs in supporting Iran,” 
(361). Bar also argues that the marginalization of the ideology allowed for a de facto 
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legitimization of Syrian nationalism as well. The Syrian Ba’ath was always more substantially 
rooted in “Syrianism” rather than “Arabism.” Therefore. Syria’s regional policies accord top 
priority to Syria’s political interests, and the regime has promoted Syrian nationalism to the Arab 
Nation. Bar is able to further explain this concept through his contextualization, “The legacy of 
the Umayyads (661-750) and Salah ad-Din (d. 1193) is invoked to justify Syrian leadership, at 
least in the territory considered Bilad al-sham (the country of Syria) or Suriya al-Kubra (Greater 
Syria). Consequently, the Syrian regime has never reconciled itself to complete independence of 
its neighbors-Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine,” (Bar, 361). While outwardly, the “pan-Arabist” 
term remained engrained in the rhetoric of the Ba’ath party, the word “Arab would become more 
and more of a code word for Syria. The overt-emphasis would also serve in the regime’s 
interests, as outlined by Bar: 
1. Domestically- to discourage signs of localism and sectarianism, on one hand, and to 
obfuscate the sectarian nature of the Alawite-led regime, as the other. 
2. Outwards to the Arab world- the implicit message is that Syria is willing to sacrifice its 
own local interests for those of the Arab nation,” and it will prefer the interests of other 
Arabs over any other circle of association that Syria may be in (Islamic, nonaligned). 
However, it expects other countries to do the same. This the ideology is translated into a 
demand that Arab countries respect Syria’s vital interests as defined by Damascus. When 
these encompass such wide ranging issues such as Lebanon and Israeli-arab conflict, this 
position, when accepted, provided Syria with disproportional regional status. In practical 
terms, this allowed Syria to demand and receive across-the-board Arab recognition of its 
own vested interests in Lebanon and vis-à-vis Israel. This was expressed in Arab League 
summits and Syria’s leverage over other Arabs in the international arena,” (Bar, 362). 
It is no surprise that Ba’ath ideology did not adapt to a primarily Muslim electorate due to 
its philosophical origins of quintessential secularism; Islam is, rather than a source of 
contingency of Arabism, a force that woke the latent potential of Arabs, and having fulfilled its 
role, is no longer necessary as a driving force-that role having been taken over by secular 
nationalism. Bar describes, “The ideology of the Syrian Ba’ath is a mélange of nineteenth-
century nationalism and twentieth-century humanistic idealism. The main tenets of this ideology 
were forged by its founders Michel Aflaq, Zaki al-Arsuzi, and the Salah al-Bitar during the 
1940s in the heyday of nationalism, anticolonialism, and socialism,” (Bar, 363). While Hafez al-
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Assad branded his leadership with a unique unity that would never surface in Syrian government 
again, it is clear in this respect how there grew a disjointed unity among ba’athist rule and 
Islamists during the rule of the less politically-savvy Bashar. Bar details the slogan of the Ba’ath 
party for our further analysis, stating, “The slogan of the Ba’ath is ‘Unity, Freedom, Socialism.’ 
This slogan encapsulates the main tenets of the party (to be detailed below): 
1. Arab Unity- the belief in the natural unity of the Arab nation 
2. Freedom from ‘imperialist’ and ‘colonialist’ yokes, implying not only political but also 
cultural emancipation from western influences (as liberally defined by the party so as to 
purge only those influences that they object to) and economic self-reliance 
3. Socialism-a tenet which should be interpreted according to a particular brand of Ba’ath 
socialism, based ostensibly on “Arab” traditions 
4. Other tenets include modernism, equality of the sexes, and human rights (albeit honored 
in all Ba’ath regimes more in the breach than in the observance)” (Bar, 363). 
This unique wave of democratic style politics in the Middle East was undeniably deeply 
at odds with the conservative Islamic cultures that it would fail to assimilate with, even at 
such superficial levels as the party slogan, especially at the third and fourth point of Bar’s 
analysis. Socialism, while based on Arab traditions, is fundamentally at odds with the 
fundamental Islamic idea of government, and by extension, political economy, would grow 
out of Islamic teachings, rather than adopting a foreign economic system. The fourth point, 
including modernist beliefs, though adopted by many Islamic cultures, would prove at odds 
with modern Islamist movements, preaching a combative brand of Islamist political values 
that grew out of the Medinan half of the Quran, citing the success of medieval Islamic 
conquest through the ruthlessness of its political and social rule. To further expand on this 
notion, Bar cites Michel Aflaq, who tended to equate religion in general with the traditional 
social and economic order that the party had vowed to topple, and with oppression of the 
weak and wide-scaled corruption. “In his words: ‘…the oppressed who see religion in this 
era a weapon that the oppressors rely upon…those who exploit the corrupt situation exploit 
this corruption (ie religion) because it drugs the people and because it prevents the people 
from a revolution against its oppressors and its enslavers.’ This secularism was evident in the 
‘Declaration of Principles’ that the party published when it assumed power in 1960; it 
determined that “the educational policy of the party is to create a new power in 1960; it 
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determined that ‘the educational policy of the party is to create a new generation of Arabs 
that believes in the unity of the nation and eternity of its mission.’ The secularism of the 
Ba’ath was even more emphasized in the ideological//pre-Asad era,” (Bar, 364-365). This 
secularization did not come as a surprise, taking into account the fact that the ideological 
founder, Michel Aflaq- was not a Muslim but Greek Orthodox. The only way that non-
Muslim Arabs would be able to integrate into an ideal of the united Arab world would be 
under a secular ideology. By this logic, Ba’athism would have to be born a quintessentially 
secular movement. “Arabism” is not contingent on, or the result of, Islam, but rather was 
inherent in the Arabs before Islam. Islam was a force that woke the latent potential of the 
Arabs, and having fulfilled its role, is no longer necessary as a driving force-that role having 
been taken over by secular nationalism,” (Bar). Understanding this transition is integral to 
understanding the Ba’ath concept of freedom, which refers not to individual freedoms or civil 
rights, as is often interpreted by the West, but rather the liberation of the Arab nation as a 
collective from the domination of the West (including that of Zionism and the State of Israel) 
and the constraints that have been imposed upon its self-determination and self-expression by 
Western colonialism, as a pre-requisite for fulfilling its national potential and unity.  Bar also 
argues that the third element in the Ba’athist slogan, “socialism,” is the economic conclusion 
of the two former elements. However, as stated prior, the economic doctrine of the Ba’ath in 
practice eschewed private enterprise and called for a state directed economy, much like the 
USSR. Bar further elaborates on this contingency. “The attitude of the Ba’ath to Islam is 
complex. Islam is viewed as an instrument for providing legitimacy to the regime, but 
rejected as a core identity in lieu of the Arab one. This is expressed in the efforts that the 
regime invested in achieving Islamic legitimacy for the Alawites; demonstrated observance 
by Hafez Al-Asadof orthodox Islamic rituals such as the lesser pilgrimate (‘umrah, the 
pilgrimage to Mecca not in the haj season) to Mecca; participation in prayers in Sunni 
mosques and fasting during Ramadan; promotion of Islamic culture such as Qur’an reading 
and building of mosques; and the use of Islamic terminology to mobilize public support of 
the leader, (Bar, 366). Despite these initiatives to allow the Ba’athist regime to remain 
malleable and mold to the values of the Islamic electorate, the Ba’ath regime also clearly 
distanced itself from the populist radical interpretation of Islam. Bar further explains this 
complex connection in terms of its political realities. “Obviously, the option of aligning with 
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the radical Muslim Brotherhood was never an option, since the fundamentalist movement 
would never accept an Alawite as a bona fide Muslim. The party position on Islamic issues 
attempted to reconcile the political need for Islamic legitimacy on one hand with its secular 
ideology, the impracticality of an Alawite leader representing the orthodox Islamic mores, 
and the leader’s secular and modernist bent on the other hand. The result is a unique Syrian 
Ba’ath interpretation of Islam tailored to legitimize a non-Sunni leader of a Sunni state and to 
delegitimize the radical Islamist opposition,” (Bar, 366). Despite these various oppositions, 
Hafez al-Asad branded his Syrian leadership with a unity that has not been successfully 
replicated. By acknowledging these inconsistencies, Hafez may have been able to reach a 
broader electorate by speaking to its constituency in terms of their core values, rather than 
plaguing the nation with demagoguery. “Hafez al-Asad is quoted in an official Ba’ath text as 
supporting a “universalistic interpretation of religion: ‘Even if we disagree about the road 
that leads to Allah, the important thing is (that this is) Allah and that we all worship him. It is 
not the right of anyone to impose on the other his path to Allah…Allah is for all and he 
regards all men as equal…every human is free how he prays, how he worships and how he 
sees Allah,” (Bar, 366). The unique secular nationalism was perhaps not the most condusive 
to Islam, but as long as Hafez was able to communicate his objectives in line with the 
majority Islamic electorate, his policies would be regarded with unparalleled success. 
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Chapter 4 
Historical Narrative III: The Fight Against Terror in Syria 
 
 
 
In this third and final historical narrative, we may begin to examine the recent 
transgressions of Syrian politics in relation to modern American diplomacy. The modern 
condition of Syria’s fall to global terror networks was undoubtedly primed by several 
destabilizing actions taken by the United States in its proxy wars against the Soviet Union in the 
1950s, as witnessed in the second historical narrative. Since this period, however, American 
politics and ambitions for the Middle East have evolved tremendously, with an increasing 
interest in maintaining a balance of powers in the region and battling Islamist groups, both 
peaceful and violent, that are becoming increasingly hostile towards the West. While undeniably 
the United States has set itself up for a distrustful relationship with Syria and the greater Middle 
East region, this does not mean we have exhausted all diplomatic strategies for dealing with the 
escalating situation. Learning from the repercussions of our past misconduct in the region, the 
West, and the larger international community, can now begin to address strategies for putting 
democratic governments back into the hands of Syrians.  
 
Bashar Al-Asad Courts Islamism 
Relying largely on the help of his father’s inner circle, Bashar’s first initiative after the 
inheritance of his father’s reign is a controlled democratization process; however, Bashar’s 
definition of Syrian democratization lies in encouraged involvement of people in promoting the 
country’s growth according to the plans of the regime, not in defining the very identity or nature 
of the regime. At the first signs of dissemblance of unity during this period of “civil society,” 
Bashar cracks down on political dissent in fear of Syria’s potential fall to the hands of Islamic 
extremist groups. Bar recounts that over six years after his death, Hafez al-Asad’s legacy is still 
plainly evident in the structure and workings of the regime he founded. Between the Assad 
family, the “old guard” of military officers and party bureaucrats, and the checks and balances of 
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various security services, the role of the Alawite community, and the involvement of the portions 
of the Sunni elite, much of his legacy endured. Despite these similarities, there were also a 
number of fundamental decades. Bar describes, “Over the decades, the regime’s apparatus served 
more as an instrument for the implementation of policy than a mechanism for policy formation. 
Under Bashar, however, this apparatus has taken an increasingly pivotal role in the formulation 
of decisions,” (Bar, 367). This transition from the president operating as point person in all 
respects to one that delegated the right to come to their own decisions shook the Syrian 
administration to its core. Bar would argue that his stature as president would come to be 
handicapped by factors inherent in the process that brought him to power. First, “His arrival at 
power not by his own manipulation of power within the regime but by the will of his dead father 
(in a country in which all previous leaders since independence have come to power by coups of 
one sort or another;” Second, “The fact that he was not his father’s original choice for 
succession,” (his deceased older brother, the more inherently charismatic and politically savvy of 
the two, was indisposed); Third, “the relatively limited-in time and scope- period of political 
apprenticeship, particularly the lack of real military training or experience;” and finally, The 
presence within the regime of a formidable “old guard” which, by virtue of having been privy to 
the wills  and ways of the late father and president for a longer period than Bashar himself had, 
wields ‘moral weight,’” (Bar, 368). These four points worked not only to delegitimize Bashar’s 
reign in the eyes of his father’s structure of close advisors- these being the same men that worked 
closely to bring Hafez himself to power- but also in the eyes of the public as the weakening of 
the president’s stronghold on policy decisions reflected a weakening in the status of the 
presidency itself. A new staff would also shake the public’s confidence in young Bashar’s 
teetering presidency. “Since Bashar took power, the majority (over sixty percent) of the officials 
of the regime, party, and local government and members of Parliament had been replaced by 
younger figures. This was implemented primarily through imposed retirement of officials over 
the age of sixty. This turnover stood in stark contrast to the three decades of stagnant stability 
under Hafez al-Asad. This process was particularly evident in the Ba’ath party, where the 
majority of representatives to the Tenth Party Congress were new faces,” (Bar, 371). 
Rejuvinating the cabinet in order to achieve Bashar’s own policy objectives, which arguably 
could have been more in tune with the trajectory of Syrian politics than Hafez’s aging institution, 
would have been a political strategy worth investigating in its merits; however, his detractors 
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point out that these changes were aimed more at appointing people who would owe their 
positions to Bashar than facilitating real reform by rejuvenation of the regime. They were not 
people from outside the acien regime, but rather younger members of the regime who had 
climbed the ladders of hierarchy but been blocked by the lack of mobility at the top (Bar). 
However, Bashar did project a genuine desire for governmental reform. Bar explains, “Unlike his 
father, who saw the economy as secondary to national political goals, Bashar subscribes to an 
“economo-centric” view of politics. He recognizes he priority of modernizing Syria’s economy 
and is aware that to do so he must gain the goodwill of the West. This entails creating a 
functional bureaucracy to replace of the feudal system that thrived under his father,” (Bar, 371). 
Putting the goodwill of the west in the forefront of his policy objectives would again radically 
shape his presidency in different ways than the rein that his father had established. Perhaps even 
more radical was his choice to go on record formally supporting a “democratization process” in 
Syria and frequently has mentioned 2007 elections as key to the next major stage in this process. 
Bar explains, “Bashar’s accession therefore raised expectations both inside Syria and in the 
international community for a “white revolution” of democratization and liberalization in the 
country, Once the intelligentsia felt that there was a chink in the ideological uniformity of the 
regime and that the regime had lost its will, undercurrents of diversity came to the fore,” (Bar, 
371). This idea would give birth to what was popularly known as the “Damascus Spring” of 
2001- an outburst of the hitherto suppressed intellectual and civil society circles, particularly in 
Damascus, and the founding of a large number of “clubs” for political debate (Bar). However, 
there were also a number of indications that Bashar’s concept of a Syrian democracy would lack 
many of the essential elements of the Western paradigm of democracy. “Bashar’s ‘Syrian // 
democracy’ must be founded on Syrian history, culture and ‘personality.’ In Bashar’s eyes, 
‘Freedom and democracy are only instruments, just like stability. The goal is progress and 
growth.’ Along with this definition of the ‘proactive’ goal of the regime, the ‘defensive’ goal is 
preservation of ‘unity’ and ‘stability.’ Popular participation is manifested in the involvement of 
the people in promoting the country’s growth according to the plans of the regime, not in 
defining the very identity or nature of the regime. The instruments for popular participation are 
the same ones that the regime used for decades for effecting social control,” (Bar, 371-372). This 
fascinating dichotomy would further inform Bashar’s apparent view that Syria is much too 
fragile for an “instant democracy,” and opening the door wide for freedom of speech would be 
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tantamount to permitting intercommunal conflict and chaos. “Since the ‘unity’ and ‘cohesion’ of 
the people and the stability of the nation are the loftiest of national values and goals, the charge 
against members of the opposition is that they impinge on these very values in the service of 
foreign enemies of Syria,” (Bar, 372). Bashar would come to struggle with this simultaneous 
interest in modernizing Syria and delegating many historically presidential decisions to the Old 
Guard. With much of his power slipping between his fingers, his policies would begin to be seen 
as intellectually suppressive rather than modern. This awkward process of pseudo 
democratization would result in a civil unrest that Islamist political groups could come to 
capitalize on. Bar explains, “Western sponsorship of a Syrian ‘civil society’ is presented as an 
attempt to replace the indigenous Syrian ‘civil society,’ based on government-regulated clubs 
and charities and tribal institutions, with a foreign concept. The result of such chaos will not be a 
victory of liberal forces that the West is trying to sponsor, but of radical Islamic forces that are 
lying in wait to take advantage of a breakdown of the regime. The decades of Algeria since the 
early 1990s and the civil war in Lebanon and Iraq after the fall of the Ba’ath regime are cited to 
prove the folly of uncontrolled democratization,” (Bar, 372). This undercurrent of disobedience, 
though nowhere near the chaotic state we may observe today, could be seen as the cataclysmic 
beginnings of what would be dubbed a political disaster by United States officials, though these 
actors would be in no way unaware of the struggles beginning to overtake Bashar’s reign. The 
Damascus Spring would draw to a close in less than a year, though it would soon be followed by 
what would be known as the Damascus Winter of January 2002, with the arrest of Syrian 
intellectuals and parliamentary backbenchers (Bar). However, Bar would argue that the nature of 
the renewed suppression was different from that which Syria knew in the past. “…Instead of 
summary arrest and disappearances of dissidents the regime initiated public trials, albeit with 
forged evidence and predetermined verdicts, but open and with ostensible legal defense and 
media cover. In doing so it appears that the regime felt that it could ward off some of the 
international criticism of its actions,” (Bar, 373). Although Bashar may have seen these forged 
trials as a way to control his public relations among influential global powers, this crackdown on 
his father’s “civil society” would come accompanied by a declared “reactivation” of the Ba’ath 
party, where members of the regional command council were sent to mobilize support for the 
regime’s actions. This reactivation of the party would be come to seen as a fairly transparent cry 
for help; it was no less a central instrument for augmenting his legitimacy. “Unlike his father, 
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Bashar relies on party and needs to coopt it. Moreover, the party plays an important role in 
Bashar’s sociopolitical worldview; he perceives it as occupying the societal space that the civil-
society movement claims for itself. Therefore, revitalization of the party is not a mere 
propaganda ploy but an attempt to replace the civil-society movement with a government-
controlled “civil society,” (Bar, 372).  This government controlled Civil Society movement may 
be seen as an abrupt half liberalization process, which analysis sympathetic to Bashar and his 
reformist credentials have linked to four main explanations. One of these is the pressures the 
president receives from the “old guard” and the Ba’ath party, who feared a Gorbachev syndrome 
and demanded an immediate halt to the growing threat. Many of the analysis who cite this 
pressure as an important explanation for the half liberalization process refer to ultimatums that 
the old guard has issued to the president. Another major argument is unilateral and unauthorized 
action on the part of security forces, which forced a fait accompli on the president without first 
obtaining his consent. Third, Bashar himself initiated steps against the reformists in order to 
ingratiate himself with the old guard, hoping to win its support and consolidate his power and 
then implement further reforms. Finally, the rise of Ariel Sharon to power in Israel, which 
strengthened the hardliners in Damascus, who Bashar then had to accommodate (Bar). Bar 
argues, however, that these versions do not do justice to Bashar’s own vested interest in the 
survival and continuity of the regime in its existing form. He offers an alternate version which 
has become more and more accepted by most Syria waters and opposition, including, “(1) Bashar 
believed he could open the door to incremental reforms and did not expect the groundswell of 
demands for full civil liberties. Bashar had understood the need for instruments of political 
expression as means for “letting off steam,” but not as a form of popular participation in 
government. Neither Bashar nor the rest of the elite were prepared for the rapid spread of 
demands for increasing freedom and the growing willingness to criticize the regime, enabled by 
breaking of the ‘Complex of Fear,” (Bar, 373). This lack of understanding of what opening the 
floodgates would provoke in terms of the dismantling of the regime by the populace would 
become a common characteristic cited in American literature citing reasons for the devolution of 
Syria. Bashar cites his second reason, “(2) The crackdown reflected Bashar’s core believes that 
the direction that civil society took was incompatible with the vital interests of the regime and its 
survival,” (Bar, 373). American literature is also beginning to commonly cite this reason for the 
decay of the Bashar regime. While Bashar attempted to use government controlled Civil Society 
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as a means for uniting a populace in increasing disarray and dissent, the fundamental issue was 
still present; despite the steps that Bashar took after the fact in order to quell increasing political 
opposition, he had, for a brief moment, allowed an undercurrent of reality to surface and become 
a part of public political discourse, despite his attempts to shut it down afterwards. Bar also 
explains, “(3) The revitalization of the party at this stage also is commensurate with Bashar’s 
own statements that the public desire for participation, which was manifested in the breakout of 
the civil-society movement, could be satisfied by adjustments in the political structure of the 
Ba’ath party and the PNF,” (Bar, 373). Again, this retroactive work would do little in terms of 
addressing the reality of a rising undercurrent of dissent. The author also cites, “(4) The attempts 
to create as semblance of due process of law in arrests and indictment of oppositionist figures 
does not represent an acceptance of the principle of separation of branches of government, but 
rather a shift from openly arbitrary authoritarianism to institutionalized authoritarianism,” (Bar, 
373). Not only was semblance of due process blatantly superficial to the public that instigated 
this rise of oppositional framework, but it represented a reality about their government that was 
far more incriminating than the trials themselves: Bashar’s meddling in criminal charges against 
these protests was symbolic of a shift from Hafez al-Asad’s point-person policies to a more 
formalized form of authoritarianism that would further provoke participants of the Damascus 
Spring. Finally, Bar describes, “(5) the slogans of the Bashar al-Asad period in Syria, ‘change 
within the framework of continuity’ and and ‘reform and development,’-are indicative of these 
domestic priorities,” (Bar, 373). The shift away from Hafez al-Asad’s fundamental domestic 
policies was not only an opportunity to reinvigorate the regime and introduce young players that 
would prove more loyal to Bashar than the old guard: it was a fundamental movement that 
Bashar had created but rarely grasped himself. In conclusion, Bar explains, “…he is not a ‘closet 
reformer’ held hostage in the hands of an ‘old guard,’ but views political liberalization (as 
opposed to economic ‘opening) as foreign, if not an existential threat to the regime,” (Bar, 374). 
Shortly after taking control of his late father’s regime, it was made clear to the Syrian population 
that Bashar had made several fundamental mistakes in his judgement of how his policies would 
impact the public relations of the regime; what is more telling, however, is that the United States 
allowed Bashar to slowly sink, as opposed to removing him all together by another covert 
operation. The initiatives of liberalization, though largely failed as described through Bar’s major 
points, was in-line with America’s republican vision of freeing Middle Eastern States from 
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dictatorial rule. It would become a common pattern that while the United States did not allow the 
Bashar al-Asad regime to collapse completely (which would at times surface as a costly 
endeavor), Bashar was largely sympathetic to American values of democratization and would 
continue to fight for those values as whatever cost to the public relations of his own regime.  
Despite Bashar’s failure at a controlled democratization of Syria upon seizing power, he 
surrounded himself with fresh, young faces of the Ba’ath party; unfortunately, these leaders have 
demonstrated very little in common with the reformist identities of revolutionary youths This 
evolution of persons in power in Syria would falsely be perceived by the United States as an 
opportunity to reinvigorate the regime with liberal and democratic values; however, they would 
serve as little more than pawns in Bashar’s complex, failing regime structure. Hafez al-Asad’s 
old guard was subsequently pushed aside, and the regime witnessed a gradual coming of age of a 
young guard. While in the eyes of the West this would work as a positive step forward towards 
liberalization of the regime, the shift from the old guard to the new elite surrounding Bashar al-
Asad disrupted the traditional patronage networks. Bar explains, “The younger generation of 
those same families, however, feel and demonstrate much less of an affinity to their ancestral 
homes or even their ’Alawite’ identity; Bashar and Maher are both married to Sunni women, as 
are the sons of Msutafa Tlas and other ‘sons of bosses,” (Bar, 383). Within this young guard, the 
author comes to define four main groups. These main groups could be defined as, first, “Sons 
and daughters of the ‘old guard.’ These ‘princelings’ were born into privilege and learned from 
their fathers the arts of wielding power in order to gain further privilege,” (Bar, 384). While 
intrinsically connected to the old guard regime, this offered an opportunity for Bashar to 
reinvigorate the regime with new members without completely losing the political savvy of the 
old guard that Bashar took so much stock in. Secondly, “The ‘second generation’ within the 
military and security apparatuses. Prominent among these are Alawite officers who came under 
Bashar’s command in the Republican Guard, along with various senior officers in the military 
who were promoted by Bashar,” (Bar, 384). This would again provide Bashar with new 
allegiances without compromising the integrity of the Old Guard military apparatus. Another 
group defined by Bar is defined as, “The young generation of the civilian branch of the Ba’ath 
party. These are party members who owe the rapid advance in their position to their association 
with Bashar. Many of them were educated in the West and support measured change in the party 
in order to guarantee the survival of the regime,” (Bar, 384). This would again come to the great 
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approval of Western powers seeking to replace Hafez al-Asad authorities with Western-and 
specifically American-sympathies to achieve Middle Eastern liberalization and democratization. 
In fact, many of these western-educated academics would become associated with Bashar before 
he became president. Many of them came into Bashar’s orbit during the last decade after he 
became ‘heir apparent,’ and would be classified, largely, as western-mainly American and 
British educated academicians with postgraduate degrees and an academic track record in 
institutions abroad, many of them in areas of economy and social sciences. Particularly, many of 
them would also stem from Bashar’s association with the Syrian Computer Society and would be 
counted among his circle of friends (Bar). Bar summarizes the main differences between the two 
“guards” below: 
Old Guard New Guard 
First generation forught for power Second generation, born into privilege 
Personal loyalty to Hafez al-Asad Less personal loyalty, vested interests 
Used to an autocratic micromanager Used to consultation and consensus 
Centralist decision making De-centralization of decision making 
Clear definition of authority Ambiguity of authority 
Little familiarity with Western culture Educated in the US and UK 
Socialist-Arab Nationalists Ideological Pragmatists 
Support state controlled economy Support wider private economy 
Military Technocrats, experienced war and 
defeat 
Academic technocrats; no experiences with 
war 
Table content published in Bar, 384  
 
Bar further claims that the middle ranks of the Ba’ath party face also undergo a massive “face 
lift” since Bashar Al-Assad came to power.  The author explains, “This process is evident from 
the composition of the institutions on a national level (…the use of the word ‘national’ refers to 
Syria and not the Ba’athist use of ‘National’ to signify Pan-Arab institutions of the party: The 
Regional Command, the Central Committee, and the Regional Congress). Many of these are 
‘second generation’ Ba’athists who grew up with the privileges of belonging to families with 
close links to the centers of power,” (Bar, 384). Bar uses the following data to break down 
Bashar al-Asad’s associates into these groups: 
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THE 
ASAD 
FAMILY 
MILITARY (NON 
FAMILY) 
BUSINESS 
SECTOR 
YOUNG 
BA’ATHISTS 
THE 
SYRIAN 
COMPUTER 
SOCIETY 
WESTERN 
EDUCATED 
ACADEMICIANS 
Maher Al-
Asad 
Fouad Nassif 
Kheir-Bek 
Firas Tias Haytham 
Satayhi 
Sami al-
Khiyami 
Abdallah Daradari 
Asef 
Shawkat 
Manaf Tias Ayman 
‘Abd al-Nur 
Ayman ‘abd 
al-Nur 
Imad Mustafa Nabil Sukkar 
Bushra al-
Asad 
Mohamad 
Mansoura 
Samir 
Seifan 
Butheina 
Sha’aban 
Mahir al-
Mujahid 
Riad al-Abrash 
Assma al-
Asad 
 Jihad & 
Jamai 
Khaddam 
Iyad Ghazai Sa’adallah 
Awa al-
Kallah 
Ghasan al-Rifa’l 
Rami & 
Makhluf 
  Majed 
Shadoud 
Hasan Risha Sa’adallah al-Qala 
Dhu al-
Himma & 
Asef 
Shaleesh 
  Ghiyab 
Barakat 
Muhammad 
Bashir al-
Munaijad 
Buthaina Sha’aban 
Numeir al-
Asad 
  Balid al-Bouz  Muhammad al-
Hussein 
Table content published in Bar, 384 
The repercussions of introducing the new guard on formal changes in ideological axioms or 
traditional slogans have until recently been rarely discussed. Bar attributes this to the ideological 
conservatism and a sense of irrelevance of the ideology. Therefore, the debate regarding reform 
focused not on the credo of the party, but rather on its practical application. He would also claim 
that practical reforms in the party itself have been marginal. “They include more freedom in 
elections on the local level of the party, instructions (July 2004) to the media to refer to party 
members as “Mr.” and not as “comrade” (rafiq) and so forth. Open discussion of ideological 
reform has increased since Bashar al-Asad came to power, and was particularly explicit during 
the period leading up to the 10th Regional Congress (June 2005). Since then, the demands for 
reform within the party have died down, or at least are not voiced in official party organs,” (Bar, 
385). This reformist trend within the Ba’ath party is on one hand clearly identified with the 
younger generation, but most of those who are identified as reformists belong to the young 
guard, and not all of those identified as members of the young guard are in favor of those 
reforms. Bar explains, “There is no indication that the younger members of the Ba’ath 
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nomeklatura- the Asad family or the second generation of the original leaders of the regime-
favor reforms that would divest them of their privileges and economic monopolies they control. 
The young generation of the military and the mokhabarat also has shown no evidence that they 
are in favor of true economic or political reform,” (Bar, 385). In fact, the author would argue that 
the reformist trend within the party is represented mainly by the second-tier younger party 
members who have recently climbed the ladders of the hierarchy (branch heads and members of 
the Central Committee and of the Regional Congress), but have been blocked by the lack of 
mobility at the top. Also, in many cases, the reformists within the party are transitive political 
actors of senior and powerful party members and enjoy political latitude by virtue of their 
protection (Bar). Bar cites several of these cases, including, “Iyad Ghazal, the reformist-minded 
director of Syria Rail, is the son of the governor of Deraa and apparently enjoys his protection; 
Bilal Hasan Turkemani is the son of Defense Minister Hasan Turkemani; Nabil “amran is the son 
of the powerful Alawite “Amran clan of the Haddadin tribe; and Ayman ‘Abd al-Nur is also a 
second generation Ba’ath member, who became active in the party thanks to his father,” (Bar, 
386). The author would argue that these Ba’ath reformists do not represent an internal party 
phenomenon alone but rather should be seen in the context of the mushrooming Civil Society 
movement (harakat al-mujtama’ al-madani), which emerged very shortly after Bashar came to 
power (the Damascus Spring that began in early 2001) and was suppressed in the winter of 2001 
(the Damascus Winter). Bar notes, “on one hand there is no doubt that Bashar is close to many of 
the reformists, particularly those affiliated with the Syrian Computer Society. Many of these, 
though, are academicians who are not active in the part or even are not party members. Even 
those reformists who are party activists are mid-level members without large constituencies and 
without patronage networks of their own. So even if Bashar likes their ideas, many of them are 
impractical on a political level. This is because, at the end of the day, implementation of ideas in 
the Syrian regime requires the support of the bureaucracy, which believes it will be damaged by 
reforms and modernization,” (Bar, 387). While the United States allowed apparent devolution of 
Syrian politics to take place under their watch, it clearly held high hopes from reform within 
which would come to be widely impractical. This allowed for Bashar’s government to 
disintegrate into chaos despite his efforts, and United States did little to prop-up this failure in 
hopes that it would recover on its own merits of liberalizing the government elites.  
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Syria may present itself as a monolithic state and society; however, the image of stability 
belies reality, where identifications with ethnic or religious communities hold stronger than ties 
to an Arab-Syrian Nationalism. Bar aptly illustrates that Syria presents to the world, but less 
convincingly to the Syrian public, the image of monolithic state and society. He writes, “The 
refrain of “national unity” and references to the citizens of the country as “brothers” or “family” 
are ubiquitous. They appear in speeches, in official slogans, and in the daily press. The regime 
does not allow expressions of communal identity to find their way into the media; the people of 
Syria are the “Syrian Arab People.” However, despite decades of enforced unity, Syria remain a 
country divided according to communal lines. The stability that the country enjoyed for decades 
has been along an “equality of misery.” That is, citizens within Syria knew that they were all 
equally oppressed by the regime and that such suppression was the lot of citizens of other 
neighboring countries (Iraq)- or alternatively, the citizens of other countries, such as Lebanon, 
suffering from endemic instability” (Bar, 391). While the Syrian government attempts to 
propagate this image of stability, the reality of increasing instability is known to all Syrians. The 
author refers to this reality through the term “communalism” (ta-ifraya) or the primary (or even 
exclusive) identification of the individual with his ethnic or religious community. This schism is 
made evident in a number of social indicators, such as the low rate of intermarriages and 
intermingling-even within the cities- and in a general sense of acrimony among different 
communities. This sense of hostility among cultural lines is a serious threat to stability against 
the regime. Although it is not accompanied by widespread violence, there is a general sense in 
the country of decay of the regime and disintegration of authority (Bar). Bar is able to point to 
specific indicators of these threats to stability within several ethnic groups. With respect to 
Sunnis, he writes, “In its early days the Ba’ath regime formed a coalition with the rural Sunni 
elites, deposing the urban Sunni elites from their traditional predominance in Syrian society. This 
however has changed. First, many of the “rural elites” have become the party of the new urban 
elite; second, the regime gradually widened its base among the Sunnis and coopted many of the 
rich Sunni families,” (Bar, 396). In addition to this shift of loyalties, the Sunni tribes of Eastern 
Syria have been sidelined during the decades of the Hafez al-Asad regime, but Bashar has stood 
in sharp contrast to this policy. Bashar is reputed to have made an attempt to cultivate their 
loyalty. “This policy began even before the US occupation of Iraq, but has accelerated since 
then. The prospects of a breakup of Iraq into Shi’ite Kurdish, and Sunni areas would leave the 
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Iraqi tribes with a stronger dependence on the Syrian tribes. The Syrian tribes participated in the 
monthly meetings of the Iraqi tribes and Ba’athists in Damascus from October 2003 and on, and 
in December 2004 Bashar himself honored the meeting with his presence,” (Bar, 396). The 
Druze, Isma’ilis, Christians and Kurds, although a minority group as compared to a Sunni 
majority, enjoy a special status under the Ba’ath Alawite regime. The Druse and Isma’ilis are 
particularly noted as being well-integrated into the military and bureaucracy, whereas the 
Christians and Kurds play a pivotal role in the economy. Bar describes that all of these 
communities have something to lose by the fall of the regime, particularly if the alternative is a 
Sunni-possibly Islamist-regime that would not safeguard their status and would impose Sunni 
Islam on the heterodox Islamic sects of relegate them to second class citizenship.  “The Druze 
and the Isma’ilis are, like the Alawaites, a heterodox Shi’ite sect which has been coopted into the 
regime. The Druze of Syria mainly hail from the Golan and the Lebanese border and have no 
history of clashes with the Alawite neighbors in the northwestern part of the country. The rivalry 
was manifested in bloody clashes between Isma’ilis and Alawites in the towns of Qadmous and 
Misyaf in mid-2005, which resulted in attacks on Alawite houses and stores,” (Bar, 396). With 
respect to Islam and Islamic opposition, the twenty years after the suppression of rebellion of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in northern Syria has indicated a discernable dift of Syria towards Islam. 
Bar writes, “This trend is characterized by a return to the mosque, both as a reaction to the 
regime and as way to deal with the difficult//economic situation. The return to Islam is manifest 
in the wearing of traditional dress, in the plethora of Islamic book stores that have cropped up in 
Damascus and other cities, and in the growth of Islamic Institutes (600 new institutes for 
memorizing Quran and madrasas) founded under the auspices of the regime in the time of Hafez 
al-Asad as a counterbalance to the Muslim Brotherhood. Another salient phenomenon is the 
large number of Syrian families that receive charity from Islamic NGOs (estimated at about 
seventy-five thousands),” (Bar, 400-401). The author also describes that although it is at times 
difficult to distinguish between the warnings of the Syrian regime that its downfall would bring 
to power radical Islamic governments and the real threat that Islamism poses to Syria, but is 
seems that one of the main modivators of Islamic radicalism in Syria is the legitimacy crisis that 
stems from the Alawite nature of the regime. “Whereas radical Islamists in other Muslim 
countries had to prove the individual deviation of their rulers or regimes in order to warrant 
declaring them as infidels (and hence, legitimizing rebellion), viewing the Alawites as non-
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Muslims provides adequate justification for rebellion. Therefore, from an early stage the Asad 
regime set as one of its primary objectives boosting its Islamic credentials and the Islamic 
legitimacy of the Alawites in general,” (Bar, 401). Overwhelmingly, the main Islamist force in 
Syria has historically been the Muslim Brotherhood, whose movement was involved in a blood 
uprising against the regime in the late 1980s and early 1980s, which resulted in the regimes 
crackdown in the north of the country and the total destruction of large parts of the city of 
Ham’ah in Gebruary 1982, with estimated tens of thousands of civilians killed. In fact, the 
ideolog y of the Brotherhood has at the time based its rejection of the regime on the grounds of 
being takfir (declaring as heretics). Years after it was totally uprooted in Syria, the movement 
began to reach an accommodation with the regime and many of its exiled leaders returned to 
Syria, while others drifted away from the focus on Syria (Bar).  “Today, the Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood officially has renounced the use of violence against the regime and is attempting to 
create a public image that may facilitate its integration in the political process of the country, 
either in the course of ‘democratization’ of the present regime, or in the wake of its fall and the 
rise of a coalition of opposition forces. After Bashar took office the MB made efforts to reach out 
to him. In May 2001, the group prepared a “National Honour Pact,” accepting the democratic 
process and, for the first time, recognizing the regime’s legitimacy,” (Bar, 401). While 
attempting to project a moderate image, the Muslim Brotherhood focuses on four main issues, 
including violence (the Muslim Brotherhood leadership reiterates that it has renounced violence), 
willingness to accept a democratic regime in Syria, retraction of the takfir of the Alawites, 
willingness to accept the Islamic legitimacy of the Sufi trends, which are relatively strong in 
Syria, and refraining from calling for the destruction of Israel or taking anti-Semitic positions. 
However, the author describes that it is not clear to what extent these positions, which are 
expressed in the Political Program of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and in interviews with the 
exiled leader of the movement, ‘Ali Sader a-Din Bayanouni, are widely accepted by the rank and 
file of the movement or to what extent the mainstream of the Muslim Brotherhood represents the 
majority of the Islamic tendency inside Syria. Additionally, the Islamist trend is not solely 
domestically grown in Syria. Bar points out the unique double standard of the regime by openly 
supporting Palestinian Hamas and Jihad and Lebanese Hezbollah, while suppressing its own 
Islamist forces and by identification with the al Qaeda attacks on the United States. Meanwhile, 
since the fall of Hafez al-Asad, and increasingly wince the fall of the Iraqi regime, the infiltration 
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of anti-Alawite and anti-Shi’ite Wahhabi elements into Syria has intensified. Bar describes, 
“These elements find resonance in the north of the country, which was the heart of the Muslim 
Brotherhood rebellion of the 1980s. The weakening of the regime will contribute to the 
ascendancy of these elements. At the same time, the traditional Muslim Brotherhood of Syria 
remains a potential force, both as claimants for national leadership-if and when the regime falls-
as rivals of the even more radical Wahhabis,” (Bar, 402). Despite these apparent biases and 
disunities among the internal elements of the regime, the United States has shifted its stance on 
Islamist policies. While the rise of Wahhabi networks was no less encouraged in Saudi Arabia- 
in addition to other aforementioned Islamist networks that functioned in opposition to Marxist 
ideals in the past- the United States began to take an anti-Islamist stance as these networks began 
to flourish in Syria, effectively undermining the Asad regime.  
It appears that Bashar seems to subscribe to a foreign policy strategy that supports 
Islamic terror networks for the sake of survival, rather than supporting the objectives of Islamists 
themselves. Through its nimble approach to organized terror, Syria has proved that its agenda 
only supports Islamism until it would precipitate an extreme reaction on the part of the West or 
Israel. In many ways this may begin to contribute to the complex relationship between the United 
States and Syria in this respect. While the United States would prefer the pro-American regime 
to stay in place, it also cannot outwardly support Islamist policies. However, Syria’s need to 
maintain ties to Islamist networks is seen as indispensable, in that Syria’s geography and history 
have been pivotal factors in forming the regime’s strategy. Bar outlines the main elements of 
these and their effects in his work, listing “[1] Absence if a tradition of national unity (the 
regions that today comprise modern Syria were completely separate provinces of the Ottoman 
Empire, with little in common, [2] Strong neighbors (Israel and Turkey) allied with the United 
States with whom Syria has ongoing territorial disputes, and [3] lack of natural riches,” (Bar, 
402). Despite these geographical limitations, Syria’s regional role is regarded as the greatest 
achievement of Hafez al-Asad, who played a part on the Arab stage that transcended Syria’s 
objective geographical and economic significance. Rather than deriving from a dictatorial 
megalomania, as was the case with Saddam Hussein, it rose from an ideological attachment to 
the ideal of “Arabism” and anticolonialism, and from the belief that only through representation 
of Arabism in general could Syria play a role in the region (Bar). One of the major components 
of Syria’s regional strategic policy is calculated use, with relative impunity, of terrorist 
76 
 
organizations. Bar describes, “Syria is almost a “founding father” of the US list of state sponsors 
of international terrorism, providing Hezbollah, HAMAS, PFLP-GC, the PIJ, and other terrorist 
organizations refuge and basing privileges. Its use of terror, though, has usually been measured 
and with a clear view not to act in a manner that would precipitate an extreme reaction on the 
part of the West or Israel,” (Bar, 402). Bar explains that while Syria has encouraged and even 
provided material and planning support to Palestinian terrorist organizations, it consistently has 
prohibited any terrorist attacks from the Golan Heights into Israel. Bar also explains that Syria 
was cautious in its use of terrorism against Turkey. “It provided support through hosting of the 
PKK (and in the past the Armenian terrorist organization, ASALA) in Lebanon. However, when 
finally severally challenged by Turkey, Syria cut off its support of the PKK and ASALA and 
occasionally, under American pressure, has lowered the profile of its hosting certain Palestinian 
organizations. Syria also took care never to allow the “tail to wag on the dog”; when necessary 
Syrian intelligence clamped down on recalcitrant terrorist organizations and reduced the level of 
Iranian Revolutionary Guard activity in Lebanon,” (Bar, 402). This relationship with Turkey 
begins to increasingly highlight how Syria calibrated its moves with respect to western foreign 
policy pressures. Some researchers even goes so far as to label Syria as a remarkable anomaly in 
terms of its relationship to Islamism.  
 
Islamism Without Islamists 
Though a nominally secular regime controlled by non-Muslims, Syria has become the 
leading sponsor of Islamism in the Arab-speaking world and in some ways seemingly at home as 
well. In his work The Truth About Syria, scholar Barry Rubin, Washington Institute visiting 
fellow describes this phenomenon as “Islamism without Islamists.” The Syrian regime becomes 
what is no longer a secular government fighting Islamism but rather the main Arab state 
promoting it.   Rubin explains, “Within Syria, the courting of Islamism helps reconcile the 60 
percent Sunni Arab majority to the rule of a regime dominated by Alawites, whose numbers are 
only one-fifth that size of the population. It undermines the appeal of opposition Islamist groups, 
notably the Muslim Brotherhood, and also of liberal movements that Sunnis might otherwise 
support. Abroad, promoting Islamism benefits the regimes foreign policy interests,” (Rubin, 
385). Before these efforts began and even thereafter, the Muslim Brotherhood, the principal 
independent Islamist group in Syria, would call the regime an infidel one, and during the 1980s it 
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raised a serious revolt which was systematically put down. Since then, it has primarily 
functioned in exile and as an underground grouping. The author further explains that the regime 
largely neutralized this threat by courting the Sunni religious establishment, which had never 
shown much involvement in the Brotherhood. “The Sunni hierarchy must be made to accept the 
Alawites as perfectly good Shi’a Muslims. Accoriding to the constitution, Syria’s president has 
to be Muslim; thus Syria’s successive presidents, Hafiz and Bashar al-Asad, had to be recognized 
as proper Muslims,” (Rubin, 385). Due to this issue of legitimacy, Hafez introduced a campaign 
to win over Sunni muslims, making a pilgrimage in 1974, raising clerics’ salaries, and 
convincing the respected (though totally politicized and relatively junior) Lebanese Shi’a cleric 
Musa al-Sadr to certify that Alawites were really Shi’a Muslims (Rubin). Hafez al-Asad’s 
government would also control the religious establishment, the education and ordination of 
ulama (Islamic scholars), the building of mosques, and so forth, with the goal of using Islam for 
four purposes: to combat liberalism by upholding tradition; to discredit the radical Islamists as 
misinterpreting their religion; to curse its own foreign enemies as anti-Muslim; and to legitimize 
the regime as the embodiment of piety (Rubin). The author describes, “Under Bashar’s reign, the 
government has taken on an even more active role as promoter of Islam. It has recognized that 
religion offers a rare outlet for Syrians otherwise frustrated by their lives and society but is 
determined that this not be channeled into support for its Islamist enemies,” (Rubin, 386). To 
illustrate this point, one of Bashar’s first acts as president was to repeal his father’s decree 
forbidding girls from wearing headscarves in school. In June 2003 a decree permitted soldiers to 
pray in military camps despite regulations that mandated that career soldiers suspected of being 
religious were to be dismissed from the army. Bashar himself would go on his own minor 
pilgrimages, and larger mosques were built, and schools became more religious in their 
instruction. In these ways the regime would portray itself as a friend of religion, and therefore a 
government that any good Sunni Muslim would be proud to support. Bashar also became a 
champion of Islamism in an international realm. Rubin explains, “He is allied with Islamist Iran, 
the patron of Islamist Hizbollah and Hamas, and the sponsor of the Sunni Islamist insurgency in 
Iraq,” (Rubin, 386). In contrast, Hafez al-Asad’s strategic foreign policy had several clear goals. 
These were, “…to enhance Syria’s regional status; to prevent a separate peace between Israel 
and Jordan, Lebanon, and the Palestinians; to cultivate good relations with external powers 
(Russia, Europe, and the Gulf Arabs); // and to challenge, when necessary, the designs of the 
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United States in the region,” (Bar, 403). In both of these instances, in the short run, domestic 
Islamist forces have been tamed, even transformed into regime supporters. Rubin describes that 
Bashar had effectively invented a new ideology, which can be called the “Islamist-Arab 
nationalist synthesis.” This is unique hybrid ideology can be best described as follows, “Islamists 
and nationalists can work in perfect harmony if they and focus on fighting the evil external 
enemies of Arabs and Muslims, America, the West, and Israel. Moreover, of course, their 
cooperation in this effort requires that both sides// enthusiastically support the regime, which 
champions their common causes,” (Rubin, 386-387). In order to accomplish this, Bashar would 
embark on what would be coined the three-prong offensive. He would first encourage non-
political Islam at home so that Syrian Sunni Muslims would be grateful to the regime. Following 
this, Bashar would sponsor radical Islamism abroad so that Islamist groups in other countries 
would ally with the Syrian government and not support counterparts who wanted to overthrow it. 
In fact, according to the author, Syria would do more to sponsor Islamist revolution abroad than 
all other Arab governments put together. In addition to the Lebanese Hezbollah and the 
Palestinian Hamas and Islamic Jihad, Bashar hosted leaders of militant Islamist opposition 
groups from Algeria, Jordan, Sudan and Tunisia. Next, Bashar persuaded liberal-minded Syrians 
that if they challenged the regime, the ultimate winders would be Islamist. Bashar claimed that 
for reformist intellectuals and women who wanted more rights, as well as Christians and Druze, 
a continuation of the Asad dictatorship would be by far the lesser of two evils. To some extent, 
this strategy was effective in achieving its purpose. “This strategy worked in pushing the Syrian 
Muslim Brotherhood opposition to the margins on both the domestic and international fronts. For 
example, at a 1998 conference in Amman called by the Syrian Brotherhood to mobilize support, 
a Jordanian participant reportedly scolded that ‘Syria is the only Arab state standing up to Israel, 
granting support to every opposition to the Zionist occupation. Therefore it is impossible for an 
Arab or a Muslim to attack it and try to harm it and its leadership,’” (Rubin, 387). To some 
extent this ideological overlap would mean Syria had to recalibrate its defense and determine its 
enemies. While Syria’s “anti imperialist” rhetoric had been couched in Marxist terms, Deputy 
Minister of Waqf Muhammad Abd al-Satter Sayyid declared on state television, “’Jihad is not 
incumbent upon each and every Muslim, Arab and Christian. The time has come for the duty of 
jihad.’ The enemy was the Jews who had ‘killed the prophets,’ allegedly depicted in the Koran 
“in a very sinister and dark way’ and cursed by Allah,” (Rubin, 387). It was definitely a strange 
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sight to see a Muslim cleric calling on Christians to fulfill the duty of jihad, which is, clearly, 
only an Islamic tenet. However, this was much in line with the Syrian ideological approach. 
Rubin explains, “On one hand, the idea was to show this as a ‘nationalist’ rather than ‘religious’ 
holy war, the perfect example of blending the two doctrines. On the other hand, the regime has 
upheld Syria’s multiethnic character. Making distinctions between religious communities would 
heighten not only Muslim-Christian tensions but also Muslim-Alawite ones. At any rate, the 
Syrian regime has invented non-Muslim Jihad,” (Rubin, 387). With these revelations, scholars 
would also come to determine three distinct groups of Islamists. One of which was a small, 
shadowy radical Islamist group (which as Rubin explains, could only conceivably be a 
government front), who occasionally launched terrorist attacks. This group, however, did not 
pose much of a threat to the regime, and the validity of the group often came into question as 
captured terrorists would tend to conveniently die before they could be questioned thoroughly. 
The second of which was the Muslim Brotherhood, whose dozens of members remain in prison. 
The author explains, “However, this is largely an exile group, led by Ali Sadr al-Dina al-Baya-
nuni rom his base in London. It formed the National Salvation Front as a broad coalition with 
other opposition groups, including some liberals, Communists, and Kurdish nationalists. Seeking 
international support against the regime, Bayanuni visited Washington, DC, where he met 
secretly with US officials. Ironically, and this also shows the success of the regime’s Islamist 
strategy, Bayanuni cited as his role model Hamas, itself a Syrian client,” (Rubin, 389). The third 
and final group potentially holds the most important position with respect to the regime, this 
being the Sunni Muslim preachers and pious practitioners who have been gaining support with 
the regime’s blessing. While the author describes the difficultly to quantify or define this “pro-
regime” Islamism, but it could one day turn against the patron that promoted such ideas and 
activists. With this information in hand, it becomes abundantly clear that while the regime has its 
own reasons to promote Islamism on a domestic and international front, it will only do this to the 
extent that United States forces allow it to keep in check as measure of self-preservation rather 
than a true commitment to international Islamism or an Islamist State condition.  
 
Introduction of Bush-Era Rhetoric 
Syrian foreign policy on Iraq changed fundamentally as a result of American action in the 
military action in the Middle East; Bashar, inheriting neighboring instability as a result of the 
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US-Iraq war, was obliged to transition from policies of pro-Iraqi rhetoric to policies in line with 
Bush’s doctrinal animosity against ‘The Axis of Evil’ in the interest of keeping radical Islamist 
organizations at bay. The Ba’ath parties of Iraq and Syria are often misinterpreted as one in the 
same; however, not only are the two unique and separate entities, but the Ba’ath party of Iraq had 
been the nemesis of the Asad regime for decades. Bar explains that the animosity between the 
two regimes had been a significant factor in Syria’s support for Iran during the Iraq-Iran war of 
the 1980s and its support for the Coalition in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 
1990. However, Bashar reversed Hafez al-Asad’s policy soon after he came to power and began 
a policy of rapprochement with Baghdad. Bar explains, “Bashar’s support of Iraq included: pro-
Iraqi rhetoric such as his referral to Iraq as Syria’s ‘strategic depth’; political support for Iraq in 
the United Nations Security Council…; economic support through illicit trade, and opening of 
the oil pipeline; and military support through smuggling of military components from Syria to 
Iraq. The regime, and Bashar himself, did not stop at pro-Iraqi statements, but escalated into 
direct anti-American rhetoric as well. Bashar accused the US of a policy directed toward 
‘gaining control over Iraqi oil and redrawing the map of the region in keeping with its 
worldview’…” (Bar, 413). Bashar’s reversal in pro-American sentiment to vehemently anti-
American policy towards Iraq is at odds with much of his previous ideology. Bar suggests that 
although the logic is not overtly clear, the deterioration of the Syrian policy regarding the Iraqi 
situation and the Syrian support for the Iraqi insurgency can provide some insight into the 
decision-making process of the regime. Bar’s analysis comes to acknowledging several factors 
that might influence Bashar’s behavior in this regard. The first factor is identified as Syria’s 
close relations with Iran and their clear influence on Syrian assessment. “The Iranian regime 
regarded a stabilized oil-rich pro-American Iraq as a clear and imminent threat to its own 
existence. Like Syria, it assessed that it would be next on the American agenda if Iraq were to be 
stabilized,” (Bar, 414). Bar explains that immediately after the first stage of ‘Iraqi Freedom,’ a 
number of of high-level consultations occurred between Syria and Iran. Bashar was clearly 
receptive of the Iranian arguments that Syria and Iran should cooperate to avert the danger. Bar’s 
second factor would be identified as the domestic consideration that allowed radical Islamists to 
act against the American presence in Iraq that would shift the focus of local Islamists away from 
acting against the regime. The final factor would be the logic of the Hafez al-Asad regime in 
providing safe haven to terrorist organizations acting against neighboring countries, including the 
81 
 
PKK and ASALA against Turkey, the Japanese Red Army, and various Palestinian 
organizations, and allowing them to operate from Syrian soil adopted by Bashar. Bar argues that 
according to this logic, such support served as a valuable bargaining chip for future negotiations 
with the challenged country (Bar). While the Syrian regime was clearly not acting in line with 
American interests in Iraq, however ambiguous those interests may be, the Syrians undoubtedly 
made fundamental changes to their foreign strategy as a tactic for survival in response to the 
United States meddling in these foreign affairs.  
Though foreign policy has generally attempted to remain positive with respect to the 
United States, the Bashar administration has grown less trusting since the beginning of the Iraq 
war, among its concerns the irrefutable intentions on the part of the US to dethrone Bashar as a 
result of his ties to global terror. The United States undoubtedly had a mixed relationship with 
Syria, in seeing it as both an adversary, given its role in Israel’s most important strategic ally, as 
well as a necessary actor in Middle Eastern political discourse. As a result, even as tensions rose 
between the two countries, Hafez al-Asad did not abandon dialogue with Washington, and 
channels of communication remained open. President Bush chose not to include Syria in his 
proclaimed “Axis of Evil,” and this decision stood as undeniable evidence that the Syrian 
regime, in stark contrast to that of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, was essentially legitimate in the 
eyes of the United States administration. However, after the Saddam Hussein regime was 
toppled, this sense of assurance eroded substantially. Bar would argue that at this point, Syria 
would now see Washington as moving inexorably toward delegitimizing the Syrian Ba’ath 
regime as well. He bases this argument on several points. The first of these points reads, “The 
US position on democratization as a major balm for the plague of terrorism places change of 
nondemocratic regimes-particularly those which are traditionally hostile to the US and 
supporters of terrorism-high on the American political agenda. The identification of the Syrian 
regime as “Ba’athist,” like the former Iraqi regime, only exacerbates this feeling,” (Bar, 418). 
The undeniable ambiguity of referencing both regimes as one in the same (“Ba’ath,” as opposed 
to their nation-specific sects) is at its surface a nominal incongruence; however, in an 
increasingly hostile discourse of anti-Islamist sentiment on the part of the United States, a feeling 
of uncertainty as a result of being labeled with this nomenclature is not only understandable, but 
arguably expected. As a second point, Bar cites, “Developments in Lebanon make Syria ‘low 
hanging fruit’ in regard to regime change. Positive regime change in Damascus can be used by 
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the administration to show an achievement and to balance the lack of success in the Iraqi 
theater,” (Bar, 418). Bashar’s increasing instability would make him increasingly self-conscious 
as a target in the eyes of the imperialist United States, whose pro-democratization initiative in 
Iraq fell flat on its face in an almost embarrassing turn of events, and may be seeking redemption 
in the eyes of the American people. On a third note, Bar points to the following: “The desertion 
of France, which had been a traditional friend of Syria and supported Bashar in his first days as 
president, leaves Syria without support from a strong European ally,” (Bar, 418). Here, again, 
Syria finds itself in a position of global weakness, in which it may find itself pray to a vying anti-
Syrian American initiative to reclaim its position of dominance in the Arab world after a failed 
Iraqi program. Finally, Bar cites, “Syria fears that American delegitimization of the Syrian 
regime will harden Israeli stance toward it and give it free run to react to Hezbollah attacks and 
terrorist attacks in Israel perpetrated by Syrian-based organizations. Under these circumstances, 
Syria believes that Israel will not enter into negotiations with Syria on the Golan. Negotiations 
with Israel or even willingness to hold them has always been a significant lever for Syria to 
achieve international acceptance, in spite of its support of terrorism, lack of democracy, etc,” 
(Bar, 418). Despite these many reasons for hesitation and suspicion of United States intentions 
towards, Syria, there is no doubt that the Bashar administration would like to reach out to the 
United States. Bar would even go so far as to say that he is eager for any contact with the 
administration with which he can mitigate the American hostility toward him. He writes, 
“Recognizing the priority of the war on terror for the US, Bashar hoped immediately after 9/11 
to acquire the good will of the administration through cooperation on intelligence on al Qaeda. 
However, his perception that the administration is intent on toppling his regime limits his ability 
to enter into any real ‘give and take’ dialogue over the few//strategic cards he regains: (1) 
support of the Iraqi insurgency; (2) support of Hezbollah; (3) hosting of Palestinian terrorist 
organizations; (4) opposition to Abu Mazen and to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process; and (5) 
willingness to revive the peace negotiations with Israel without reference to the ‘deposit’ or to 
taking up the negotiations at the point where they ended,” (Bar, 418-419). Due to these limits, 
Bashar had to formulate his policy priority vis a vis the United States to convince it that the 
Syrian regime is still strong and resilient, and therefore the United States cannot count on its 
falling, and the consequences of toppling the regime would be catastrophic as they would bring 
about the disintegration of the country into rival communities similar to Iraq, and may even bring 
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the Jihadi movement and the Muslim Brotherhood to power, and that Syria will continue to be 
nuisance to American interests in the region as long as its own interests are not addressed. 
However, even this idea fell short.  “Bashar’s failure to convince the US of the resilience of his 
regime and of the inadvisability of toppling it leaves him only one option, namely, trying to 
prove that Syria’s nuisance value warrants changing policy towards it. As Bashar’s hopes for a 
substantial dialogue with the US diminishes, he may be tempted to step up his ‘nuisance value’ 
by threatening US interests in various ways (such as escalating terrorism and support of Iraqi 
insurgency,” (419). With this onset of negative reinforcement, the newly concocted adversarial 
nature of the regime with respect to the United States would shape foreign relations not only with 
mainly Syrian Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, but also newly forming Islamist 
groups vying to take advantage of an increasingly precarious regime.  
 
Resurrection of the Ba’ath 
In recent years we have witnessed the extraordinary phenomenon of the seemingly 
arbitrary rise of the incredibly savvy 21st century Islamist terrorist group in Syria known as the 
Islamic State in Levant (or, more commonly referred to as ISIS/ISIL); however, experts would 
argue that the jihadist group is quietly utilizing a network of former members of Saddam 
Hussein’s Ba’ath Party to help militarize a fighting force that has effectively erased the border 
between both nations and left roughly six million people under its rule. Jason Breslow, digital 
editor at FRONTLINE PBS, writes extensively on the issue of the extent to which Saddam’s 
former soldiers are fueling the rise of ISIS. The author explains that the extent of this seemingly 
mismatched alliance is detailed in a new report by the New York-based intelligence firm, the 
Soufan Group. Despite the deep philosophical divide between the Islamic State and the Ba’ath 
Party, the two sides have found “sufficient coincidence of interest to overcome any ideological 
disagreement.” Richard Barrett, the report’s author, has termed this a “marriage of convenience,” 
and can be seen throughout the Islamic State hierarchy. The author describes, “The current head 
of the group’s military council, for example, is believed to be Abu Ahmad al Alwani, an ex-
member of Saddam Hussein’s army. So too was al Alwani’s predecessor. Another member of the 
military council, Abu Muhanad al Sweidawi, was once a lieutenant colonel in Hussein’s air 
defense intelligence, but by early 2014 was heading ISIS operations in western Syria, according 
to the report,” (Breslow). Even beyond this analysis there is evidence of the organizations’ 
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overlaps. The two deputies to the Islamic State’s self-promoted caliph, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, 
are former Ba’athists: Abu Muslim al Afari and Turkmani is believed to have been a senior 
special forces officer and a member of military intelligence in Hussein’s army. Currently he 
serves as Baghdadi’s number two by supervising ISIS operations in Iraq. Abu Ali al Anbari, 
acting as second deputy, oversees operations in Syria. Both of these men are also suspected of 
serving in the Islamic State’s main governing body, titled the “Shura Council,” (Breslow). The 
connections between these two groups grows even deeper after comprehensive analysis. The 
author explains, “Even the appointment of al Baghdadi to lead the Islamic State of Iraq in 2010 is 
reported by an ISIS defector to have been engineered by a former Baathist: Haji Bakr, an ex-
colonel from the Iraqi Revolutionary Guard. Bakr “initially attracted criticism from fellow 
members of the group for his lack of a proper beard and lax observance of other dictates of their 
religious practice,” the report notes, “But his organizational skills, knowledge of the Iraqi Army 
and network of fellow ex-Baathists made him a valuable resource,” (Breslow). This type of 
expertise and network of connections has made former Ba’athists valuable to the Islamic State, 
according to Barret. Barret cites the long-term planning and preparation seen in the Islamic 
State’s capture of Nineveh Province and its capital, Mosul, in June 2014. Although typically 
painted by western media as the work of neophyte enthusiasts inspired by their imagined rewards 
of martyrdom, it is clearly the result of detailed planning by people who know Iraq well, have 
prior experience and training, and are able to manage an organization with discipline and 
secrecy. All of these characteristics qualify as characteristics of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist 
supporters. However, the author points out that the incentives for even ex-Ba’athists may be 
equally opportunistic. The author quotes, “’What the Baathists probably get out of it is a way 
back into Iraq,” says Brian Fishman, a counterterrorism research fellow at the New America 
Foundation. Before the Islamic State’s emergence, Fishman notes, many Baathists had been 
effectively forced out of Iraq to neighboring Syria. Today, they’re back home, slowly acquiring 
influence and territory,’” (Breslow). It becomes clear that the Ba’athists have a stake in this 
marriage of convenience; however, upon further analysis of their motivations, the more pressing 
question emerges: how long can this alliance last? Analysists agree that one of the few points the 
two groups agree on is restoring Sunni rule in Iraq. However, at its core, the Islamic state focuses 
on expanding the Islamic caliphate that it declared in June 29. 2014, while the Ba’ath Party in 
Iraq has been a largely secular, nationalist movement. However, as the author explains, some 
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fissures have begun to surface. “In July, for example, Reuters reported that Sunni militants that 
helped ISIS capture Mosul rounded up as many as 60 senior ex-military officers and other 
onetime members of the Baath Party. That same month, a rival Sunni group made up of many 
former Baathists issued a statement denouncing the Islamic State’s persecution of Iraq’s religious 
minorities,” (Breslow). However, as the author points out, how deep any split may go is hard to 
tell. The author again cites Barrett, who claims that ex-Ba’athists may decide it’s in their interest 
to continue harnessing the energy of ISIS in order to regain prominence in Iraq. “Barrett says its 
easy to see ex-Baathists then tell themselves, ‘Once we achieve our objectives, our political 
objectives, then we’ll sort out all this business about these crazies who believe in a caliphate.’ On 
the other hand, Baathists may simply come to the conclusion that there is nowhere else for them 
to go. ‘They’re going to make the best of a bad job in a way,’ Barrett says,” (Breslow).  
Similarly, Fishman sees a mirrored decision facing former Ba’athists, though he warns against 
assuming the block which act in concert. He notes that it is important to remembered that in late 
2006, Ba’athists faced a comparable scenario, and while some opted to continue their 
involvement in the Iraqi insurgency, others chose to align themselves with the United States 
against the Sunni militants. On the other hand, Islamists viewed the alliances as being guided 
more by politics than it is by ideology. The author claims, “ISIS at the end of the day is a 
political actor, and they have this sort of extreme, even ideological perspective, but that is all 
framed through who is helping us on the battlefield and who’s not,” he says. “If you’re helping 
them on the battlefield, they’re going to find a reason to think you’re a good guy. If you are not 
helping them on the battlefield, they’re going to find a reason to think you’re a bad guy,” 
(Breslow). With this evidence, we can hardly proclaim the rise of the Islamic State in Syria as 
arbitrary; the submission of the Ba’ath party and its resurrection can be directly related to United 
States foreign policy towards the Syrian regime that caused its destabilization and eventual rise 
of a far more systematized political party.  
 
2011 Democratic Uprising 
On this note this brings our narrative to the ever-memorable 2011 democratic uprising, 
priming the Syrian political position of recent memory. At its surface, the State Department has 
poured billions of dollars into anti-Islamist and anti-terrorist campaigns; on a more informal 
level, however, NGOs and government-financed organizations has been promoting democratic 
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change in Syria and the greater Middle East region. Ron Nixon, New York Times contributor to 
the World report describes how even as the United States poured billions of dollars into foreign 
military programs and anti-terrorism campaigns, a small core of American government-financed 
organizations was promoting democracy in authoritarian Arab states. He writes, “The money 
spent on these programs was minute compared with efforts led by the Pentagon. But as American 
officials and others look back at the uprisings of the Arab Spring, they are seeing that the United 
States’ democracy-building campaigns played a bigger role in fomenting protests than was 
previously known, with key leaders of the movements having been trained by the Americans in 
campaigning, organizing through new media tools and monitoring elections,” (Nixon). Nixon 
articulates these key leaders as a number of groups and individuals who would come to be 
directly involved in the revolts and reforms spurred across the region, such as the April 6 Youth 
Movement in Egypt, the Bahrain Center for Human Rights and grass-roots activists like Entsar 
Qadhi, a youth leader in Yemen, received training and financing from groups like the 
International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute and Freedom House, a 
nonprofit human rights organization based in Washington, according to interviews in recent 
weeks and American diplomatic cables obtained by WikiLeaks (Nixon). The work of these 
groups often provoked tensions between the Middle Eastern and United states leaders, who both 
would complain that their leadership was being undermined. The ties between these groups and 
the United States administration are relatively transparent. “The Republican and Democratic 
institutes are loosely affiliated with the Republican and Democratic Parties. They were created 
by Congress and are financed through the National Endowment for Democracy, which was set 
up in 1983 to channel grants for promoting democracy in developing nations. The National 
Endowment receives about $100 million annually from Congress. Freedom House also gets the 
bulk of its money from the American government, mainly from the State Department,” (Nixon). 
Nixon goes on to clarify that there are no doubts that the Arab uprisings grew out of domestic 
grievances, rather than “foreign influence” as stipulated by some theories perpetuated by Middle 
Eastern leaders, and though the United States did not fund them to start the protests, they did 
help support their development of skills and networking. Stephen McInerney, executive director 
of the Project on Middle East Democracy, a Washington-based advocacy and research group, 
attests to this fact. He claims, “That training did play a role in what ultimately happened, but it 
was their revolution. We didn’t start it,’” (Nixon). One of these initiatives is the 2008 technology 
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meeting in New York, where Egyptian youth leaders were taught to use social networking and 
mobile technologies to promote democracy. Several private enterprises sponsored this event, 
including Facebook, Google, MTV, and Columbia Law School, as well as the State Department. 
“’We learned how to organize and build coalitions,’ said Bashem Fathy, a founder of the youth 
movement that ultimately drove the Egyptian uprisings. Mr. Fathy, who attended training with 
Freedom House, said, ‘This certainly helped during the revolution,’” (Nixon). Testimonials like 
these are innumerable. Ms. Qadhi, Yemeni youth activist, attended American training sessions in 
Yemen. She describes, “It helped me very much because I used to think that change only takes 
place by force and by weapons,’ she said. ‘But now, she said, it is clear that results can be 
achieved with peaceful protests and other nonviolent means,’” (Simon). Despite the glowing 
popularity of these initiatives among many activists, some members of activist groups 
complained in interviews that the United States was hypocritical for helping them at the same 
time that it was supporting the governments they sought to change. Mr. Fathy, the Egyptian 
activist. He explains, “’While we appreciated the training we received through the NGOs 
sponsored by the U.S. government, and it did help us in our struggles, we are also aware that the 
same government also trained the state security investigative service, which was responsible for 
the harassment and jailing of many of us,’” (Nixon). Nixon explains that interviews with officials 
of the nongovernmental groups and a review of diplomatic cables obtained by WikiLeaks show 
that the democracy programs were constant sources of tension between the United States and 
many Arab governments. The cables, in particular, show how leaders in the Middle East and 
North Africa viewed these groups with deep suspicion, and tried to weaken them. Today the 
work of these groups is among the reasons that governments in turmoil claim that Western 
meddling was behind the uprisings, with some officials noting that leaders like Ms. Qadhi were 
trained and financed by the United States (Nixon). The author claims, “Diplomatic cables report 
how American officials frequently assured skeptical governments that the training was aimed at 
reform, not promoting revolutions,” (Nixon). One example the author cites is from 2010, a few 
months before national elections in Bahrain, where officials barred a representative of the 
National Democratic Institute from entering the country. Bahraini officials worried that the 
group’s political training disproportionately benefited the opposition, according to a January 
2010 cable. Another one of these examples takes place in Yemen, where the United States has 
been spending millions on an anti-terrorism program, officials complained that American efforts 
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to promote democracy amounted to interference in internal Yemeni affairs. Additionally, the 
author cites the case of Egypt, where the opposition to American groups was second to none. 
“Egypt, whose government receives $1.5 billion annually in military and economic aid from the 
United States, viewed efforts to promote political change with deep suspicion, even outrage. 
Hosni Mubarak, then Egypt’s president, was “deeply skeptical of the U.S. role in democracy 
promotion,” said a diplomatic cable from the United States Embassy in Cairo dated Oct. 9, 
2007,” (Nixon). Additionally, at one time the United State financed political reform groups by 
channeling money through the Egyptian government. However, in 2005, under a Bush 
administration initiative, local groups were given direct grants, much the chagrin of Egyptian 
officials (Nixon). Nixon cites a September 2006 cable, where Mahmoud Nayel, an official with 
the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, complained to American Embassy officials about the 
United States government’s “arrogant tactics in promoting reform in Egypt,” (Nixon). The 
Republican and Democratic institutes were the main targets of Egyptian complaints. Egyptian 
officials complained that the United States was providing support for “illegal organizations,” per 
diplomatic cables. Nixon specifically cites, “Gamal Mubarak, the former president’s son, is 
described in an Oct. 20, 2008, cable as ‘irritable about direct U.S. democracy and governance 
funding of Egyptian NGOs,’” (Nixon). The transparency of these relationships especially 
surfaced when the Egyptian government even appealed to groups like Freedom House to stop 
working with local political activists and human rights groups. The author writes, “They were 
constantly saying: ‘Why are you working with those groups, they are nothing. All they have are 
slogans,’” said Sherif Mansour, an Egyptian activist and a senior program officer for the Middle 
East and North Africa at Freedom House,” (Nixon). However, when their appeals to the United 
States government failed, the Egyptian authorities reacted by restricting the activities of the 
American nonprofit organizations. Nixon lists examples of hotels that were to host training 
sessions were closed for renovations, staff members of the groups were followed, local activists 
were intimidated and jailed, and state-owned newspapers accused activists of receiving money 
from American intelligence agencies. However, affiliating themselves with the American 
organizations may have tainted leaders within their own groups. “According to one diplomatic 
cable, leaders of the April 6 Youth Movement in Egypt told the American Embassy in 2009 that 
some members of the group had accused Ahmed Maher, a leader of the January uprising, and 
other leaders of “treason” in a mock trial related to their association with Freedom House, which 
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more militant members of the movement described as a “Zionist organization,” (Nixon). As a 
result of the overwhelming government opposition, some groups moved their training sessions to 
friendlier countries like Jordan or Morocco, and sent activists to the United States for training. In 
fact, the conception of democratic demonstration in Syria was largely peaceful, as Asad chose to 
maintain a political message of unity and intellectual compromise as opposed to violent civilian-
government clash. However, the Syrian dictatorship made no attempt to conceal the revolts in 
Tunisia and Egypt from its people, and indeed spoke of them openly. Anderson, a New York 
Times contributor, explores this difficult contingency. “’We have more difficult circumstances 
than most of the Arab countries,’ President Bashar al- Assad grandly informed The Wall Street 
Journal on Jan. 31, ‘but in spite of that, Syria is stable. Why? Because you have to be very 
closely linked to the beliefs of the people,’” (Anderson). Despite this initial outward 
commentary, Syria’s state-controlled media went silent on the topic.  There was a brief mention 
when in early March, demonstators took to the streets of southern Syrian city Dara’a to protest 
the arrest and reported torture of a group of high-school students for writing anti-government 
graffiti on the walls. Anderson reports, “’I heard about what happened in Dara’a through social 
media,’ Majd said, ‘from Facebook and YouTube.’ It was from the same venues that Majd 
learned of a solidarity protest, called the Day of Dignity, that was to take place in front of the 
Khaled bin al- Waleed Mosque in downtown Homs on March 18. Heeding the admonitions of 
his parents, Majd stayed well away from that rally, but he heard through friends that hundreds of 
demonstrators had shown up, watched over by a nearly equal number of police officers and state 
security personnel. It was a shocking story to the 18- year-old college student; Homs had simply 
never experienced anything like it,” (Anderson). This demonstration was reportedly tiny in 
comparison with the following, occurring just one week later. In this instance, thousands of 
protesters assembled.  Anderson describes Majd’s experience among the onlookers, who 
managed to get close enough to hear their demands, among them reform, greater civil rights, a 
repeal of state – of – emergency edict that had been in place in Syria for the previous 48 years. 
Asad delivered a speech to the Syrian Parliament on March 30, which was carried live by state 
television and radio outlets. He writes, “While protests had spread to a number of Syrian cities, 
they were still largely peaceful, with dissenters calling for changes in the regime rather than for 
its overthrow. As a result — and with the assumption that the regime had learned something 
from the recent collapse of the Tunisian and Egyptian governments and the widening chaos in 
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Libya — many expected Assad to take a conciliatory approach,” (Anderson). Anderson explains, 
however, that this expectation was also in part passed on Asad’s personality. He describes that in 
the 11 years he had ruled the nation since the death of his father, the unassuming 
ophthalmologist had adopted many trappings of reform. Aside from this, the author also 
describes his attractive young wife, Asma, who had put a pleasing, modern face on the Syrian 
autocracy. However, behind this charm, little had truly changed; Syria’s secret police were still 
everywhere, and the ‘deep state’- the country’s permanent ruling class of bureaucrats and 
military figures-remained firmly in the hands of the Alawite minority. The Alawites feared that 
any compromise with the protesters was to invite a Sunni revolution and, with it, their demise 
(Anderson). Anderson writes, “Assad soon realized that this conciliatory approach did not stand 
strong against western-trained rebels; as a result, Assad began to reform his message to take a 
more hard-line approach to the dissent threatening the stability of the regime,” (Anderson). After 
providing vague rhetoric about future reform, Assad instead used his parliamentary speech to 
accuse the protesters of aiding the Israeli enemy and to issue a stern warning. “’Burying sedition 
is a national, moral and religious duty, and all those who can contribute to burying it and do not 
are part of it,’ he declared. ‘There is no compromise or middle way in this.’ In keeping with a 
tradition begun during his father’s reign, Assad’s speech was repeatedly interrupted by members 
of Parliament leaping to their feet to shout out their undying love and gratitude to the president,” 
(Anderson). Anderson recounts an uneasiness that fell over Homs after Asad’s address. While he 
describes a state of protests sprinkled across town, supervised by heavily armed security forces, 
but it was as if no one was quite sure what to do next. He speculates that each side was fearful of 
leading the nation into the kind of open warfare then agitating Libya. As Anderson describes, 
there was a brief interlude that would come to precede the moment that would trigger what we 
know today as the Syrian Civil War. The Syrian Government, a loose alliance of Syrian Arab 
rebel groups, the Syrian Democratic Forces, Salafi jihadist groups (al-Nusra Front) and the 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), all receiving substantial support from foreign actors, 
would become a proxy war waged by both regional and global powers. The author describes, 
“The interlude ended abruptly on April 17, 2011. That evening, as reported by Al Jazeera, a 
small group of demonstrators, maybe 40 in all, were protesting outside a mosque in Homs when 
several cars stopped alongside them. A number of men clambered out of the cars - presumably 
either local plainclothes police officers or members of the largely Alawite shabiha  and 
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proceeded to shoot at least 25 protesters at point-blank range,” (Anderson). Anderson interviews 
Majd, who recounts these events in a brilliant narrative that describes the tens of thousands of 
demonstrators that gathered at the Clock Tower Square downtown, and this time, the police and 
shabiha took to the roofs and upper floors of the surrounding buildings to shoot down at them. 
“’That is when everything changed…Where before it was protests, from April 17 it was an 
uprising.” As protesters started to be killed almost every day, their funerals the next day became 
rallying points for more protesters to take to the streets; the evermore brutal response of the 
security forces at these gatherings then created a new round of shaheeds, or martyrs, ensuring 
greater crowds — and more killing — at the next funerals. By early May, the cycle of violence 
had escalated so swiftly that the Syrian Army came into Homs en masse, effectively shutting 
down the city. “Nobody trusted the local security forces,” Majd recalled, referring to the vast 
apparatus of mukhabarat and uniformed police who traditionally held sway in Syrian towns,” 
(Anderson). In addition to this turn of events, Anderson describes what he would argue to be one 
of the more baffling features of the Syrian civil war: the fantastic tangle of tacit ceasefires or 
temporary alliances that are often forged between various militias and the regime, or even with 
just a local army commander. He describes how these can organize themselves in various ways, 
with specific examples including radical Islamist political groups aligning with an Alawite 
shabiha gang, who pose a horrifying puzzle to anyone trying to navigate the battlefield, because 
it that no one is necessarily who they seem and that death can come from anywhere. He writes, 
“But this pattern of secret deal- making also served to long inoculate the Waer district from the 
scorched- earth tactics the Assad regime was employing elsewhere in Homs because, at any 
given time, at least some of the myriad rebel militias roaming the neighborhood were apt to be in 
secret concord with the state,” (Anderson). However, this dynamic of innumerable permutations 
ended in May 2013, capstoned by the Free Syrian Army moving back into the devastated Baba 
Amr neighborhood, and there had been surrounded and slaughtered. The few that escaped would 
run to Waer and nearly took total control of the enclave. In fact, the Syrian army artillery shells 
soon began raining down on Majd’s neighborhood. “While the scale of shelling was nothing like 
what befell Baba Amr or Khalidiya, it was enough to keep the Ibrahim family in their fourth-
floor apartment, forever trying to guess where safety lay,” (Anderson). While, again, it could 
hardly be argued that the events leading up to this catastrophe were directly prompted through 
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United States intervention, the connections between Syrian upheaval and United States meddling 
are clear. In this light, we see the United States has few to blame other than themselves. 
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Chapter 5 
Strategies for Diplomatic Engagement with Syria in the 21st Century 
 
 
 
 After outlining all three of these narratives in a historical discourse that highlights the 
United States’ short sighted policies towards the crucial future of Syria, and the way that these 
policies have fueled an inevitable rise of the Islamic State and similar Islamist political groups, 
our options for a civil engagement with Syria seem to be narrowing by the minute. 
Understanding the harrowing demise of Syria as a result of its close correlation with United 
States foreign policy is a brutal, yet necessary step towards understanding what is left to be done. 
Brown, author for the USC Center for Public Diplomacy  (CPD), takes on the unique challenge 
of scholarly research examining what we may learn as academics from our political faux pas in a 
way that informs discourse regarding Syrian relations for the better. Much like the previous 
literatures examined by this project, Brown believes that, “…The current crisis in Syria, initiated 
by a March 2011 uprising to oust President Bashar al-Assad and his Ba’athist regime, is 
descending into the valley of “the choice of the lesser of two evils,” but without a clear answer as 
to which evil United States policy makers should pursue,” (Brown, 27). He claims that in the 
beginning of the conflict, the choice was clear- supporting rebel groups would force al-Asad to 
step down from power and remove a key Iranian ally, thereby providing a counter balance to the 
arc of Iranian induced instability in the Levant, which was then a containment of Iran.  
“While it seemed that the removal of al-Assad would insure a limiting effect on Iran, the picture 
is now complicated by the gains of Islamist rebel groups with ties to al Qaeda. It is perhaps 
ironic that the Ba’athist regimes birthed by U.S. alienation of Syria in the early Cold War era, 
would have been responsible for repression of Islamist organizations that now threaten both the 
al- Assad government as well as U.S. interests in Syria and the greater Middle East region,” (27). 
He writes that while it is a stretch to consider the containment of Iran as anything close to an 
actual doctrinal component of United States policy, it is somewhat reflective of the overarching 
policy toward the Soviet Union that drove military and diplomatic decisions in 1957 and created 
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a similar sense of volatility in Syria, falling just short of open conflict. The author also describes 
that much of that uncertainty was driven by failure to adapt diplomatic efforts to counter the 
general attitude in the Cold War period in Syria, as he describes, “the throbbing heart of 
Arabism,” that there was no room for compromise on “what, in Syrian eyes, was the post-
colonial monstrosity known as Israel,” (Brown). He writes, “It was ‘The Arabists,’ as Robert 
Kaplan calls them, that were the appointed expert diplomats in Syria assigned to report on what 
was going on in their parcel of the world in order to inform policy choices. But history shows 
that the perceptions and opinions of these experts did not manifest in the policies of the United 
States, making it difficult if not impossible for the U.S. to communicate effectively in Syria in 
one-on-one diplomatic fashion or in a broader public diplomatic engagement,” (Brown, 28). It is 
here again that Brown shores up an oral history collected in 1978 by Charles Yost, a career 
diplomat who serviced in Syria, who explains that while the policy aimed at increasing 
opposition to Soviet influence in Arab nations, it was instead received with suspicion and 
hostility because it created a fear of United States covert interference exercised at will and all 
across the Middle East. Brown cites Yost’s expert opinion on the matter, which states that the 
doctrine was a mistake, and contended that even if it was not, it was at least not well messaged to 
Syrian leaders or their population. “He reflected on driving in his sedan through Syrian streets 
where people, upon seeing American flags on the car, would yell ‘Down with Eisenhower 
Doctrine.’ Yet Yost contends, they wouldn’t have really known what it was they were actually 
protesting. And with regard to an attempted CIA coup in August of 1957, Yost shared that the 
local station chief actually advised against it, yet nevertheless was told to execute it. The result 
was, as history has recorded in Yost’s explicit description, an ill-advised attempt at “clumsily 
getting into their domestic affairs” and conducting “more Cold War hanky panky than was 
justified and more than Ike would have preferred to initiate,” (Brown, 28). It is clear that so 
much of the animosity and turmoil we witness today in the Middle East is a result of the 
intrusion of United States foreign policy on Arab, and in this case study particularly Syrian 
affairs. While the situation is increasingly dire, Brown does offer some advice for United States 
policy with respect to Syria going forward in response to what relatively brief historical narrative 
we have as empirical evidence for policy formulation in the future. 
 While we have relatively little evidence of any foreign policy towards Syria as being 
positively received in the past by the Syrian people or its administration, we can glean a few 
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important points from the historical narratives explored within the last sixty years of active 
engagement in Syrian foreign relations. One of the most important of these lessons is to heed 
advice of area experts. “Current U.S. Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford is described by Kaplan as 
“straight out of the mold of Arabists going back decades: dealing with a new situation as he has 
found it, basing his judgments on considerable area and linguistic expertise.” Ford believes the 
U.S. strategic goals are to deny safe haven and access to chemical weapons for terrorist groups, 
and assure Syria is a source of stability in the region, and believes the only way to achieve this is 
through a politically negotiated transition,” (Brown). This type of initiative would, of course, 
require game-changing diplomatic engagement, though it would arguably save the United States 
years of armed conflict in the process and gain respect of regional allies lost during the 
Eisenhower era and beyond. The Obama and now Trump administration both navigate difficult 
choices, in dealing with the onset of a post-war period for the nation that has guided security 
strategies focused on more fiscally attainable and less active National Security Strategy, which 
may be likened to the New Look approach Eisenhower instituted in his first term in office. 
However, we are now dealing with a region that is much more unstable than it has been before, 
even with respect to the post-World War II Middle East, and this state is further complicated by 
the complexity of a non-state threat in al-Qaeda that Eisenhower did not have to consider. In 
acknowledging these factors, Brown outlines a few conventional paths. He defines these paths as 
[1] dealing with “the devil we know” and attempt to keep al-Asad in power, or [2] continue to 
adhere to a Middle East doctrine that would suggest a continued concern for the security of Israel 
in an Iranian influenced, Alawite run Syria. However, if we follow neither of these conventions, 
a new opportunity presents itself. Rather than relying solely in supporting the rebels in order to 
limit Iranian influence through al-Asad, or solely support the stability of al-Asad to counter al 
Qaeda influence, we instead rely on dialogue with the leaders of the region in a more holistic 
sense as suggested by Ambassador Ford. “Instability post-Arab Spring and increasing turmoil in 
neighboring Iraq suggest that there is no place for unilateral or thin-sliced approaches to the 
current Syrian conflict. A regional solution is in order that, while supportive of U.S. objectives, 
is not solely framed around U.S. objectives,” (Brown, 29). It seems as though there has already 
been some initiative taken by the United States in this new form of diplomacy. For example, 
throughout April 2013, the Obama administration held talks with leaders of Turkey, Jordan, 
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. “It seems that the historical lesson learned from the 1957 
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crisis in Syria is that those talks should not solely concentrate on security approaches to ending 
conflict and should not include only those four nations aligned with the United States. Instead, 
diplomatic outreach to Bashar al-Assad and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad should be 
part of a grand strategic approach addressing not only the optimal way to end conflict and re-
establish a stable and reformed Syrian government, but also the security of Israel and the 
influence of al Qaeda in the region,” (Brown, 29). The Trump administration, in contrast, has yet 
to outline any particular diplomatic initiative in the region with respect to Syria, but time will tell 
whether he heeds similar foreign policy advice, or chooses to follow one of the more 
conventional paths that fall short of a holistic approach to Syrian affairs. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions and Implications 
 
 
 
With these three narratives and their criticisms behind us, it is now time to look forward 
in the state of urgency Syria therein has found itself. The three narratives speak to a fascinating 
chapter of American history we seem reluctant to acknowledge: allowing Syria to become 
submissive to three waves of United States foreign policy with respect to the Arab world, these 
three chapters again outlined as [1] a Wilsonian state of state independence, [2] Soviet alienation 
and anti-communist proliferation, and [3] the war on terror, specifically radical Islamist violence, 
has led to its destabilization and ultimate deterioration as opposed to the prosperous state it 
discovered under the guidance of its Arab partners when the United States was able to take a step 
back from Syrian affairs. Finding this stability of course is a difficult task that grows increasingly 
difficult as Syria seems to be spiraling into a particularly dark and horrific abyss of violence and 
pain; however, the key in this case may truly lie in the opportunity to use the immense powers of 
the United States to be guided by our trusted regional allies. While the Syrian Crisis cannot be 
solved overnight or by any singular policy, we hold the potential to facilitate a mediated recovery 
if we allow ourselves to accept regional actors as an untapped potential in unlocking regional 
stability.  
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